the critique of practical reason-第7节

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；　not　an　object　of　the　senses；　and　consequently　does　not　belong　to　the　class　of　phenomena；　it　follows　that　the　idea　of　it；　which　determines　the　will；　is　distinct　from　all　the　principles　that　determine　events　in　nature　according　to　the　law　of　causality；　because　in　their　case　the　determining　principles　must　themselves　be　phenomena。　Now；　if　no　other　determining　principle　can　serve　as　a　law　for　the　will　except　that　universal　legislative　form；　such　a　will　must　be　conceived　as　quite　independent　of　the　natural　law　of　phenomena　in　their　mutual　relation；　namely；　the　law　of　causality；　such　independence　is　called　freedom　in　the　strictest；　that　is；　in　the　transcendental；　sense；　consequently；　a　will　which　can　have　its　law　in　nothing　but　the　mere　legislative　form　of　the　maxim　is　a　free　will。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　VI。　PROBLEM　II。

　　Supposing　that　a　will　is　free；　to　find　the　law　which　alone　is　competent　to　determine　it　necessarily。　　　Since　the　matter　of　the　practical　law；　i。e。；　an　object　of　the　maxim；　can　never　be　given　otherwise　than　empirically；　and　the　free　will　is　independent　on　empirical　conditions　（that　is；　conditions　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense）　and　yet　is　determinable；　consequently　a　free　will　must　find　its　principle　of　determination　in　the　law；　and　yet　independently　of　the　matter　of　the　law。　But；　besides　the　matter　of　the　law；　nothing　is　contained　in　it　except　the　legislative　form。　It　is　the　legislative　form；　then；　contained　in　the　maxim；　which　can　alone　constitute　a　principle　of　determination　of　the　＇free＇　will。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK。

　　Thus　freedom　and　an　unconditional　practical　law　reciprocally　imply　each　other。　Now　I　do　not　ask　here　whether　they　are　in　fact　distinct；　or　whether　an　unconditioned　law　is　not　rather　merely　the　consciousness　of　a　pure　practical　reason　and　the　latter　identical　with　the　positive　concept　of　freedom；　I　only　ask；　whence　begins　our　knowledge　of　the　unconditionally　practical；　whether　it　is　from　freedom　or　from　the　practical　law？　Now　it　cannot　begin　from　freedom；　for　of　this　we　cannot　be　immediately　conscious；　since　the　first　concept　of　it　is　negative；　nor　can　we　infer　it　from　experience；　for　experience　gives　us　the　knowledge　only　of　the　law　of　phenomena；　and　hence　of　the　mechanism　of　nature；　the　direct　opposite　of　freedom。　It　is　therefore　the　moral　law；　of　which　we　become　directly　conscious　（as　soon　as　we　trace　for　ourselves　maxims　of　the　will）；　that　first　presents　itself　to　us；　and　leads　directly　to　the　concept　of　freedom；　inasmuch　as　reason　presents　it　as　a　principle　of　determination　not　to　be　outweighed　by　any　sensible　conditions；　nay；　wholly　independent　of　them。　But　how　is　the　consciousness；　of　that　moral　law　possible？　We　can　become　conscious　of　pure　practical　laws　just　as　we　are　conscious　of　pure　theoretical　principles；　by　attending　to　the　necessity　with　which　reason　prescribes　them　and　to　the　elimination　of　all　empirical　conditions；　which　it　directs。　The　concept　of　a　pure　will　arises　out　of　the　former；　as　that　of　a　pure　understanding　arises　out　of　the　latter。　That　this　is　the　true　subordination　of　our　concepts；　and　that　it　is　morality　that　first　discovers　to　us　the　notion　of　freedom；　hence　that　it　is　practical　reason　which；　with　this　concept；　first　proposes　to　speculative　reason　the　most　insoluble　problem；　thereby　placing　it　in　the　greatest　perplexity；　is　evident　from　the　following　consideration：　Since　nothing　in　phenomena　can　be　explained　by　the　concept　of　freedom；　but　the　mechanism　of　nature　must　constitute　the　only　clue；　moreover；　when　pure　reason　tries　to　ascend　in　the　series　of　causes　to　the　unconditioned；　it　falls　into　an　antinomy　which　is　entangled　in　incomprehensibilities　on　the　one　side　as　much　as　the　other；　whilst　the　latter　（namely；　mechanism）　is　at　least　useful　in　the　explanation　of　phenomena；　therefore　no　one　would　ever　have　been　so　rash　as　to　introduce　freedom　into　science；　had　not　the　moral　law；　and　with　it　practical　reason；　come　in　and　forced　this　notion　upon　us。　Experience；　however；　confirms　this　order　of　notions。　Suppose　some　one　asserts　of　his　lustful　appetite　that；　when　the　desired　object　and　the　opportunity　are　present；　it　is　quite　irresistible。　＇Ask　him＇…　if　a　gallows　were　erected　before　the　house　where　he　finds　this　opportunity；　in　order　that　he　should　be　hanged　thereon　immediately　after　the　gratification　of　his　lust；　whether　he　could　not　then　control　his　passion；　we　need　not　be　long　in　doubt　what　he　would　reply。　Ask　him；　however…　if　his　sovereign　ordered　him；　on　pain　of　the　same　immediate　execution；　to　bear　false　witness　against　an　honourable　man；　whom　the　prince　might　wish　to　destroy　under　a　plausible　pretext；　would　he　consider　it　possible　in　that　case　to　overcome　his　love　of　life；　however　great　it　may　be。　He　would　perhaps　not　venture　to　affirm　whether　he　would　do　so　or　not；　but　he　must　unhesitatingly　admit　that　it　is　possible　to　do　so。　He　judges；　therefore；　that　he　can　do　a　certain　thing　because　he　is　conscious　that　he　ought；　and　he　recognizes　that　he　is　free…　a　fact　which　but　for　the　moral　law　he　would　never　have　known。

