the critique of practical reason-第9节

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urpose　as　if　it　were　his　own；　provided　only　he　knows　that　he　can　do　so　safely；　and　without　discovery；　you　would　either　believe　that　the　recommender　was　mocking　you；　or　that　he　had　lost　his　senses。　So　sharply　and　clearly　marked　are　the　boundaries　of　morality　and　self…love　that　even　the　commonest　eye　cannot　fail　to　distinguish　whether　a　thing　belongs　to　the　one　or　the　other。　The　few　remarks　that　follow　may　appear　superfluous　where　the　truth　is　so　plain；　but　at　least　they　may　serve　to　give　a　little　more　distinctness　to　the　judgement　of　common　sense。　　　The　principle　of　happiness　may；　indeed；　furnish　maxims；　but　never　such　as　would　be　competent　to　be　laws　of　the　will；　even　if　universal　happiness　were　made　the　object。　For　since　the　knowledge　of　this　rests　on　mere　empirical　data；　since　every　man's　judgement　on　it　depends　very　much　on　his　particular　point　of　view；　which　is　itself　moreover　very　variable；　it　can　supply　only　general　rules；　not　universal；　that　is；　it　can　give　rules　which　on　the　average　will　most　frequently　fit；　but　not　rules　which　must　hold　good　always　and　necessarily；　hence；　no　practical　laws　can　be　founded　on　it。　Just　because　in　this　case　an　object　of　choice　is　the　foundation　of　the　rule　and　must　therefore　precede　it；　the　rule　can　refer　to　nothing　but　what　is　＇felt＇；　and　therefore　it　refers　to　experience　and　is　founded　on　it；　and　then　the　variety　of　judgement　must　be　endless。　This　principle；　therefore；　does　not　prescribe　the　same　practical　rules　to　all　rational　beings；　although　the　rules　are　all　included　under　a　common　title；　namely；　that　of　happiness。　The　moral　law；　however；　is　conceived　as　objectively　necessary；　only　because　it　holds　for　everyone　that　has　reason　and　will。　　　The　maxim　of　self…love　（prudence）　only　advises；　the　law　of　morality　commands。　Now　there　is　a　great　difference　between　that　which　we　are　advised　to　do　and　that　to　which　we　are　obliged。　　　The　commonest　intelligence　can　easily　and　without　hesitation　see　what；　on　the　principle　of　autonomy　of　the　will；　requires　to　be　done；　but　on　supposition　of　heteronomy　of　the　will；　it　is　bard　and　requires　knowledge　of　the　world　to　see　what　is　to　be　done。　That　is　to　say；　what　duty　is；　is　plain　of　itself　to　everyone；　but　what　is　to　bring　true　durable　advantage；　such　as　will　extend　to　the　whole　of　one's　existence；　is　always　veiled　in　impenetrable　obscurity；　and　much　prudence　is　required　to　adapt　the　practical　rule　founded　on　it　to　the　ends　of　life；　even　tolerably；　by　making　proper　exceptions。　But　the　moral　law　commands　the　most　punctual　obedience　from　everyone；　it　must；　therefore；　not　be　so　difficult　to　judge　what　it　requires　to　be　done；　that　the　commonest　unpractised　understanding；　even　without　worldly　prudence；　should　fail　to　apply　it　rightly。　　　It　is　always　in　everyone's　power　to　satisfy　the　categorical　command　of　morality；　whereas　it　is　seldom　possible；　and　by　no　means　so　to　everyone；　to　satisfy　the　empirically　conditioned　precept　of　happiness；　even　with　regard　to　a　single　purpose。　The　reason　is　that　in　the　former　case　there　is　question　only　of　the　maxim；　which　must　be　genuine　and　pure；　but　in　the　latter　case　there　is　question　also　of　one's　capacity　and　physical　power　to　realize　a　desired　object。　A　command　that　everyone　should　try　to　make　himself　happy　would　be　foolish；　for　one　never　commands　anyone　to　do　what　he　of　himself　infallibly　wishes　to　do。　We　must　only　command　the　means；　or　rather　supply　them；　since　he　cannot　do　everything　that　he　wishes。　But　to　command　morality　under　the　name　of　duty　is　quite　rational；　for；　in　the　first　place；　not　everyone　is　willing　to　obey　its　precepts　if　they　oppose　his　inclinations；　and　as　to　the　means　of　obeying　this　law；　these　need　not　in　this　case　be　taught；　for　in　this　respect　whatever　he　wishes　to　do　be　can　do。　　　He　who　has　lost　at　play　may　be　vexed　at　himself　and　his　folly；　but　if　he　is　conscious　of　having　cheated　at　play　（although　he　has　gained　thereby）；　he　must　despise　himself　as　soon　as　he　compares　himself　with　the　moral　law。　This　must；　therefore；　be　something　different　from　the　principle　of　private　happiness。　For　a　man　must　have　a　different　criterion　when　he　is　compelled　to　say　to　himself：　〃I　am　a　worthless　fellow；　though　I　have　filled　my　purse〃；　and　when　he　approves　himself；　and　says：　〃I　am　a　prudent　man；　for　I　have　enriched　my　treasure。〃　　　Finally；　there　is　something　further　in　the　idea　of　our　practical　reason；　which　accompanies　the　transgression　of　a　moral　law…　namely；　its　ill　desert。　