战争与和平(下)-第22节

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ion　of　that　will　is　independent　of　time；　and　is　not　called　forth　by　anything；　as　the　Deity　is　not　connected　with　the　event。　But　when　we　speak　of　commands　that　are　the　expression　of　the　will　of　men；　acting　in　time　and　connected　with　one　another；　we　must；　if　we　are　to　understand　the　connection　of　the　command　with　the　event；　restore　（1）　the　conditions　of　all　the　circumstances　that　took　place；　the　dynamic　continuity　in　time　both　of　the　event　and　of　the　person　commanding　it；　and　（2）　the　condition　of　the　inevitable　connection　in　which　the　person　commanding　stands　with　those　who　carry　out　his　command。


Chapter　6
ONLY　THE　EXPRESSION　of　the　will　of　the　Deity；　not　depending　on　time；　can　relate　to　a　whole　series　of　events　that　have　to　take　place　during　several　years　or　centuries；　and　only　the　Deity；　acting　by　His　will　alone；　not　affected　by　any　cause；　can　determine　the　direction　of　the　movement　of　humanity。　Man　acts　in　time；　and　himself　takes　part　in　the　event。
Restoring　the　first　condition　that　was　omitted；　the　condition　of　time；　we　perceive　that　no　single　command　can　be　carried　out　apart　from　preceding　commands　that　have　made　the　execution　of　the　last　command　possible。
Never　is　a　single　command　given　quite　independently　and　arbitrarily；　nor　does　it　cover　a　whole　series　of　events。　Every　command　is　the　sequel　to　some　other；　and　it　never　relates　to　a　whole　course　of　events；　but　only　to　one　moment　in　those　events。
When　we　say；　for　instance；　that　Napoleon　commanded　the　army　to　go　to　fight；　we　sum　up　in　one　single　expression　a　series　of　consecutive　commands；　depending　one　upon　another。　Napoleon　could　not　command　a　campaign　against　Russia；　and　never　did　command　it。　He　commanded　one　day　certain　papers　to　be　written　to　Vienna；　to　Berlin；　and　to　Petersburg；　next　day　certain　decrees　and　instructions　to　the　army；　the　fleet；　and　the　commissariat；　and　so　on　and　so　on—millions　of　separate　commands；　making　up　a　whole　series　of　commands；　corresponding　to　a　series　of　events　leading　the　French　soldiers　to　Russia。
Napoleon　was　giving　commands　all　through　his　reign　for　an　expedition　to　England。　On　no　one　of　his　undertakings　did　he　waste　so　much　time　and　so　much　effort；　and　yet　not　once　during　his　reign　was　an　attempt　made　to　carry　out　his　design。　Yet　he　made　an　expedition　against　Russia；　with　which；　according　to　his　repeatedly　expressed　conviction；　it　was　to　his　advantage　to　be　in　alliance；　and　this　is　due　to　the　fact　that　his　commands　in　the　first　case　did　not；　and　in　the　second　did；　correspond　with　the　course　of　events。
In　order　that　a　command　should　certainly　be　carried　out；　it　is　necessary　that　the　man　should　give　a　command　that　can　be　carried　out。　To　know　what　can　and　what　cannot　be　carried　out　is　impossible；　not　only　in　the　case　of　Napoleon’s　campaign　against　Russia；　in　which　millions　took　part；　but　even　in　the　case　of　the　simplest　event；　since　millions　of　obstacles　may　always　arise　to　prevent　its　being　carried　out。　Every　command　that　is　carried　out　is　always　one　out　of　a　mass　of　commands　that　are　not　carried　out。　All　the　impossible　commands　are　inconsistent　with　the　course　of　events　and　are　not　carried　out。　Only　those　which　are　possible　are　connected　with　consecutive　series　of　commands；　consistent　with　series　of　events；　and　they　are　carried　out。
Our　false　conception　that　the　command　that　precedes　an　event　is　the　cause　of　an　event　is　due　to　the　fact　that　when　the　event　has　taken　place　and　those　few　out　of　thousands　of　commands；　which　happen　to　be　consistent　with　the　course　of　events；　are　carried　out；　we　forget　those　which　were　not；　because　they　could　not　be　carried　out。　Apart　from　that；　the　chief　source　of　our　error　arises　from　the　fact　that　in　the　historical　account　a　whole　series　of　innumerable；　various；　and　most　minute　events；　as；　for　instance；　all　that　led　the　French　soldiers　to　Russia；　are　generalised　into　a　single　event；　in　accordance　with　the　result　produced　by　that　series　of　events；　and　by　a　corresponding　generalisation　a　whole　series　of　commands　too　is　summed　up　into　a　single　expression　of　will。
We　say：　Napoleon　chose　to　invade　Russia　and　he　did　so。　In　reality　we　never　find　in　all　Napoleon’s　doings　anything　like　an　expression　of　that　design：　what　we　find　is　a　series　of　commands　or　expressions　of　his　will　of　the　most　various　and　undefined　tendency。　Out　of　many　series　of　innumerable　commands　of　Napoleon　not　carried　out；　one　series　of　commands　for　the　campaign　of　1812　was　carried　out；　not　from　any　essential　difference　between　the　commands　carried　out　and　those　not　carried　out；　but　simply　because　the　former　coincided　with　the　course　of　events　that　led　the　French　soldiers　into　Russia；　just　as　in　stencil…work　one　figure　or　another　is　sketched；　not　because　the　colours　are　laid　on　this　side　or　in　that　way；　but　because　on　the　figure　cut　out　in　stencil；　colours　are　laid　on　all　sides。
