战争与和平(下)-第18节

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anders；　or；　generally　speaking；　of　those　persons　who　form　the　subject　of　historical　memoirs。　The　answers　given　by　historians　of　this　class　to　the　question　as　to　the　force　which　brings　about　events　are　satisfactory；　but　only　so　long　as　there　is　only　one　historian　for　any　event。　But　as　soon　as　historians　of　different　views　and　different　nationalities　begin　describing　the　same　event；　the　answers　given　by　them　immediately　lose　all　their　value；　as　this　force　is　understood　by　them；　not　only　differently；　but　often　in　absolutely　opposite　ways。　One　historian　asserts　that　an　event　is　due　to　the　power　of　Napoleon；　another　maintains　that　it　is　produced　by　the　power　of　Alexander；　a　third　ascribes　it　to　the　influence　of　some　third　person。　Moreover；　historians　of　this　class　contradict　one　another　even　in　their　explanation　of　the　force　on　which　the　influence　of　the　same　person　is　based。　Thiers；　a　Bonapartist；　says　that　Napoleon’s　power　rested　on　his　virtue　and　his　genius；　Lanfrey；　a　Republican；　declares　that　it　rested　on　his　duplicity　and　deception　of　the　people。　So　that　historians　of　this　class；　mutually　destroying　each　other’s　position；　at　the　same　time　destroy　the　conception　of　the　force　producing　events；　and　give　no　answer　to　the　essential　question　of　history。
Writers　of　universal　history；　who　have　to　deal　with　all　the　nations　at　once；　appear　to　recognise　the　incorrectness　of　the　views　of　historians　of　separate　countries　as　to　the　force　that　produces　events。　They　do　not　recognise　this　force　as　a　power　pertaining　to　heroes　and　sovereigns；　but　regard　it　as　the　resultant　of　many　forces　working　in　different　directions。　In　describing　a　war　on　the　subjugation　of　a　people；　the　writer　of　general　history　seeks　the　cause　of　the　event；　not　in　the　power　of　one　person；　but　in　the　mutual　action　on　one　another　of　many　persons　connected　with　the　event。
The　power　of　historical　personages　conceived　as　the　product　of　several　forces；　according　to　this　view；　can　hardly；　one　would　have　supposed；　be　regarded　as　a　self…sufficient　force　independently　producing　events。　Yet　writers　of　general　history　do　in　the　great　majority　of　cases　employ　the　conception　of　power　again　as　a　self…sufficient　force　producing　events　and　standing　in　the　relation　of　cause　to　them。　According　to　their　exposition　now　the　historical　personage　is　the　product　of　his　time；　and　his　power　is　only　the　product　of　various　forces；　now　his　power　is　the　force　producing　events。　Gervinus；　Schlosser；　for　instance；　and　others；　in　one　place；　explain　that　Napoleon　is　the　product　of　the　Revolution；　of　the　ideas　of　1789；　and　so　on；　and　in　another　plainly　state　that　the　campaign　of　1812　and　other　events　not　to　their　liking　are　simply　the　work　of　Napoleon’s　wrongly　directed　will；　and　that　the　very　ideas　of　1789　were　arrested　in　their　development　by　Napoleon’s　arbitrary　rule。　The　ideas　of　the　Revolution；　the　general　temper　of　the　age　produced　Napoleon’s　power。　The　power　of　Napoleon　suppressed　the　ideas　of　the　Revolution　and　the　general　temper　of　the　age。
This　strange　inconsistency　is　not　an　accidental　one。　It　confronts　us　at　every　turn；　and；　in　fact；　whole　works　upon　universal　history　are　made　up　of　consecutive　series　of　such　inconsistencies。　This　inconsistency　is　due　to　the　fact　that　after　taking　a　few　steps　along　the　road　of　analysis；　these　historians　have　stopped　short　halfway。
To　find　the　component　forces　that　make　up　the　composite　or　resultant　force；　it　is　essential　that　the　sum　of　the　component　parts　should　equal　the　resultant。　This　condition　is　never　observed　by　historical　writers；　and　consequently；　to　explain　the　resultant　force；　they　must　inevitably　admit；　in　addition　to　those　insufficient　contributory　forces；　some　further　unexplained　force　that　affects　also　the　resultant　action。
The　historian　describing　the　campaign　of　1813；　or　the　restoration　of　the　Bourbons；　says　bluntly　that　these　events　were　produced　by　the　will　of　Alexander。　But　the　philosophic　historian　Gervinus；　controverting　the　view　of　the　special　historian　of　those　events；　seeks　to　prove　that　the　campaign　of　1813　and　the　restoration　of　the　Bourbons　was　due　not　only　to　Alexander；　but　also　to　the　work　of　Stein；　Metternich；　Madame　de　Sta？l；　Talleyrand；　Fichte；　Chateaubriand；　and　others。　The　historian　obviously　analyses　the　power　of　Alexander　into　component　forces。　Talleyrand；　Chateaubriand；　and　so　on；　and　the　sum　of　these　component　forces；　that　is；　the　effect　on　one　another　of　Chateaubriand；　Talleyrand；　Madame　de　Sta？l；　and　others　is　obviously　not　equal　to　the　resultant　effect；　that　is；　the　phenomenon　of　millions　of　Frenchmen　submitting　to　the　Bourbons。　