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m　the　definition　of　the　ideas　of　free　will　and　necessity　from　the　immense　multitude　of　phenomena　in　her　domain　that　are　always　dependent　on　those　two　elements。
Whatever　presentation　of　the　activity　of　one　man　or　of　several　persons　we　examine；　we　always　regard　it　as　the　product　partly　of　that　man　or　men’s　free　will；　partly　of　the　laws　of　necessity。
Whether　we　are　discussing　the　migrations　of　peoples　and　the　inroads　of　barbarians；　or　the　government　of　Napoleon　III。；　or　the　action　of　some　man　an　hour　ago　in　selecting　one　direction　for　his　walk　out　of　several；　we　see　nothing　contradictory　in　it。　The　proportion　of　freedom　and　necessity　guiding　the　actions　of　those　men　is　clearly　defined　for　us。
Very　often　our　conception　of　a　greater　or　less　degree　of　freedom　differs　according　to　the　different　points　of　view　from　which　we　regard　the　phenomenon。
But　every　human　action　is　always　alike　conceived　by　us　as　a　certain　combination　of　free　will　and　necessity。
In　every　action　we　investigate；　we　see　a　certain　proportion　of　freedom　and　a　certain　proportion　of　necessity。　And　whatever　action　we　investigate；　the　more　necessity　we　see；　the　less　freedom；　and　the　more　freedom；　the　less　necessity。
The　proportion　of　freedom　to　necessity　is　decreased　or　increased；　according　to　the　point　of　view　from　which　the　act　is　regarded；　but　there　always　remains　an　inverse　ratio　between　them。
A　drowning　man　clutching　at　another　and　drowning　him；　or　a　hungry　mother　starved　by　suckling　her　baby　and　stealing　food；　or　a　man　trained　to　discipline　who　at　the　word　of　command　kills　a　defenceless　man；　all　seem　less　guilty—that　is；　less　free　and　more　subject　to　the　law　of　necessity　to　one　who　knows　the　circumstances　in　which　they　are　placed；　and　more　free　to　one　who　did　not　know　that　the　man　was　himself　drowning；　that　the　mother　was　starving；　that　the　soldier　was　on　duty；　and　so　on。　In　the　same　way　a　man　who　has　twenty　years　ago　committed　a　murder　and　afterwards　has　gone　on　living　calmly　and　innocently　in　society　seems　less　guilty；　and　his　acts　seem　more　subject　to　the　law　of　necessity；　to　one　who　looks　at　his　act　after　the　lapse　of　twenty　years　than　to　one　looking　at　the　same　act　the　day　after　it　was　perpetrated。　And　just　in　the　same　way　the　act　of　a　madman；　a　drunkard；　or　a　man　labouring　under　violent　excitement　seems　less　free　and　more　inevitable　to　one　who　knows　the　mental　condition　of　the　man　who　performed　the　action；　and　more　free　and　less　inevitable　to　one　who　does　not　know　it。　In　all　such　cases　the　conception　of　freedom　is　increased　or　diminished；　and　that　of　necessity　correspondingly　diminished　or　increased；　according　to　the　point　of　view　from　which　the　action　is　regarded。　So　that　the　more　necessity　is　seen　in　it　the　less　freedom。　And　vice　versa。
Religion；　the　common…sense　of　humanity；　the　science　of　law；　and　history　itself　understand　this　relation　between　necessity　and　free　will。
All　cases；　without　exception；　in　which　our　conception　of　free　will　and　necessity　varies　depend　on　three　considerations：
1。　The　relation　of　the　man　committing　the　act　to　the　external　world。
2。　His　relation　to　time。
3。　His　relation　to　the　causes　leading　to　the　act。
In　the　first　case　the　variation　depends　on　the　degree　to　which　we　see　the　man’s　relation　to　the　external　world；　on　the　more　or　less　clear　idea　we　form　of　the　definite　position　occupied　by　the　man　in　relation　to　everything　co…existing　with　him。　It　is　this　class　of　considerations　that　makes　it　obvious　to　us　that　the　drowning　man　is　less　free　and　more　subject　to　necessity　than　a　man　standing　on　dry　ground；　and　that　makes　the　actions　of　a　man　living　in　close　connection　with　other　people　in　a　thickly　populated　district；　bound　by　ties　of　family；　official　duties；　or　business　undertaking；　seem　undoubtedly　less　free　than　those　of　a　man　living　in　solitude　and　seclusion。
If　we　examine　a　man　alone；　apart　from　his　relations　to　everything　around　him；　every　action　of　his　seems　free　to　us。　But　if　we　see　any　relation　of　his　to　anything　surrounding；　if　we　perceive　any　connection　between　him　and　anything　else；　a　man　speaking　to　him；　a　book　read　by　him；　the　work　he　is　employed　in；　even　the　air　he　breathes；　or　the　light　that　falls　on　the　objects　around　him；　we　perceive　that　every　one　of　those　circumstances　has　its　influence　on　him；　and　controls　at　least　one　side　of　his　activity。　And　the　more　we　perceive　of　those　influences；　the　smaller　the　idea　we　form　of　his　freedom；　and　the　greater　our　conception　of　the　necessity　to　which　he　is　subject。
