the critique of practical reason-第4节

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h　the　practical　use　of　reason。　In　this；　reason　is　concerned　with　the　grounds　of　determination　of　the　will；　which　is　a　faculty　either　to　produce　objects　corresponding　to　ideas；　or　to　determine　ourselves　to　the　effecting　of　such　objects　（whether　the　physical　power　is　sufficient　or　not）；　that　is；　to　determine　our　causality。　For　here；　reason　can　at　least　attain　so　far　as　to　determine　the　will；　and　has　always　objective　reality　in　so　far　as　it　is　the　volition　only　that　is　in　question。　The　first　question　here　then　is　whether　pure　reason　of　itself　alone　suffices　to　determine　the　will；　or　whether　it　can　be　a　ground　of　determination　only　as　dependent　on　empirical　conditions。　Now；　here　there　comes　in　a　notion　of　causality　justified　by　the　critique　of　the　pure　reason；　although　not　capable　of　being　presented　empirically；　viz。；　that　of　freedom；　and　if　we　can　now　discover　means　of　proving　that　this　property　does　in　fact　belong　to　the　human　will　（and　so　to　the　will　of　all　rational　beings）；　then　it　will　not　only　be　shown　that　pure　reason　can　be　practical；　but　that　it　alone；　and　not　reason　empirically　limited；　is　indubitably　practical；　consequently；　we　shall　have　to　make　a　critical　examination；　not　of　pure　practical　reason；　but　only　of　practical　reason　generally。　For　when　once　pure　reason　is　shown　to　exist；　it　needs　no　critical　examination。　For　reason　itself　contains　the　standard　for　the　critical　examination　of　every　use　of　it。　The　critique；　then；　of　practical　reason　generally　is　bound　to　prevent　the　empirically　conditioned　reason　from　claiming　exclusively　to　furnish　the　ground　of　determination　of　the　will。　If　it　is　proved　that　there　is　a　＇practical＇　reason；　its　employment　is　alone　immanent；　the　empirically　conditioned　use；　which　claims　supremacy；　is　on　the　contrary　transcendent　and　expresses　itself　in　demands　and　precepts　which　go　quite　beyond　its　sphere。　This　is　just　the　opposite　of　what　might　be　said　of　pure　reason　in　its　speculative　employment。　　　However；　as　it　is　still　pure　reason；　the　knowledge　of　which　is　here　the　foundation　of　its　practical　employment；　the　general　outline　of　the　classification　of　a　critique　of　practical　reason　must　be　arranged　in　accordance　with　that　of　the　speculative。　We　must；　then；　have　the　Elements　and　the　Methodology　of　it；　and　in　the　former　an　Analytic　as　the　rule　of　truth；　and　a　Dialectic　as　the　exposition　and　dissolution　of　the　illusion　in　the　judgements　of　practical　reason。　But　the　order　in　the　subdivision　of　the　Analytic　will　be　the　reverse　of　that　in　the　critique　of　the　pure　speculative　reason。　For；　in　the　present　case；　we　shall　commence　with　the　principles　and　proceed　to　the　concepts；　and　only　then；　if　possible；　to　the　senses；　whereas　in　the　case　of　the　speculative　reason　we　began　with　the　senses　and　had　to　end　with　the　principles。　The　reason　of　this　lies　again　in　this：　that　now　we　have　to　do　with　a　will；　and　have　to　consider　reason；　not　in　its　relation　to　objects；　but　to　this　will　and　its　causality。　We　must；　then；　begin　with　the　principles　of　a　causality　not　empirically　conditioned；　after　which　the　attempt　can　be　made　to　establish　our　notions　of　the　determining　grounds　of　such　a　will；　of　their　application　to　objects；　and　finally　to　the　subject　and　its　sense　faculty。　We　necessarily　begin　with　the　law　of　causality　from　freedom；　that　is；　with　a　pure　practical　principle；　and　this　determines　the　objects　to　which　alone　it　can　be　applied。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　PART。

　　　　　　　　　　　ELEMENTS　OF　PURE　PRACTICAL　REASON。

　　　　　　BOOK　I。　The　Analytic　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　　CHAPTER　I。　Of　the　Principles　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I。　DEFINITION。

　　Practical　principles　are　propositions　which　contain　a　general　determination　of　the　will；　having　under　it　several　practical　rules。　They　are　subjective；　or　maxims；　when　the　condition　is　regarded　by　the　subject　as　valid　only　for　his　own　will；　but　are　objective；　or　practical　laws；　when　the　condition　is　recognized　as　objective；　that　is；　valid　for　the　will　of　every　rational　being。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK。

　　Supposing　that　pure　reason　contains　in　itself　a　practical　motive；　that　is；　one　adequate　to　determine　the　will；　then　there　are　practical　laws；　otherwise　all　practical　principles　will　be　mere　maxims。　In　case　the　will　of　a　rational　being　is　pathologically　affected；　there　may　occur　a　conflict　of　the　maxims　with　the　practical　laws　recognized　by　itself。　For　example；　one　may　make　it　his　maxim　to　let　no　injury　pass　unrevenged；　and　yet　he　may　see　that　this　is　not　a　practical　law；　but　only　his　own　maxim；　that；　on　the　contrary；　regarded　as　being　in　one　and　the　same　maxim　a　rule　for　the　will　of　every　rational　being；　it　must　contradict　itself。　In　natural　philosophy　the　principles　of　what　happens；　e。g。；　the　principle　of　equality　of　action　and　reaction　in　the　communication　of　motion）　are　at　the　same　time　laws　of　nature；　for　the　use　of　reason　there　is　theoretical　and　determined　by　the　nature　of　the　object。　In　practical　philosophy；　i。e。；　that　which　has　to　do　only　with　the　grounds　of　determination　of　the　will；　the　principles　which　a　man　makes　for　himself　are　not　laws　by　which　one　is　inevitably　bound；　because　reason　in　practical　matters　has　to　do　with　the　subject；　namely；　with　the　faculty　of　desire；　the　special　character　of　which　may　occasion　variety　in　the　rule。　The　practical　rule　is　always　a　product　of　reason；　because　it　prescribes　action　as　a　means　to　the　effect。　But　in　the　case　of　a　being　with　whom　reason　does　not　of　itself　determine　the　will；　this　rule　is　an　imperative；　i。e。；　a　rule　characterized　by　〃shall；〃　which　expresses　the　objective　necessitation　of　the　action　and　signifies　that；　if　reason　completely　determined　the　will；　the　action　would　inevitably　take　place　according　to　this　rule。　Imperatives；　therefore；　are　objectively　valid；　and　are　quite　distinct　from　maxims；　which　are　subjective　principles。　The　former　either　determine　the　conditions　of　the　causality　of　the　rational　being　as　an　efficient　cause；　i。e。；　merely　in　reference　to　the　effect　and　the　means　of　attaining　it；　or　they　determine　the　will　only；　whether　it　is　adequate　to　the　effect　or　not。　The　former　would　be　hypothetical　imperatives；　and　contain　mere　precepts　of　skill；　the　latter；　on　the　contrary；　would　be　categorical；　and　would　alone　be　practical　laws。　Thus　maxims　are　principles；　but　not　imperatives。　Imperatives　themselves；　however；　when　they　are　conditional　（i。e。；　do　not　determine　the　will　simply　as　will；　but　only　in　respect　to　a　desired　effect；　that　is；　when　they　are　hypothetical　imperatives）；　are　practical　precepts　but　not　laws。　Laws　must　be　sufficient　to　determine　the　will　as　will；　even　before　I　ask　whether　I　have　power　sufficient　for　a　desired　effect；　or　the　means　necessary　to　produce　it；　hence　they　are　categorical：　otherwise　they　are　not　laws　at　all；　because　the　necessity　is　wanting；　which；　if　it　is　to　be　practical；　must　be　independent　of　conditions　which　are　pathological　and　are　therefore　only　contingently　connected　with　the　will。　Tell　a　man；　for　example；　that　he　must　be　industrious　and　thrifty　in　youth；　in　order　that　he　may　not　want　in　old　age；　this　is　a　correct　and　important　practical　precept　of　the　will。　But　it　is　easy　to　see　that　in　this　case　the　will　is　directed　to　something　else　which　it　is　presupposed　that　it　desires；　and　as　to　this　desire；　we　must　leave　it　to　the　actor　himself　whether　he　looks　forward　to　other　resources　than　those　of　his　own　acquisition；　or　does　not　expect　to　be　old；　or　thinks　that　in　case　of　future　necessity　he　will　be　able　to　make　shift　with　little。　Reason；　from　which　alone　can　spring　a　rule　involving　necessity；　does；　indeed；　give　necessity　to　this　precept　（else　it　would　not　be　an　imperative）；　but　this　is　a　necessity　dependent　on　subjective　conditions；　and　cannot　be　supposed　in　the　same　degree　in　all　subjects。　But　that　reason　may　give　laws　it　is　necessary　that　it　should　only　need　to　presuppose　itself；　because　rules　are　objectively　and　universally　valid　only　when　they　hold　without　any　contingent　subjective　conditions；　which　distinguish　one　rational　being　from　another。　Now　tell　a　man　that　he　should　never　make　a　deceitful　promise；　this　is　a　rule　which　only　concerns　his　will；　whether　the　purposes　he　may　have　can　be　attained　thereby　or　not；　it　is　the　volition　only　which　is　to　be　determined　a　priori　by　that　rule。　If　now　it　is　found　that　this　rule　is　practically　right；　then　it　is　a　law；　because　it　is　a　categorical　imperative。　Thus；　practical　laws　refer　to　the　will　only；　without　considering　what　is　attained　by　its　causality；　and　we　may　disregard　this　latter　（as　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense）　in　order　to　have　them　quite　pure。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　II。　THEOREM　I。

　　All　practical　principles　which　presuppose　an　object　（matter）　of　the　faculty　of　desire　as　the　ground　of　determination　of　the　will　are　empirical　and　can　furnish　no　practical　laws。　　　By　the　matter　of　the　faculty　of　desire　I　mean　an　object　the　realization　of　which　is　desired。　Now；　if　the　desire　for　this　object　precedes　the　practical　rule　and　is　the　condition　of　our　making　it　a　principle；　then　I　say　（in　the　first　place）　this　principle　is　in　that　case　wholly　empirical；　for　then　what　determines　the　choice　is　the　idea　of　an　object　and　that　relation　of　this　idea　to　the　subject　by　which　its　faculty　of　desire