战争与和平(下)-第26节

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erstand　how　and　by　what　the　way　was　paved　for　his　activity。　If　we　have　a　large　range　of　experiments；　if　our　observation　is　continually　directed　to　seeking　correlations　in　men’s　actions　between　causes　and　effects；　their　actions　will　seem　to　us　more　necessary　and　less　free；　the　more　accurately　we　connect　causes　and　effects。　If　the　actions　investigated　are　simple；　and　we　have　had　a　vast　number　of　such　actions　under　observation；　our　conception　of　their　inevitability　will　be　even　more　complete。　The　dishonest　conduct　of　the　son　of　a　dishonest　father；　the　misbehaviour　of　women；　who　have　been　led　into　certain　surroundings；　the　relapse　of　the　reformed　drunkard　into　drunkenness；　and　so　on；　are　instances　of　conduct　which　seem　to　us　to　be　less　free　the　better　we　understand　their　cause。　If　the　man　himself　whose　conduct　we　are　examining　is　on　the　lowest　stage　of　mental　development；　like　a　child；　a　mad…man；　or　a　simpleton；　then　when　we　know　the　causes　of　the　act　and　the　simplicity　of　the　character　and　intelligence；　we　see　so　great　an　element　of　necessity；　and　so　little　free　will；　that　we　can　foretell　the　act　that　will　follow；　as　soon　as　we　know　the　cause　bound　to　bring　it　forth。
In　all　legislative　codes　the　exoneration　of　crime　or　admission　of　mitigating　circumstances　rests　only　on　those　three　classes　of　consideration。　The　guilt　is　conceived　as　greater　or　less　according　to　the　greater　or　lesser　knowledge　of　the　conditions　in　which　the　man　judged　is　placed；　the　greater　or　less　interval　of　time　between　the　perpetration　of　the　crime　and　the　judgment　of　it；　and　the　greater　or　less　comprehension　of　the　causes　that　led　to　the　act。


Chapter　10
AND　THUS　our　conception　of　free　will　and　necessity　is　gradually　diminished　or　increased　according　to　the　degree　of　connection　with　the　external　world；　the　degree　of　remoteness　in　time；　and　the　degree　of　dependence　on　causes　which　we　see　in　the　phenomenon　of　man’s　life　that　we　examine。　So　that　if　we　examine　the　case　of　a　man　in　which　the　connection　with　the　external　world　is　better　known；　the　interval　of　time　between　the　examination　and　the　act　greater；　and　the　causes　of　the　action　easier　to　comprehend；　we　form　a　conception　of　a　greater　element　of　necessity　and　less　free　will。　If　we　examine　a　man　in　a　less　close　dependence　on　external　conditions；　if　his　action　is　committed　at　a　moment　nearer　the　present；　and　the　causes　leading　him　to　it　are　beyond　our　ken；　we　form　a　conception　of　a　less　element　of　necessity　and　a　greater　element　of　free　will　in　his　action。
But　in　neither　case；　however　we　shift　our　point　of　view；　however　clear　we　make　to　ourselves　the　connection　in　which　the　man　is　placed　with　the　external　world；　or　however　fully　comprehensible　it　may　appear　to　us；　however　long　or　short　a　period　of　time　we　select；　however　explicable　or　unfathomable　the　causes　of　the　act　may　be　to　us；　we　can　never　conceive　of　complete　free　will；　nor　of　complete　necessity　in　any　action。
1。　However　carefully　we　imagine　a　man　excluded　from　the　influence　of　the　external　world；　we　can　never　form　a　conception　of　freedom　in　space。　Every　act　of　man’s　is　inevitably　limited　by　what　surrounds　him　and　by　his　own　body。　I　raise　my　arm　and　let　it　fall。　My　action　seems　to　me　free；　but　asking　myself　could　I　raise　my　arm　in　any　direction；　I　see　that　I　moved　it　in　the　direction　in　which　there　was　least　hindrance　to　the　action　arising　from　bodies　around　me　or　from　the　construction　of　my　own　body。　I　chose　one　out　of　all　the　possible　directions；　because　in　that　direction　I　met　with　least　hindrance。　For　my　action　to　be　entirely　free；　it　would　have　to　meet　with　no　hindrance　in　any　direction。　To　conceive　a　man　quite　free；　we　have　to　conceive　him　outside　of　space；　which　is　obviously　impossible。
2。　However　near　we　bring　the　time　of　criticism　to　the　time　of　action；　we　can　never　form　a　conception　of　freedom　in　time。　For　if　I　examine　an　act　committed　a　second　ago；　I　must　still　recognise　that　it　is　not　free；　since　the　act　is　irrevocably　linked　to　the　moment　at　which　it　was　committed。　Can　I　lift　my　arm？　I　lift　it；　but　I　ask　myself：　Could　I　not　have　lifted　my　arm　in　that　moment　of　time　that　has　just　passed？　To　convince　myself　of　that；　I　do　not　lift　my　arm　the　next　moment。　But　I　am　not　abstaining　from　lifting　it　that　first　moment　of　which　I　asked　myself　the　question。　The　time　has　gone　by　and　to　detain　it　was　not　in　my　power；　and　the　hand　which　I　then　raised　and　the　air　in　which　I　raised　it　are　not　the　same　as　the　hand　I　do　not　raise　now　or　the　air　in　which　I　do　not　now　raise　it。　The　moment　in　which　the　first　movement　took　place　is　irrevocable；　and　in　that　moment　I　could　only　perform　one　action；　and　whatever　movement　I　had　made；　that　movement　could　have　been　the　only　one。　The　fact　that　the　following　moment　I　abstained　from　lifting　my　arm　did　not　prove　that　I　could　have　abstained　from　lifting　it。　And　since　my　movement　could　only　be　one　in　one　moment　of　time；　it　could　have　been　no　other。　To　conceive　it　to　oneself　as　free；　one　must　conceive　it　in　the　present　on　the　boundary　between　the　past　and　the　future；　that　is；　outside　time；　which　is　impossible。