So　that　examining　in　time　the　relation　of　commands　to　events；　we　find　that　the　command　can　never　in　any　case　be　the　cause　of　the　event；　but　that　a　certain　definite　dependence　exists　between　them。　To　understand　of　what　this　dependence　consists；　it　is　essential　to　restore　the　other　circumstance　lost　sight　of；　a　condition　accompanying　any　command　issuing　not　from　the　Deity；　but　from　man。　That　circumstance　is　that　the　man　giving　the　command　is　himself　taking　part　in　the　event。
That　relation　of　the　commanding　person　to　those　he　commands　is　indeed　precisely　what　is　called　power。　That　relation　may　be　analysed　as　follows。
For　common　action；　men　always　unite　in　certain　combinations；　in　which；　in　spite　of　the　difference　of　the　objects　aimed　at　by　common　action；　the　relation　between　the　men　taking　a　part　in　the　action　always　remains　the　same。
Uniting　in　these　combinations；　men　always　stand　in　such　a　relation　to　one　another　that　the　largest　number　of　men　take　a　greater　direct　share；　and　a　smaller　number　of　men　a　less　direct　share　in　the　combined　action　for　which　they　are　united。　Of　all　such　combinations　in　which　men　are　organised　for　the　performance　of　common　action；　one　of　the　most　striking　and　definite　examples　is　the　army。
Every　army　is　composed　of　members　of　lower　military　standing—the　private　soldiers；　who　are　always　the　largest　proportion　of　the　whole；　of　members　of　a　slightly　higher　military　standing—corporals　and　non…commissioned　officers；　who　are　fewer　in　number　than　the　privates；　of　still　higher　officers；　whose　numbers　are　even　less；　and　so　on；　up　to　the　chief　military　command　of　all；　which　is　concentrated　in　one　person。
The　military　organisation　may　be　with　perfect　accuracy　compared　to　the　figure　of　a　cone；　the　base　of　which；　with　the　largest　diameter；　consists　of　privates；　the　next　higher　and　smaller　plane；　of　the　lower　officers；　and　so　on　up　to　the　apex　of　the　cone；　which　will　be　the　commander…in…chief。
The　soldiers；　who　are　the　largest　number；　form　the　lowest　plane　and　the　base　of　the　cone。　The　soldier　himself　does　the　stabbing　and　hacking；　and　burning　and　pillaging；　and　always　receives　commands　to　perform　these　acts　from　the　persons　in　the　plane　next　above。　He　himself　never　gives　a　command。　The　non…commissioned　officer　（these　are　fewer　in　number）　more　rarely　performs　the　immediate　act　than　the　soldier；　but　he　gives　commands。　The　officer　next　above　him　still　more　rarely　acts　directly　himself；　and　still　more　frequently　commands。　The　general　does　nothing　but　command　the　army；　and　hardly　ever　makes　use　of　a　weapon。　The　commander…in…chief　never　takes　direct　part　in　the　action　itself；　and　simply　makes　general　arrangements　as　to　the　movements　of　the　masses。　A　similar　relation　exists　in　every　combination　of　persons　for　common　action—in　agriculture；　commerce；　and　in　every　department　of　activity。
And　so　without　artificially　analysing　all　the　converging　planes　of　the　cone　and　ranks　of　the　army　or　classes　or　ranks　of　any　department　whatever；　or　public　undertaking；　from　lower　to　higher；　a　law　comes　into　existence；　by　which　men　always　combine　together　for　the　performance　of　common　action　in　such　relation　that　the　more　directly　they　take　part　in　the　action；　the　less　they　command；　and　the　greater　their　numbers；　and　the　less　direct　the　part　they　take　in　the　common　action；　the　more　they　command；　and　the　fewer　they　are　in　number；　passing　in　that　way　from　the　lower　strata　up　to　a　single　man　at　the　top；　who　takes　least　direct　share　in　the　action；　and　devotes　his　energy　more　than　all　the　rest　to　giving　commands。
This　is　the　relation　of　persons　in　command　to　those　whom　they　command；　and　it　constitutes　the　essence　of　the　conception　of　what　is　called　power。
Restoring　the　conditions　of　time　under　which　all　events　take　place；　we　found　that　a　command　is　carried　out　only　when　it　relates　to　a　corresponding　course　of　events。　Restoring　the　essential　condition　of　connection　between　the　persons　commanding　and　fulfilling　the　commands；　we　have　found　that　by　their　very　nature　the　persons　commanding　take　the　smallest　part　in　the　action　itself；　and　their　energy　is　exclusively　directed　to　commanding。


Chapter　7
WHEN　SOME　EVENT　takes　place；　men　express　their　opinions　and　desires　in　regard　to　the　event；　and　as　the　event　proceeds　from　the　combined　action　of　many　men；　some　one　of　the　opinions　or　desires　expressed　is　certain　to　be　at　least　approximately　fulfilled。　When　one　of　the　opinions　exp