战争与和平(下)-第1节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


欢迎访问：　　　txtsk
Epilogue　I
Chapter　1
SEVEN　YEARS　had　passed　by。　The　storm…tossed；　historic　ocean　of　Europe　was　subsiding　within　its　shores。　It　seemed　to　have　grown　calm；　but　the　mysterious　forces　moving　humanity　（mysterious；　because　the　laws　controlling　their　action　are　unknown　to　us）　were　still　at　work。
Although　the　surface　of　the　ocean　of　history　seemed　motionless；　the　movement　of　humanity　was　as　uninterrupted　as　the　flow　of　time。　Various　series　of　groups　of　men　were　joining　together　and　separating；　the　causes　were　being　prepared　that　would　bring　about　the　formation　and　the　dissolution　of　empires　and　the　migrations　of　peoples。
The　ocean　of　history　was　not　now；　as　before；　tossed　violently　from　one　shore　to　the　other；　it　was　seething　in　its　depths。　Historical　figures　were　not　dashing　abruptly　from　one　side　to　the　other；　now　they　seemed　to　be　rotating　on　the　same　spot。　The　historical　figures；　that　had　in　the　preceding　years　at　the　head　of　armies　reflected　the　movement　of　the　masses；　commanding　wars；　and　marches；　and　battles；　now　reflected　that　movement　in　political　and　diplomatic　combinations；　statutes；　and　treaties。
This　tendency　on　the　part　of　the　figures　of　history；　the　historians　call　the　reaction。
In　describing　the　part　played　by　these　historical　personages；　the　historians　criticise　them　severely；　supposing　them　to　be　the　cause　of　what　they　call　the　reaction。　All　the　celebrated　persons　of　that　period；　from　Alexander　and　Napoleon　to　Madame　de　Sta？l；　Foty；　Schelling；　Fichte；　Chateaubriand；　and　so　on；　receive　the　severest　criticism　at　their　hands；　and　are　acquitted　or　condemned　according　as　they　worked　for　progress　or　for　reaction。
In　Russia；　too；　so　they　tell　us；　a　reaction　was　taking　place　at　that　period；　and　the　person　chiefly　to　blame　for　that　reaction　was　Alexander　I。—the　same　Alexander　who；　by　their　own　account；　was　chiefly　responsible　for　the　liberal　movement　at　the　beginning　of　his　reign；　and　for　the　saving　of　Russia。
In　modern　Russian　literature　there　is　no　one；　from　the　schoolboy　essay　writer　to　the　learned　historian；　who　would　not　throw　his　stone　at　Alexander　for　the　unprincipled　acts　of　this　later　period　of　his　reign。
‘‘He　should　have　acted　in　such　and　such　a　way。　On　that　occasion　he　acted　well；　and　on　that　other　he　acted　ill。　He　behaved　splendidly　in　the　beginning　of　his　reign　and　during　1812；　but　he　did　ill　in　giving　a　constitution　to　Poland；　in　making　the　Holy　Alliance；　in　letting　Araktcheev　have　power；　in　encouraging　Golitsin　and　mysticism；　and　later　on；　in　encouraging　Shishkov；　and　Foty。　He　acted　wrongly　in　interfering　with　the　army　on　active　service；　he　acted　wrongly　in　cashiering　the　Semyonovsky　regiment；　and　so　on。’’
One　might　cover　ten　pages　in　enumerating　all　the　faults　found　in　him　by　the　historians　on　the　assumption　that　they　possess　a　knowledge　of　what　is　for　the　good　of　humanity。
What　do　these　criticisms　mean？
Do　not　the　very　actions　for　which　the　historians　applaud　Alexander　I。；　such　as　the　liberalism　of　the　early　part　of　his　reign；　the　struggle　with　Napoleon；　the　firmness　shown　in　1812；　and　the　campaign　of　1813；　proceed　from　those　very　sources—the　circumstances　of　birth　and　breeding　and　life　that　made　Alexander’s　personality　what　it　was—from　which　proceed　also　the　acts　for　which　he　is　censured　by　the　historians；　such　as　the　Holy　Alliance；　the　restoration　of　Poland；　the　reaction　from　1820　onward？
What　is　the　substance　of　the　charge　brought　in　these　criticisms？　It　is　a　charge　brought　against　an　historical　personage　standing　at　the　highest　possible　pinnacle　of　human　power；　as　it　were；　in　the　focus　where　all　the　rays　of　history　concentrated　their　blinding　light　upon　him；　a　personage　subjected　to　the　strongest　influences　of　intrigue；　deceit；　flattery；　and　self…deception；　inseparable　from　power；　a　personage　who　felt　himself　at　every　moment　of　his　life　responsible　for　all　that　was　being　done　in　Europe；　and　a　personage；　not　an　invented　character；　but　a　live　creature；　like　any　other　man；　with　his　own　personal　idiosyncrasies；　and　passions　and　impulses　towards　goodness；　beauty；　and　truth。　And　the　charge　brought　against　this　personage　is　not　that　he　was　not　virtuous　（the　historians　have　no　reproach　to　make　against　him　on　this　score）；　but　that　he；　living　fifty　years　ago；　had　not　the　same　views　as　to　the　good　of　humanity　as　those　held　to…day　by　a　professor　who　has；　from　his　youth　up；　been　engaged　in　study；　i。e。　in　reading　books；　listening　to　lectures；　and　making　notes　of　those　books　and　those　lectures　in　a　note…book。
But　even　if　we　assume　that　Alexander　I。；　fifty　years　ago；　was　mistaken　in　his　view　of　what　was　for　the　good　of　peoples；　we　can　hardly　help　assuming　that　the　historian；　criticising　Alexander；　will；　after　a　certain　lapse　of　time；　prove　to　be　also　incorrect　in　his　view　of　what　is　for　the　good　of　humanity。　It　is　the　more　natural　and　inevitable　to　assume　this　because；　watching　the　development　of　history；　we　see　that　with　every　year；　with　every　new　writer；　the　view　of　what　is　for　the　good　of　humanity　is　somewhat　shifted；　so　that　what　did　seem　good；　after　ten　years；　is　regarded　as　harmful；　and　vice　versa。　That　is　not　all。　We　even　find　in　history　the　views　of　contemporaries　as　to　what　was　good；　and　what　was　harmful；　utterly　opposed　to　one　another。　Some　regard　the　giving　of　a　constitution　to　Poland；　and　the　Holy　Alliance；　as　highly　to　the　credit　of　Alexander；　while　others　regard　the　same　actions　as　a　slur　on　his　name。
It　is　impossible　to　say　of　the　careers　of　Alexander　and　of　Napoleon　that　they　were　beneficial　or　harmful；　seeing　that　we　cannot　say　wherein　the　benefit　or　harm　of　humanity　lies。　If　any　one　dislikes　the　career　of　either；　he　only　dislikes　it　from　its　incompatibility　with　his　own　limited　conception　of　what　is　the　good　of　humanity。　Even　though　I　regard　as　good　the　preservation　of　my　father’s　house　in　Moscow　in　1812；　or　the　glory　of　the　Russian　army；　or　the　flourishing　of　the　Petersburg　or　some　other　university；　or　the　independence　of　Poland；　or　the　supremacy　of　Russia；　or　the　balance　of　European　power；　or　a　special　branch　of　European　enlightenment—progress—yet　I　am　bound　to　admit　that　the　activity　of　any　historical　personage　had；　apart　from　such　ends；　other　ends　more　general　and　beyond　my　grasp。
But　let　us　suppose　that　so…called　science　has　the　power　of　conciliating　all　contradictions；　and　has　an　invariable　standard　of　good　and　bad　by　which　to　try　historical　personages　and　events。
Let　us　suppose　that　Alexander　could　have　acted　quite　differently。　Let　us　assume　that；　in　accordance　with　the　prescription　of　those　who　censure　him；　and　who　profess　a　knowledge　of　the　final　end　of　the　movement　of　humanity；　he　could　have　followed　that　programme　of　nationalism；　of　freedom；　of　equality；　and　of　progress　（there　seems　to　be　no　other）　which　his　modern　critics　would　have　selected　for　him。　Let　us　suppose　that　programme　could　have　been　possible；　and　had　actually　been　formulated　at　that　time；　and　that　Alexander　could　have　acted　in　accordance　with　it。　What；　then；　would　have　become　of　the　activity　of　all　the　persons　who　were　opposing　the　tendency　of　the　government　of　that　day—of　the　activity　which；　in　the　opinion　of　the　historians；　was　good　and　beneficial？　There　would　have　been　none　of　that　activity；　there　would　have　been　no　life；　there　would　have　been　nothing。
Once　admit　that　human　life　can　be　guided　by　reason；　and　all　possibility　of　life　is　annihilated。


Chapter　2
IF　ONE　ADMITS；　as　historians　do；　that　great　men　lead　humanity　to　the　attainment　of　certain　ends；　such　as　the　aggrandisement　of　Russia　or　of　France；　or　the　balance　of　power；　or　the　diffusion　of　the　ideas　of　the　revolution；　or　of　general　progress；　or　anything　else　you　like；　it　becomes　impossible　to　explain　the　phenomena　of　history　apart　from　the　conceptions　of　chance　and　genius。
If　the　object　of　the　European　wars　of　the　beginning　of　this　century　had　been　the　aggrandisement　of　Russia；　that　object　might　have　been　attained　without　any　of　the　preceding　wars；　and　without　invasion　of　foreign　territory。
If　the　object　were　the　aggrandisement　of　France；　that　aim　might　have　been　attained　apart　from　the　revolution　and　the　empire。　If　the　object　were　the　diffusion　of　ideas；　the　printing　of　books　would　have　attained　that　object　much　more　effectually　than　soldiers。　If　the　object　were　the　progress　of　civilisation；　one　may　very　readily　assume　that　there　are　other　more　effectual　means　of　diffusing　civilisation　than　the　slaughter　of　men　and　the　destruction　of　their　property。
Why　did　it　come　to　pass　in　this　way　and　no　other？　Because　it　happened　so。　‘‘Chance　created　the　position；　genius　took　advantage　of　it；’’　says　history。
But　what　is　chance？　What　is　genius？
The　words　chance　and　genius　mean　nothing　actually　existing；　and　so　cannot　be　defined。　These　words　merely　denote　a　certain　stage　in　the　comprehension　of　phenomena。　I　do　not　know　how　some　phenomenon　is　brought　about；　I　believe　that　I　cannot　know；　consequently　I　do　not　want　to　know　and　talk　of　chance。　I　see　a　force　producing　an　effect　out　of　proportion　with　the　average　effect　of　human　powers；　I　do　not　understand　how　this　is　brought　about；　and　I　talk　about　genius。
To　a　flock　of　sheep　the　sheep　who　is　every　evening　driven　by　the　shepherd　into　a　special　pen　to　feed；　and　becomes　twice　as　fat　as　t