　　　　　　　　　VII。　FUNDAMENTAL　LAW　OF　THE　PURE　PRACTICAL　REASON。

　　Act　so　that　the　maxim　of　thy　will　can　always　at　the　same　time　hold　good　as　a　principle　of　universal　legislation。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK。

　　Pure　geometry　has　postulates　which　are　practical　propositions；　but　contain　nothing　further　than　the　assumption　that　we　can　do　something　if　it　is　required　that　we　should　do　it；　and　these　are　the　only　geometrical　propositions　that　concern　actual　existence。　They　are；　then；　practical　rules　under　a　problematical　condition　of　the　will；　but　here　the　rule　says：　We　absolutely　must　proceed　in　a　certain　manner。　The　practical　rule　is；　therefore；　unconditional；　and　hence　it　is　conceived　a　priori　as　a　categorically　practical　proposition　by　which　the　will　is　objectively　determined　absolutely　and　immediately　（by　the　practical　rule　itself；　which　thus　is　in　this　case　a　law）；　for　pure　reason　practical　of　itself　is　here　directly　legislative。　The　will　is　thought　as　independent　on　empirical　conditions；　and；　therefore；　as　pure　will　determined　by　the　mere　form　of　the　law；　and　this　principle　of　determination　is　regarded　as　the　supreme　condition　of　all　maxims。　The　thing　is　strange　enough；　and　has　no　parallel　in　all　the　rest　of　our　practical　knowledge。　For　the　a　priori　thought　of　a　possible　universal　legislation　which　is　therefore　merely　problematical；　is　unconditionally　commanded　as　a　law　without　borrowing　anything　from　experience　or　from　any　external　will。　This；　however；　is　not　a　precept　to　do　something　by　which　some　desired　effect　can　be　attained　（for　then　the　will　would　depend　on　physical　conditions）；　but　a　rule　that　determines　the　will　a　priori　only　so　far　as　regards　the　forms　of　its　maxims；　and　thus　it　is　at　least　not　impossible　to　conceive　that　a　law；　which　only　applies　to　the　subjective　form　of　principles；　yet　serves　as　a　principle　of　determination　by　means　of　the　objective　form　of　law　in　general。　We　may　call　the　consciousness　of　this　fundamental　law　a　fact　of　reason；　because　we　cannot　reason　it　out　from　antecedent　data　of　reason；　e。g。；　the　consciousness　of　freedom　（for　this　is　not　antecedently　given）；　but　it　forces　itself　on　us　as　a　synthetic　a　priori　proposition；　which　is　not　based　on　any　intuition；　either　pure　or　empirical。　It　would；　indeed；　be　analytical　if　the　freedom　of　the　will　were　presupposed；　but　to　presuppose　freedom　as　a　positive　concept　would　require　an　intellectual　intuition；　which　cannot　here　be　assumed；　however；　when　we　regard　this　law　as　given；　it　must　be　observed；　in　order　not　to　fall　into　any　misconception；　that　it　is　not　an　empirical　fact；　but　the　sole　fact　of　the　pure　reason；　which　thereby　announces　itself　as　originally　legislative　（sic　volo；　sic　jubeo）。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　COROLLARY。

　　Pure　reason　is　practical　of　itself　alone　and　gives　（to　man）　a　universal　law　which　we　call　the　moral　law。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK。

　　The　fact　just　mentioned　is　undeniable。　It　is　only　necessary　to　analyse　the　judgement　that　men　pass　on　the　lawfulness　of　their　actions；　in　order　to　find　that；　whatever　inclination　may　say　to　the　contrary；　reason；　incorruptible　and　selfconstrained；　always　confronts　the　maxim　of　the　will　in　any　action　with　the　pure　will；　that　is；　with　itself；　considering　itself　as　a　priori　practical。　Now　this　principle　of　morality；　just　on　account　of　the　universality　of　the　legislation　which　makes　it　the　formal　supreme　determining　principle　of　the　will；　without　regard　to　any　subjective　differentes；　is　declared　by　the　reason　to　be　a　law　for　all　rational　beings；　in　so　far　as　they　have　a　will；　that　is；　a　power　to　determine　their　causality　by　the　conception　of　rules；　and；　therefore；　so　far　as　they　are　capable　of　acting　according　to　principles；　and　consequently　also　according　to　practical　a　priori　principles　（for　these　alone　have　the　necessity　that　reason　requires　in　a　principle）。　It　is；　therefore；　not　limited　to　men　only；　but　applies　to　all　finite　beings　that　possess　reason　and　will；　nay；　it　even　includes　the　Infinite　Being　as　the　supreme　intelligence。　In　the　former　case；　however；　the　law　has　the　form　of　an　imperative；　because　in　them；　as　rational　beings；　we　can　suppose　a　pure　will；　but　being　creatures　affected