2。　The　second　cause　of　variation　is　due　to　the　degree　of　distinctness　with　which　the　man’s　position　in　time　is　perceived；　the　clearness　of　the　notion　formed　by　us　of　the　place　the　man’s　action　fills　in　time。　It　is　owing　to　this　class　of　considerations　that　the　fall　of　the　first　man；　leading　to　the　origin　of　the　human　race；　seems　to　us　obviously　less　free　than　the　marriage　of　any　one　of　our　contemporaries。　It　is　owing　to　this　class　of　considerations　that　the　life　and　acts　of　men　who　lived　years　ago　cannot　seem　to　me　as　free　as　the　life　of　my　contemporaries；　the　consequences　of　whose　acts　are　still　unknown　to　me。
The　variation　in　our　conception　of　free　will　in　this　connection　depends　on　the　interval　of　time　that　has　elapsed　between　the　action　and　our　criticism　of　it。
If　I　examine　an　act　I　have　committed　a　moment　ago　in　approximately　the　same　circumstances　as　I　am　placed　in　now；　my　act　appears　to　me　indubitably　free。　But　if　I　examine　an　act　I　have　committed　a　month　ago；　then　being　placed　in　other　circumstances；　I　cannot　help　recognising　that　had　not　that　act　been　committed；　much　that　is　good　and　agreeable；　and　even　inevitable；　resulting　from　that　act；　could　not　have　taken　place。　If　I　reflect　on　a　still　more　remote　action；　performed　ten　years　or　more　ago；　the　consequences　of　my　act　are　even　plainer　to　me；　and　it　will　be　difficult　for　me　to　conceive　what　would　have　happened　if　that　action　had　not　taken　place。　The　further　back　I　go　in　my　reminiscences；　or　what　is　the　same　thing；　the　further　forward　in　my　criticism　of　them；　the　more　doubtful　becomes　my　view　of　the　freedom　of　my　action。
We　find　precisely　the　same　ratio　of　variation　in　our　views　of　the　element　of　free　will　in　the　general　affairs　of　men　in　history。　A　contemporary　event　we　conceive　of　as　undoubtedly　the　doing　of　all　the　men　we　know　of　concerned　in　it。　But　with　a　more　remote　event；　we　see　its　inevitable　consequences；　which　prevent　our　conceiving　of　anything　else　as　possible。　And　the　further　back　we　go　in　the　examination　of　events；　the　less　arbitrary　they　seem　to　us。
The　Austro…Prussian　war　appears　to　us　to　be　undoubtedly　the　result　of　the　crafty　acts　of　Bismarck　and　so　on。
The　Napoleonic　wars；　though　more　doubtful；　appear　to　us　the　effect　of　the　free　will　of　the　leading　heroes　of　those　wars。　But　in　the　Crusades　we　see　an　event；　filling　its　definite　place　in　history；　without　which　the　modern　history　of　Europe　is　inconceivable；　although　to　the　chroniclers　of　the　Crusades；　those　events　appeared　simply　due　to　the　will　of　a　few　persons。　In　the　migrations　of　peoples　it　never　occurs　to　any　one　now　that　the　renewal　of　the　European　world　depended　on　a　caprice　of　Attila’s。　The　more　remote　in　history　the　subject　of　our　observations；　the　more　doubtful　we　feel　of　the　free　will　of　the　persons　concerned　in　the　event；　and　the　more　obvious　is　the　law　of　necessity　in　it。
3。　The　third　element　influencing　our　judgment　is　the　degree　to　which　we　can　apprehend　that　endless　chain　of　causation　demanded　by　the　reason；　in　which　every　phenomenon　comprehended；　and　so　every　act　of　man；　must　have　its　definite　place；　as　a　result　of　past　and　a　cause　of　future　acts。
This　is　the　element　that　causes　our　acts　and　those　of　others　to　appear　to　us　on　one　side　more　free　the　less　we　know　of　the　physiological；　psychological；　and　historical　laws　deduced　from　observation；　and　the　less　thoroughly　the　physiological；　psychological；　or　historical　cause　of　the　act　has　been　investigated　by　us；　and　on　the　other　hand　the　less　simple　the　act　observed　and　the　less　complex　the　character　and　mind　of　the　man　whose　action　we　are　examining。
When　we　have　absolutely　no　understanding　of　the　causes　of　an　action—whether　vicious　or　virtuous　or　simply　non…moral—we　ascribe　a　greater　element　of　free　will　to　it。　In　the　case　of　a　crime；　we　are　more　urgent　in　demanding　punishment　for　the　act；　in　the　case　of　a　virtuous　act；　we　are　warmer　in　our　appreciation　of　its　merits。　In　cases　of　no　moral　bearing；　we　recognise　more　individuality；　originality；　and　independence　in　it。　But　if　only　one　of　the　innumerable　causes　of　the　act　is　known　to　us；　we　recognise　a　certain　element　of　necessity；　and　are　less　ready　to　exact　punishment　for　the　crime；　to　acknowledge　merit　in　the　virtuous　act；　or　freedom　in　the　apparent　originality。　The　fact　that　the　criminal　was　reared　in　vicious　surroundings　softens　his　fault　in　our　eyes。　The　self…sacrifice　of　a　father；　of　a　mother；　or　self…sacrifice　with　the　possibility　of　reward　is　more　comprehensible　than　gratuitous　self…sacrifice；　and　so　is　regarded　by　us　as　less　deserving　of　sympathy　and　less　the　work　of　free　will。　The　founder　of　a　sect；　of　a　party；　or　the　inventor　impresses　us　less　when　we　understand　how　and　by　what　the　way　was　paved　for　his　activity。　If　we　have　a　large　range　of　experiments；