战争与和平(下)-第24节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


This　consciousness　is　a　source　of　self…knowledge　utterly　apart　and　independent　of　reason。　Through　reason　man　observes　himself；　but　he　knows　himself　only　through　consciousness。
Apart　from　consciousness　of　self；　any　observation　and　application　of　reason　is　inconceivable。
To　understand；　to　observe；　to　draw　conclusions；　a　man　must　first　of　all　be　conscious　of　himself　as　living。　A　man　knows　himself　as　living；　not　otherwise　than　as　willing；　that　is；　he　is　conscious　of　his　free　will。　Man　is　conscious　of　his　will　as　constituting　the　essence　of　his　life；　and　he　cannot　be　conscious　of　it　except　as　free。
If　subjecting　himself　to　his　own　observation；　a　man　perceives　that　his　will　is　always　controlled　by　the　same　law　（whether　he　observes　the　necessity　of　taking　food；　or　of　exercising　his　brain；　or　anything　else）；　he　cannot　regard　this　never…varying　direction　of　his　will　otherwise　than　as　a　limitation　of　it。　If　it　were　not　free；　it　could　not　be　limited。　A　man’s　will　seems　to　him　to　be　limited　just　because　he　is　not　conscious　of　it　except　as　free。　You　say：　I　am　not　free。　But　I　have　lifted　and　dropped　my　hand。　Everybody　understands　that　this　illogical　reply　is　an　irrefutable　proof　of　freedom。
This　reply　is　an　expression　of　a　consciousness　not　subject　to　reason。
If　the　consciousness　of　freedom　were　not　a　separate　source　of　self…knowledge　apart　from　reason；　it　would　be　controlled　by　reasoning　and　experience。　But　in　reality　such　control　never　exists；　and　is　inconceivable。
A　series　of　experiments　and　arguments　prove　to　every　man　that　he；　as　an　object　of　observation；　is　subject　to　certain　laws；　and　the　man　submits　to　them；　and　never；　after　they　have　once　been　pointed　out　to　him；　controverts　the　law　of　gravity　or　of　impenetrability。　But　the　same　series　of　experiments　and　arguments　proves　to　him　that　the　complete　freedom　of　which　he　is　conscious　in　himself　is　impossible；　that　every　action　of　his　depends　on　his　organisation；　on　his　character；　and　the　motives　acting　on　him。　But　man　never　submits　to　the　deductions　of　these　experiments　and　arguments。
Learning　from　experience　and　from　reasoning　that　a　stone　falls　to　the　ground；　a　man　unhesitatingly　believes　this；　and　in　all　cases　expects　the　law　he　has　learnt　to　be　carried　out。
But　learning　just　as　incontestably　that　his　will　is　subject　to　laws；　he　does　not；　and　cannot；　believe　it。
However　often　experience　and　reasoning　show　a　man　that　in　the　same　circumstances；　with　the　same　character；　he　does　the　same　thing　as　before；　yet　on　being　led　the　thousandth　time　in　the　same　circumstances；　with　the　same　character；　to　an　action　that　always　ends　in　the　same　way；　he　feels　just　as　unhesitatingly　convinced　that　he　can　act　as　he　chooses；　as　ever。　Every　man；　savage　and　sage　alike；　however　incontestably　reason　and　experience　may　prove　to　him　that　it　is　impossible　to　imagine　two　different　courses　of　action　under　precisely　the　same　circumstances；　yet　feels　that　without　this　meaningless　conception　（which　constitutes　the　essence　of　freedom）　he　cannot　conceive　of　life。　He　feels　that　however　impossible　it　may　be；　it　is　so；　seeing　that；　without　that　conception　of　freedom；　he　would　be　not　only　unable　to　understand　life；　but　could　not　live　for　a　single　instant。
He　could　not　live　because　all　men’s　instincts；　all　their　impulses　in　life；　are　only　efforts　to　increase　their　freedom。　Wealth　and　poverty；　health　and　disease；　culture　and　ignorance；　labour　and　leisure；　repletion　and　hunger；　virtue　and　vice；　are　all　only　terms　for　greater　or　less　degrees　of　freedom。
To　conceive　a　man　having　no　freedom　is　impossible　except　as　a　man　deprived　of　life。
If　the　idea　of　freedom　appears　to　the　reason　a　meaningless　contradiction；　like　the　possibility　of　doing　two　actions　at　a　single　moment　of　time；　or　the　possibility　of　an　effect　without　a　cause；　that　only　proves　that　consciousness　is　not　subject　to　reason。
That　unwavering；　irrefutable　consciousness　of　freedom；　not　influenced　by　experience　and　argument；　recognised　by　all　thinkers；　and　felt　by　all　men　without　exception；　that　consciousness　without　which　no　conception　of　man　is　reliable；　constitutes　the　other　side　of　the　question。
Man　is　the　creation　of　an　Almighty；　All…good；　and　All…wise　God。　What　is　sin；　the　conception　of　which　follows　from　man’s　consciousness　of　freedom？　That　is　the　question　of　theology。
Men’s　actions　are　subject　to　general　and　invariable　laws；　expressed　in　statistics。　What　is　man’s　responsibility　to　society；　the　conception　of　which　follows　from　his　consciousness　of　freedom？　That　is　the　question　of　jurisprudence。