Such　and　such　words　being　said　to　one　another　by　Chateaubriand；　Madame　de　Sta？l；　and　others；　only　affects　their　relation　to　one　another；　and　does　not　account　for　the　submission　of　millions。　And　therefore　to　explain　how　the　submission　of　millions　followed　from　their　relation　to　one　another；　that　is；　how　from　component　forces　equal　to　a　given　quantity　A；　there　followed　a　resultant　equal　to　a　thousand　times　A；　the　historian　is　inevitably　bound　to　admit　that　force　of　power；　which　he　has　renounced；　accepting　it　in　the　resultant　force；　that　is；　he　is　obliged　to　admit　an　unexplained　force　that　acts　on　the　resultant　of　those　components。　And　this　is　just　what　the　philosophic　historians　do。　And　consequently　they　not　only　contradict　the　writers　of　historical　memoirs；　but　also　contradict　themselves。
Country　people　who　have　no　clear　idea　of　the　cause　of　rain　say：　The　wind　has　blown　away　the　rain；　or　the　wind　is　blowing　up　for　rain；　according　as　they　are　in　want　of　rain　or　of　fair　weather。　In　the　same　way；　philosophic　historians　at　times；　when　they　wish　it　to　be　so；　when　it　fits　in　with　their　theory；　say　that　power　is　the　result　of　events；　and　at　times；　when　they　want　to　prove　something　else；　they　say　power　produces　the　events。
A　third　class　of　historians；　the　writers　of　the　so…called　history　of　culture；　following　on　the　lines　laid　down　by　the　writers　of　universal　history　who　sometimes　accept　writers　and　ladies　as　forces　producing　events；　yet　understand　that　force　quite　differently。　They　see　that　force　in　so…called　culture；　in　intellectual　activity。　The　historians　of　culture　are　quite　consistent　as　regards　their　prototypes—the　writers　of　universal　history—for　if　historical　events　can　be　explained　by　certain　persons　having　said　certain　things　to　one　another；　why　not　explain　them　by　certain　persons　having　written　certain　books？　Out　of　all　the　immense　number　of　tokens　that　accompany　every　living　phenomenon；　these　historians　select　the　symptom　of　intellectual　activity；　and　assert　that　this　symptom　is　the　cause。　But　in　spite　of　all　their　endeavours　to　prove　that　the　cause　of　events　lies　in　intellectual　activity；　it　is　only　by　a　great　stretch　that　one　can　agree　that　there　is　anything　in　common　between　intellectual　activity　and　the　movement　of　peoples。　And　it　is　altogether　impossible　to　admit　that　intellectual　activity　has　guided　the　actions　of　men；　for　such　phenomena　as　the　cruel　murders　of　the　French　Revolution；　resulting　from　the　doctrine　of　the　equality　of　man；　and　the　most　wicked　wars　and　massacres　arising　from　the　Gospel　of　love；　do　not　confirm　this　hypothesis。
But　even　admitting　that　all　the　cunningly　woven　arguments　with　which　these　histories　abound　are　correct；　admitting　that　nations　are　governed　by　some　indefinite　force　called　an　idea—the　essential　question　of　history　still　remains　unanswered；　or　to　the　power　of　monarchs　and　the　influence　of　counsellors　and　other　persons；　introduced　by　the　philosophic　historian；　another　new　force　is　now　joined—the　idea；　the　connection　of　which　with　the　masses　demands　explanation。　One　can　understand　that　Napoleon　had　power　and　so　an　event　came　to　pass；　with　some　effort　one　can　even　conceive　that　Napoleon　together　with　other　influences　was　the　cause　of　an　event。　But　in　what　fashion　a　book；　Le　Contrat　Social；　led　the　French　to　hack　each　other　to　pieces　cannot　be　understood　without　an　explanation　of　the　causal　connection　of　this　new　force　with　the　event。
There　undoubtedly　exists　a　connection　between　all　the　people　living　at　one　time；　and　so　it　is　possible　to　find　some　sort　of　connection　between　the　intellectual　activity　of　men　and　their　historical　movements；　just　as　one　may　find　a　connection　between　the　movements　of　humanity　and　commerce；　handicrafts；　gardening；　and　anything　you　like。　But　why　intellectual　activity　should　be　conceived　of　by　the　historians　of　culture　as　the　cause　or　the　expression　of　a　whole　historical　movement；　it　is　hard　to　understand。　Historians　can　only　be　led　to　such　a　conclusion　by　the　following　considerations：　（1）　That　history　is　written　by　learned　men；　and　so　it　is　natural　and　agreeable　to　them　to　believe　that　the　pursuit　of　their　calling　is　the　basis　of　the　movement　of　the　whole　of　humanity；　just　as　a　similar　belief　would　be　natural　and　agreeable　to　merchants；　agriculturists；　or　soldiers　（such　a　belief　on　their　part　does　not　find　expression　simply　because　merchants　and　soldiers　don’t　write　history）；　and　（2）　that　spiritual　activity；　enlightenment；　civilisation；　culture；　ideas　are　all　vague；　indefinite　conceptions；　under　cover　of　which　they　can　conveniently　use　phrases　having　less　definite　signification；　and　so　easily　brought　under　any　theory。
But