3。　However　we　increase　the　degree　of　difficulty　of　comprehending　the　causes　of　the　act；　we　never　reach　a　conception　of　complete　free　will；　that　is；　absolute　absence　of　cause。　Though　the　cause　of　the　expression　of　will　in　any　act　of　our　own　or　another’s　may　be　beyond　our　ken；　it　is　the　first　impulse　of　the　intellect　to　presuppose　and　seek　a　cause；　without　which　no　phenomenon　is　conceivable。　I　raise　my　arm　in　order　to　perform　an　act　independent　of　any　cause；　but　the　fact　that　I　want　to　perform　an　act　independent　of　any　cause　is　the　cause　of　my　action。
But　even　if　by　conceiving　a　man　entirely　excluded　from　external　influence；　and　exercising　only　a　momentary　act　in　the　present；　not　called　forth　by　any　cause；　we　were　to　reduce　the　element　of　necessity　to　an　infinitesimal　minimum　equivalent　to　nil；　we　should　even　then　not　have　reached　a　conception　of　complete　free　will　in　a　man；　for　a　creature；　uninfluenced　by　the　external　world；　outside　of　time；　and　independent　of　cause；　is　no　longer　a　man。
In　the　same　way　we　can　never　conceive　a　human　action　subject　only　to　necessity　without　any　element　of　free　will。
1。　However　we　increase　our　knowledge　of　the　conditions　of　space　in　which　a　man　is　placed；　that　knowledge　can　never　be　complete　since　the　number　of　these　conditions　is　infinitely　great；　seeing　that　space　is　in　finite。　And　so　long　as　not　all　the　conditions　that　may　influence　a　man　are　defined；　the　circle　of　necessity　is　not　complete；　and　there　is　still　a　loophole　for　free　will。
2。　Though　we　may　make　the　period　of　time　intervening　between　an　act　and　our　criticism　of　it　as　long　as　we　choose；　that　period　will　be　finite；　and　time　is　infinite；　and　so　in　this　respect　too　the　circle　of　necessity　is　not　complete。
3。　However　easy　the　chain　of　causation　of　any　act　may　be　to　grasp；　we　shall　never　know　the　whole　chain；　since　it　is　endless；　and　so　again　we　cannot　attain　absolute　necessity。
But　apart　from　that；　even　if；　reducing　the　minimum　of　free　will　till　it　is　equivalent　to　nil；　we　were　to　admit　in　some　case—as；　for　instance；　that　of　a　dying　man；　an　unborn　babe；　an　idiot—a　complete　absence　of　free　will；　we　should　in　so　doing　have　destroyed　the　very　conception　of　man；　in　the　case　we　are　examining；　since　as　soon　as　there　is　no　free　will；　there　is　no　man。　And　therefore　the　conception　of　the　action　of　a　man　subject　only　to　the　law　of　necessity；　without　the　smallest　element　of　free　will；　is　as　impossible　as　the　conception　of　a　completely　free　human　action。
Thus　to　conceive　a　human　action　subject　only　to　the　law　of　necessity　without　free　will；　we　must　assume　a　knowledge　of　an　infinite　number　of　conditions　in　space；　an　infinitely　long　period　of　time；　and　an　infinite　chain　of　causation。
To　conceive　a　man　perfectly　free；　not　subject　to　the　law　of　necessity；　we　must　conceive　a　man　outside　of　space；　outside　of　time；　and　free　from　all　dependence　on　cause。
In　the　first　case；　if　necessity　were　possible　without　free　will；　we　should　be　brought　to　a　definition　of　the　laws　of　necessity　in　the　terms　of　the　same　necessity；　that　is；　to　mere　form　without　content。
In　the　second　case；　if　free　will　were　possible　without　necessity；　we　should　come　to　unconditioned　free　will　outside　of　space；　and　time　and　cause；　which　by　the　fact　of　its　being　unconditioned　and　unlimited　would　be　nothing　else　than　content　without　form。
We　should　be　brought　in　fact　to　these　two　fundamental　elements；　of　which　man’s　whole　cosmic　conception　is　made　up—the　incomprehensible　essence　of　life　and　the　laws　that　give　form　to　that　essence。
Reason　says：　1。　space　with　all　the　forms　given　it　by　its　visibility—matter—is　infinite；　and　is　not　thinkable　otherwise。
2。　Time　is　infinite　movement　without　one　moment　of　rest；　and　it　is　not　otherwise　thinkable。
3。　The　connection　of　cause　and　effect　has　no　beginning；　and　can　have　no　end。
Consciousness　says：　1。　I　alone　am；　and　all　that　exists　is　only　I；　consequently　I　include　space。
2。　I　measure　moving　time　by　the　unchanging　moment　of　the　present；　in　which　alone　I　am　conscious　of　myself　living；　consequently　I　am　outside　of　time；　and
3。　I　am　outside　of　cause；　since　I　feel　myself　the　cause　of　every　phenomenon　of　my　life。
Reason　gives　expre