e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特-第95节
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value。 Moreover； though the value equation has usually shown equities to be cheaper than bonds； that result is not inevitable： When bonds are calculated to be the more attractive investment； they should be bought。
根据这种现金流量折现的公式计算，投资人应该选择的是价钱最低的那一种投资，不论他的盈余变化大不大、营收有没有成长，与现在的盈余以及帐面价值差多少，虽然大部分的状况下，投资股票所算出来的价值会比债券要来多划算，但是这却不是绝对，要是当债券所算出来的价值高于股票，则投资人应该买的就是债券。
Leaving the question of price aside； the best business to own is one that over an extended period can employ large amounts of incremental capital at very high rates of return。 The worst business to own is one that must； or will； do the opposite … that is； consistently employ ever…greater amounts of capital at very low rates of return。 Unfortunately； the first type of business is very hard to find： Most high…return businesses need relatively little capital。 Shareholders of such a business usually will benefit if it pays out most of its earnings in dividends or makes significant stock repurchases。
今天先不管价格多少，最值得拥有的企业是那种在一段长的期间可以将大笔的资金运用在相当高报酬的投资上，最不值得拥有的企业是那种跟前面那个例子完全相反的，在一段长的期间将大笔的资金运用在相当低报酬的投资之上，不幸的是，第一类的企业可遇不可求，大部分拥有高报酬的企业都不需要太多的资金，这类企业的股东通常会因为公司发放大量的股利或是买回自家公司的股份而大大地受惠。
Though the mathematical calculations required to evaluate equities are not difficult； an analyst … even one who is experienced and intelligent … can easily go wrong in estimating future 〃coupons。〃 At Berkshire； we attempt to deal with this problem in two ways。 First； we try to stick to businesses we believe we understand。 That means they must be relatively simple and stable in character。 If a business is plex or subject to constant change； we're not smart enough to predict future cash flows。 Incidentally； that shorting doesn't bother us。 What counts for most people in investing is not how much they know； but rather how realistically they define what they don't know。 An investor needs to do very few things right as long as he or she avoids big mistakes。
虽然评估股权投资的数学计算式并不难，但是即使是一个经验老到、聪明过人的分析师，在估计未来年度票息时也很容易发生错误，在Berkshire我们试图以两种方法来解决这个问题，首先我们试着坚守在我们自认为了解的产业之上，这表示他们本身通常相当简单且稳定，如果企业很复杂而产业环境也一直在变，我们实在是没有足够的聪明才智去预测其未来的现金流量，碰巧的是，这个缺点一点也不会让我们感到困扰，就投资而言，人们应该注意的，不是他到底知道多少，而是应该注意自己到底有多少是不知道的，投资人不需要花太多时间去做对的事，只要他能够尽量避免去犯重大的错误。
Second； and equally important； we insist on a margin of safety in our purchase price。 If we calculate the value of a mon stock to be only slightly higher than its price； we're not interested in buying。 We believe this margin…of…safety principle； so strongly emphasized by Ben Graham； to be the cornerstone of investment success。
第二点一样很重要，那就是我们在买股票时，必须要坚持安全边际，若是我们所计算出来的价值只比其价格高一点，我们不会考虑买进，我们相信恩师葛拉罕十分强调的安全边际原则，是投资成功最关键的因素。
Fixed…Ine Securities固定收益证券
Below we list our largest holdings of fixed…ine securities：
下表是我们固定收益证券主要持有的部位：
（000s omitted） Cost of Preferreds andIssuer Amortized Value of Bonds Market
ACF Industries Debentures American Express 〃Percs〃 Champion International Conv。 Pfd。 First Empire State Conv。 Pfd Salomon Conv。 Pfd。 USAir Conv。 Pfd Washington Public Power Systems Bonds
133；065（1） 300；000 300；000（1） 40；000 700；000（1） 358；000（1） 58；768（1）
163；327 309；000（1）（2） 309；000（2） 68；000（1）（2） 756；000（2） 268；500（2） 81；002
（1） Carrying value in our financial statements （1）是指财务报表上的帐面价值
（2） Fair value as determined by Charlie and me （2）公平价值是由查理跟我来判断
During 1992 we added to our holdings of ACF debentures； had some of our WPPSS bonds called； and sold our RJR Nabisco position。
1992年我们增加了ACF债券的部位，另外华盛顿公用电力系统债券有部份被赎回，另外RJR Nabisco的部位则已出清。
Over the years； we've done well with fixed…ine investments； having realized from them both large capital gains （including 80 million in 1992） and exceptional current ine。 Chrysler Financial； Texaco； Time…Warner； WPPSS and RJR Nabisco were particularly good investments for us。 Meanwhile； our fixed…ine losses have been negligible： We've had thrills but so far no spills。