A　man’s　actions　follow　from　his　innate　character　and　the　motives　acting　on　him。　What　is　conscience　and　the　sense　of　right　and　wrong　in　action　that　follows　from　the　consciousness　of　freedom？　That　is　the　question　of　ethics。
Man　in　connection　with　the　general　life　of　humanity　is　conceived　as　governed　by　the　laws　that　determine　that　life。　But　the　same　man；　apart　from　that　connection；　is　conceived　of　as　free。　How　is　the　past　life　of　nations　and　of　humanity　to　be　regarded—as　the　product　of　the　free　or　not　free　action　of　men？　That　is　the　question　of　history。
Only　in　our　conceited　age　of　the　popularisation　of　knowledge；　thanks　to　the　most　powerful　weapon　of　ignorance—the　diffusion　of　printed　matter—the　question　of　the　freedom　of　the　will　has　been　put　on　a　level；　on　which　it　can　no　longer　be　the　same　question。　In　our　day　the　majority　of　so…called　advanced　people—that　is；　a　mob　of　ignoramuses—have　accepted　the　result　of　the　researches　of　natural　science；　which　is　occupied　with　one　side　only　of　the　question；　for　the　solution　of　the　whole　question。
There　is　no　soul　and　no　free　will；　because　the　life　of　man　is　expressed　in　muscular　movements；　and　muscular　movements　are　conditioned　by　nervous　activity。　There　is　no　soul　and　no　free　will；　because　at　some　unknown　period　of　time　we　came　from　apes；　they　say；　and　write；　and　print。　Not　at　all　suspecting　that　thousands　of　years　ago　all　religions　and　all　thinkers　have　admitted—have　never；　in　fact；　denied—that　same　law　of　necessity；　which　they　are　now　so　strenuously　trying　to　prove　by　physiology　and　comparative　zoology。　They　do　not　see　that　natural　science　can　do　no　more　in　this　question　than　serve　to　illumine　one　side　of　it。　The　fact　that；　from　the　point　of　view　of　observation；　the　reason　and　the　will　are　but　secretions　of　the　brain；　and　that　man；　following　the　general　law　of　development；　may　have　developed　from　lower　animals　at　some　unknown　period　of　time；　only　illustrates　in　a　new　aspect　the　truth；　recognised　thousands　of　years　ago　by　all　religious　and　philosophic　theories；　that　man　is　subject　to　the　laws　of　necessity。　It　does　not　advance　one　hair’s…breadth　the　solution　of　the　question；　which　has　another　opposite　side；　founded　on　the　consciousness　of　freedom。
If　men　have　descended　from　apes　at　an　unknown　period　of　time；　that　is　as　comprehensible　as　that　they　were　fabricated　out　of　a　clod　of　earth　at　a　known　period　of　time　（in　the　one　case　the　date　is　the　unknown　quantity；　in　the　other　the　method　of　fabrication）；　and　the　question　how　to　reconcile　man’s　consciousness　of　free　will　with　the　law　of　necessity　to　which　he　is　subject　cannot　be　solved　by　physiology　and　zoology；　seeing　that　in　the　frog；　the　rabbit；　and　the　monkey　we　can　observe　only　muscular　and　nervous　activity；　while　in　man　we　find　muscular　and　nervous　activity　plus　consciousness。
The　scientific　men　and　their　disciples　who　suppose　they　are　solving　this　question　are　like　plasterers　set　to　plaster　one　side　of　a　church　wall；　who；　in　the　absence　of　the　chief　superintendent　of　their　work；　should　in　the　excess　of　their　zeal　plaster　over　the　windows；　and　the　holy　images；　and　the　woodwork；　and　the　scaffolding；　and　rejoice　that　from　the　plasterers’　point　of　view　everything　was　now　so　smooth　and　even。


Chapter　9
THE　QUESTION　of　free　will　and　necessity　holds　a　position　in　history　different　from　its　place　in　other　branches　of　knowledge；　because　in　history；　the　question　relates；　not　to　the　essential　nature　of　the　will　of　man；　but　to　the　representation　of　the　manifestations　of　that　will　in　the　past　and　under　certain　conditions。
History；　in　regard　to　the　solution　of　this　question；　stands　to　the　other　sciences　in　the　position　of　an　experimental　science　to　speculative　sciences。
The　subject　of　history　is　not　the　will　of　man；　but　our　representation　of　its　action。
And　so　the　insoluble　mystery　of　the　union　of　the　two　antinomies　of　freedom　and　necessity　does　not　exist　for　history　as　it　does　for　theology；　ethics；　and　philosophy。　History　deals　with　the　representation　of　the　life　of　man；　in　which　the　union　of　those　two　antinomies　is　accomplished。
In　actual　life　every　historical　event；　every　human　action；　is　quite　clearly　and　definitely　understood；　without　a　sense　of　the　slightest　contradiction　in　it；　although　every　event　is　conceived　of　partly　as　free；　and　partly　as　necessary。
To　solve　the　problem　of　combining　freedom　and　necessity　and　the　question　what　constitutes　the　essence　of　those　two　conceptions；　the　philosophy　of　history　can　and　ought　to　go　to　work　in　a　direction　opposite　to　that　taken　by　the　other　sciences。　Instead　of　first　defining　the　ideas　of　freedom　and　necessity　in　themselves；　and　then　ranging　the　phenomena　of　life　under　those　definitions；　history　must　form　the