Now　the　notion　of　punishment；　as　such；　cannot　be　united　with　that　of　becoming　a　partaker　of　happiness；　for　although　he　who　inflicts　the　punishment　may　at　the　same　time　have　the　benevolent　purpose　of　directing　this　punishment　to　this　end；　yet　it　must　first　be　justified　in　itself　as　punishment；　i。e。；　as　mere　harm；　so　that　if　it　stopped　there；　and　the　person　punished　could　get　no　glimpse　of　kindness　hidden　behind　this　harshness；　he　must　yet　admit　that　justice　was　done　him；　and　that　his　reward　was　perfectly　suitable　to　his　conduct。　In　every　punishment；　as　such；　there　must　first　be　justice；　and　this　constitutes　the　essence　of　the　notion。　Benevolence　may；　indeed；　be　united　with　it；　but　the　man　who　has　deserved　punishment　has　not　the　least　reason　to　reckon　upon　this。　Punishment；　then；　is　a　physical　evil；　which；　though　it　be　not　connected　with　moral　evil　as　a　natural　consequence；　ought　to　be　connected　with　it　as　a　consequence　by　the　principles　of　a　moral　legislation。　Now；　if　every　crime；　even　without　regarding　the　physical　consequence　with　respect　to　the　actor；　is　in　itself　punishable；　that　is；　forfeits　happiness　（at　least　partially）；　it　is　obviously　absurd　to　say　that　the　crime　consisted　just　in　this；　that　be　has　drawn　punishment　on　himself；　thereby　injuring　his　private　happiness　（which；　on　the　principle　of　self…love；　must　be　the　proper　notion　of　all　crime）。　According　to　this　view；　the　punishment　would　be　the　reason　for　calling　anything　a　crime；　and　justice　would；　on　the　contrary；　consist　in　omitting　all　punishment；　and　even　preventing　that　which　naturally　follows；　for；　if　this　were　done；　there　would　no　longer　be　any　evil　in　the　action；　since　the　harm　which　otherwise　followed　it；　and　on　account　of　which　alone　the　action　was　called　evil；　would　now　be　prevented。　To　look；　however；　on　all　rewards　and　punishments　as　merely　the　machinery　in　the　hand　of　a　higher　power；　which　is　to　serve　only　to　set　rational　creatures　striving　after　their　final　end　（happiness）；　this　is　to　reduce　the　will　to　a　mechanism　destructive　of　freedom；　this　is　so　evident　that　it　need　not　detain　us。　　　More　refined；　though　equally　false；　is　the　theory　of　those　who　suppose　a　certain　special　moral　sense；　which　sense　and　not　reason　determines　the　moral　law；　and　in　consequence　of　which　the　consciousness　of　virtue　is　supposed　to　be　directly　connected　with　contentment　and　pleasure；　that　of　vice；　with　mental　dissatisfaction　and　pain；　thus　reducing　the　whole　to　the　desire　of　private　happiness。　Without　repeating　what　has　been　said　above；　I　will　here　only　remark　the　fallacy　they　fall　into。　In　order　to　imagine　the　vicious　man　as　tormented　with　mental　dissatisfaction　by　the　consciousness　of　his　transgressions；　they　must　first　represent　him　as　in　the　main　basis　of　his　character；　at　least　in　some　degree；　morally　good；　just　as　he　who　is　pleased　with　the　consciousness　of　right　conduct　must　be　conceived　as　already　virtuous。　The　notion　of　morality　and　duty　must；　therefore；　have　preceded　any　regard　to　this　satisfaction；　and　cannot　be　derived　from　it。　A　man　must　first　appreciate　the　importance　of　what　we　call　duty；　the　authority　of　the　moral　law；　and　the　immediate　dignity　which　the　following　of　it　gives　to　the　person　in　his　own　eyes；　in　order　to　feel　that　satisfaction　in　the　consciousness　of　his　conformity　to　it　and　the　bitter　remorse　that　accompanies　the　consciousness　of　its　transgression。　It　is；　therefore；　impossible　to　feel　this　satisfaction　or　dissatisfaction　prior　to　the　knowledge　of　obligation；　or　to　make　it　the　basis　of　the　latter。　A　man　must　be　at　least　half　honest　in　order　even　to　be　able　to　form　a　conception　of　these　feelings。　I　do　not　deny　that　as　the　human　will　is；　by　virtue　of　liberty；　capable　of　being　immediately　determined　by　the　moral　law；　so　frequent　practice　in　accordance　with　this　principle　of　determination　can；　at　least；　produce　subjectively　a　feeling　of　satisfaction；　on　the　contrary；　it　is　a　duty　to　establish　and　to　cultivate　this；　which　alone　deserves　to　be　called　properly　the　moral　feeling；　but　the　notion　of　duty　cannot　be　derived　from　it；　else　we　should　have　to　suppose　a　feeling　for　the　law　as　such；　and　thus　make　that　an　object　of　sensation　which　can　only　be　thought　by　the　reason；　and　this；　if　it　is　not　to　be　a　flat　contradiction；　would　destroy　all　notion　of　duty　and　put　in　its　place　a　mere　mechanical　play　of　refined　inclinations　sometimes　contending　with　the　coarser。　　　If　now　we　compare　our　formal　supreme　principle　of　pure　practical　reason　（that　of　autonomy　of　the　will）　with　all　previous　material　principles　of　morality；　we　can　exhibit　them　all　in　a　table　in　which　all　possible　cases　are　exhausted；　except　the　one　formal　principle；　and　thus　we　can　show　visibly　that　it　is　vain　to　look　for　any　other　principle　than　that　now　proposed。　In　fact　all　possible　principles　of　determination　of　the　will　are