过去几年来，我们在固定收益证券的表现还不错，靠着他们不但实现了相当大量的资本利得（包含1992年的8；000万）与利息收益，克莱斯勒、Texaco、时代华纳、WPPSS与RJR Nabisco都是相当好的投资，另一方面发生损失的部份也相当少，虽然过程一度紧张但幸好最后并没有搞砸。
Despite the success we experienced with our Gillette preferred； which converted to mon stock in 1991； and despite our reasonable results with other negotiated purchases of preferreds； our overall performance with such purchases has been inferior to that we have achieved with purchases made in the secondary market。 This is actually the result we expected。 It corresponds with our belief that an intelligent investor in mon stocks will do better in the secondary market than he will do buying new issues。
虽然我们在吉列特别股的投资还算是成功（在1991年转换为普通股），但整体而言，这类协议谈判所取得的特别股投资的绩效还是略逊于从次级市场所取得的投资，不过这种结果我们早已预期到，这与我们相信一个智能型的投资人在次级流通市场的表现会比初级发行市场来的好的道理是相同的。
The reason has to do with the way prices are set in each instance。 The secondary market； which is periodically ruled by mass folly； is constantly setting a 〃clearing〃 price。 No matter how foolish that price may be； it's what counts for the holder of a stock or bond who needs or wishes to sell； of whom there are always going to be a few at any moment。 In many instances； shares worth xin business value have sold in the market for 1/2x or less。
原因与当初设定价格的方式有关，次级市场时常受惠于群众愚蠢的心理所影响，总是会有一个重新设定的全新价格，不管价格是多么的离谱，那都是代表该股票或债券的持有人想要出脱的价格，不论何时总会有一小部份的股东会有这种念头，在很多的情况下，一家具有X价值的股票往往以不到一半半数，也就是1/2X的价格求售。
The new…issue market； on the other hand； is ruled by controlling stockholders and corporations； who can usually select the timing of offerings or； if the market looks unfavorable； can avoid an offering altogether。 Understandably； these sellers are not going to offer any bargains； either by way of a public offering or in a negotiated transaction： It's rare you'll find x for1/2x here。 Indeed； in the case of mon…stock offerings； selling shareholders are often motivated to unload only when they feel the market is overpaying。 （These sellers； of course； would state that proposition somewhat differently； averring instead that they simply resist selling when the market is underpaying for their goods。）
至于初级发行市场则受到发行公司与大股东所掌控，通常会选择对他们最有利的时点发行，当市场状况不理想的时候，甚至会避开发行，可以理解的是，卖方不太可能让你有任何便宜可占，不管是透过公开发行或私下协议的方式都一样，你不可能以一半的价格买到你想要的东西，尤其是在发行普通股时，原有股东惟有在他们认为市场价格明显过高时，才有可能大幅出脱其持股，（这些卖方当然会换另外一种说词，强调如果市场过于低估其股份时，他们是不可能贱价出售的）。
To date； our negotiated purchases； as a group； have fulfilled but not exceeded the expectation we set forth in our 1989 Annual Report： 〃Our preferred stock investments should produce returns modestly above those achieved by most fixed…ine portfolios。〃 In truth； we would have done better if we could have put the money that went into our negotiated transactions into open…market purchases of the type we like。 But both our size and the general strength of the markets made that difficult to do。
到目前为止，我们透过协议所作的投资，算是勉强达到我们在1989年年报所作的预期，这些特别股投资应该可以产生比一般固定收益债券还好一点的报酬，不可讳言若是我们当初不是透过协议而是直接在公开市场上买进类似的投资的话，我们的表现可能会更好，只是考量到我们的规模太大与市场的状况，这样的做法在执行上有其困难度。
There was one other memorable line in the 1989 Annual Report： 〃We have no ability to forecast the economics of the investment banking business； the airline industry； or the paper industry。〃 At the time some of you may have doubted this confession of ignorance。 Now； however； even my mother acknowledges its truth。
1989年报还有一段相当令人怀念的话，〃我们没有能力去预测投资银行业、航空业或是造纸业的前景〃，在当时或许有很多人怀疑我们这样公开的承认有点无知，不过到如今，连我的母亲都不得不承认这项事实。
In the case of our mitment to USAir； industry economics had soured before the ink dried on our check。 As I've previously mentioned； it was I who happily jumped into the pool； no one pushed me。 Yes； I knew the industry would be ruggedly petitive； but I did not expect its leaders to engage in prolonged kamikaze behavior。 In the last two years； airline panies have acted as if they are members of a petitive tontine； which they wish to bring to its conclusion as rapidly as possible。
就像我们在美国航空的投资，在我们签发支票的墨水还没干之前，产业情况就已经开始�
