lect09-第5节

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necessarily　presuppose　or　require　it。






　　　　It　should　be　understood　that　the　Frankish　procedure　was






completely　at　the　disposal　of　the　complainant。　It　is　not　a






strictly　judicial　procedure；　but　rather　a　procedure　regulating






extrajudicial　redress。　If　the　complainant　observes　the　proper






forms；　the　part　of　the　Court　in　licensing　seizure　is　purely






passive。　Even　after　the　exhaustive　examination　which　this　part　of






the　Salic　Law　has　undergone　from　Professor　Sohm；　it　is　very






difficult　to　say　whether　at　any　point　of　the　procedure　the






defendant　had　the　opportunity　of　putting　in　a　substantial






defence；　but　it　seems　certain　that；　whenever　he　could　do　this；　he






appeared　virtually　as　a　plaintiff　like　the　distrainee　in　our






Action　of　Replevin；　and　there　is　no　doubt　that；　if　he　submitted






or　was　unsuccessful　in　attacking　the　proceedings　of　the　other






side；　he　paid　not　only　the　original　debt　but　various　additional






penalties　entailed　by　neglect　to　comply　with　previous　notices　to






discharge　it。　Such　a　procedure　seems　to　us　founded　on　the　now






monstrous　assumption　that　plaintiffs　are　always　in　the　right　and






defendants　always　in　the　wrong。　Yet　the　assumption　would　not






perhaps　have　struck　the　earliest　authors　of　legal　improvement　as






altogether　monstrous；　nor　could　they　have　quite　comprehended　the






modern　principle　which　compels　the　complainant　to　establish　at






all　events　a　prim*　facie　case。　With　them；　the　man　most　likely　to






be　in　the　right　would　appear　to　be　the　man　who　faced　the　manifold






risks　attending　the　effort　to　obtain　redress；　the　man　who






complained　to　the　Popular　Assembly；　the　man　who　cried　for　justice






to　the　King　sitting　in　the　gate。　It　is　only　when　violent　wrong






has　ceased　to　be　rife；　when　the　dangers　of　contesting　the






oppressions　of　powerful　men　have　become　insignificant；　when　the






law　has　been　long　and　regularly　administered　according　to






technical　procedure；　that　unjust　claims　are　seen　to　be　hardly






less　common　than　unjust　refusals　to　satisfy　them。　In　one






particular　case；　the　complaint　of　the　King；　the　old　assumption






that　complainants　are　presumably　in　the　right　was　kept　long　alive






among　us；　and　had　much　to　do　with　the　obstinate　dislike　of






lawyers　to　allowing　prisoners　to　be　defended　by　Counsel。






　　　　Gaius　speaking　of　the　Legis　Actiones　generally；　observes　that






'they　fell　into　discredit；　because　through　the　excessive　subtlety






of　the　ancient　lawyers；　things　came　to　such　a　pass　that　he　who






committed　the　smallest　error　failed　altogether。'






　　　　Blackstone；　many　centuries　afterwards；　has　the　following






remark　on　the　English　Law　of　Distress：　'The　many　particulars






which　attend　the　taking　of　a　distress　used　formerly　to　make　it　a






hazardous　kind　of　proceeding；　for；　if　any　one　irregularity　was






committed；　it　vitiated　the　whole。'






　　　　I　quote　these　passages；　not　only　on　account　of　the　curious






similarity　of　language　between　two　writers　of　whom　the　later






could　not　possibly　have　read　the　earlier；　but　because　the






excessive　technicality　of　ancient　law　which　they　both　notice　goes






some　way　to　explain　the　severity　and　one…sidedness　of　the　old






Teutonic　procedure。　The　power　of　seizing　a　man's　property






extra…judicially　in　satisfaction　of　your　demand　was；　as　Professor






Sohm　justly　remarks；　a　sort　of　two…edged　sword。　You　might　bring






your　adversary　to　the　ground　by　it；　but　you　were　extremely　likely






to　injure　yourself。　For；　unless　the　complainant　who　sought　to






distrain　went　through　all　the　acts　and　words　required　by　the　law






with　the　most　rigorous　accuracy；　he　in　his　turn；　besides　failing






in　his　object；　incurred　a　variety　of　penalties；　which　could　be






just　as　harshly　exacted　as　his　own　original　demand。　The






difficulty　of　putting　the　procedure　into　operation　thus　at　once






made　disputants　cautious　in　resorting　to　it；　and　seemed　to　men　in






general　to　compensate　for　its　inherent　inequitableness。　This






consideration；　however；　though　it　explains　in　part　how　the　harsh






ancient　law　reconciled　itself　to　the　sense　of　right；　is　not　by






itself　sufficient　to　account　for　the　form　which　it　assumed　in　the






Teutonic　Codes；　or　for　the　vitality　of　a　portion　of　it　amid　our






own　institutions。






　　　　I　cannot　doubt　that　the　practice　which　I　have　called　by　the






general　name　of　Distress　kept　its　place　in　ancient　Teutonic　law






partly　as　a　mere　'survival。'　I　have　already　insisted　that　one






great　characteristic　of　the　primitive　ages　was　the　fewness　of






human　ideas。　Societies；　just　emerging　from　the　savage　state；　had






been　used　to　associate　redress　of　wrong　with　the　seizure　of　a






wrong…doer's　goods；　and　they　were　unable　mentally　quite　to






disconnect　the　two　even　when　they　began　to　regulate　the　practice。






They　did　not；　therefore；　supersede　distress　by　a　wholly　new






system；　but　engrafted　it　on　a　later　procedure；　which　occasionally






took　the　form　so　curiously　preserved　in　its　main　features　to　our






own　day　by　the　English　Common　law；　but　which　at　a　relatively






later　date　and　more　generally　may　be　believed　to　have　shaped






itself　on　the　model　of　the　rules　observed　by　the　Salian　Franks。






　　　　It　is　not　possible　to　explain　all　survivals　by　some






convenience　which　they　incidentally　serve。　Some　have　undoubtedly






been　continued　by　superstition；　some　by　mere　habit。　But　those






relics　of　ancient　thought　and　conduct　which　have　been　kept　alive






longest　have　generally　had　an　usefulness　of　their　own。　Here　the






private　redress　of　wrong；　taken　into　the　legal　procedure；　served






to　compel　the　appearance　of　the　defendant　and　his　submission　to






jurisdiction　at　a　time　when　judicial　authority　was　yet　in　its






infancy；　and　when　Courts　of　Justice　could　not　as　yet　completely






and　regularly　command　the　aid　of　sovereign　power。　Gradually；　as






the　public　force；　the　arm　of　the　State；　was　more　and　more　placed






at　the　disposal　of　tribunals；　they　were　able　more　and　more　to






dispense　with　extrajudicial　assistance。　In　the　state　of　Teutonic






law　represented　by　the　Frankish　Code；　we　find　a　specific　class　of






cases　tried　throughout　judicially　（in　our　modern　sense　of　the






word）　from　the　initial　stage　to　the　judgment；　but　the　judgment　is






not　by　its　own　force　operative。　If　the　defendant　has　expressly






promised　to　obey　it；　the　Count　or　royal　deputy；　on　being　properly






summoned；　will　execute　it；　but　if　no　such　promise　has　been　made；






the　plaintiff　has　no　remedy　except　an　application　to　the　King　in






person。　No　long　time；　however；　after　the　Franks　have　been　settled






within　the　Empire；　we　find　that　mother　step　has　been　taken






towards　the　administration　of　justice　on　modern　principles；　and






now　the　royal　deputy　will　execute　the　judgment　even　though　there






has　been　no　promise　to　submit　to　it。　At　this　point　Distress　is






wholly　taken　out　of　the　hands　of　private　litigants　and






extrajudicial　seizure　becomes　judicial　seizure。　The　change　is






obviously　a　result　of　the　growing　vigour　of　Courts；　greatly　due






in　our　own　country　to　the　development　of　royal　justice　at　the






expense　of　popular　justice。　Still　English　judicial　proceedings






long　savoured　of　the　old　practices。　Every　student　of　our　ancient






English　forms　of　proceeding　will　recollect　on　what　small　apparent






provocation　the　King　constantly　took　the　lands　of　the　defendant






into　his　hands　or　seized　his　goods；　simply　to　compel　or　perfect






his　submission　to　the　royal　jurisdiction。　It　seems　probable　that






Distress　was　gradually　lost　in　and　absorbed　by　Attachment　and






Distringas。　The　theory　of　Attachment　now　is　that　it　is　the　taking






of　property　into　the　actual　or　constructive　possession　of　the






judicial　power；　and　the　later　course　of　change　under　which　it　has






faded　into　an　occasional　and　exceptional　proceeding；　requiring　to






be　justified　by　special　reasons；　corresponds　with　the　growing






confidence　of　Courts　of　Justice　in　their　possession　of






irresistible　power　confided　to　them　by　the　sovereign。　As　regards






that　fragme