the critique of practical reason-第36节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


e　law。　But　the　subjective　effect　of　this　law；　namely；　the　mental　disposition　conformed　to　it　and　made　necessary　by　it；　to　promote　the　practically　possible　summum　bonum；　this　pre…supposes　at　least　that　the　latter　is　possible；　for　it　would　be　practically　impossible　to　strive　after　the　object　of　a　conception　which　at　bottom　was　empty　and　had　no　object。　Now　the　above…mentioned　postulates　concern　only　the　physical　or　metaphysical　conditions　of　the　possibility　of　the　summum　bonum；　in　a　word；　those　which　lie　in　the　nature　of　things；　not；　however；　for　the　sake　of　an　arbitrary　speculative　purpose；　but　of　a　practically　necessary　end　of　a　pure　rational　will；　which　in　this　case　does　not　choose；　but　obeys　an　inexorable　command　of　reason；　the　foundation　of　which　is　objective；　in　the　constitution　of　things　as　they　must　be　universally　judged　by　pure　reason；　and　is　not　based　on　inclination；　for　we　are　in　nowise　justified　in　assuming；　on　account　of　what　we　wish　on　merely　subjective　grounds；　that　the　means　thereto　are　possible　or　that　its　object　is　real。　This；　then；　is　an　absolutely　necessary　requirement；　and　what　it　pre…supposes　is　not　merely　justified　as　an　allowable　hypothesis；　but　as　a　postulate　in　a　practical　point　of　view；　and　admitting　that　the　pure　moral　law　inexorably　binds　every　man　as　a　command　（not　as　a　rule　of　prudence）；　the　righteous　man　may　say：　〃I　will　that　there　be　a　God；　that　my　existence　in　this　world　be　also　an　existence　outside　the　chain　of　physical　causes　and　in　a　pure　world　of　the　understanding；　and　lastly；　that　my　duration　be　endless；　I　firmly　abide　by　this；　and　will　not　let　this　faith　be　taken　from　me；　for　in　this　instance　alone　my　interest；　because　I　must　not　relax　anything　of　it；　inevitably　determines　my　judgement；　without　regarding　sophistries；　however　unable　I　may　be　to　answer　them　or　to　oppose　them　with　others　more　plausible。*＇2＇

　　*But　even　here　we　should　not　be　able　to　allege　a　requirement　of　reason；　if　we　had　not　before　our　eyes　a　problematical；　but　yet　inevitable；　conception　of　reason；　namely；　that　of　an　absolutely　necessary　being。　This　conception　now　seeks　to　be　defined；　and　this；　in　addition　to　the　tendency　to　extend　itself；　is　the　objective　ground　of　a　requirement　of　speculative　reason；　namely；　to　have　a　more　precise　definition　of　the　conception　of　a　necessary　being　which　is　to　serve　as　the　first　cause　of　other　beings；　so　as　to　make　these　latter　knowable　by　some　means。　Without　such　antecedent　necessary　problems　there　are　no　requirements…　at　least　not　of　pure　reason…　the　rest　are　requirements　of　inclination。　　　*＇2＇　In　the　Deutsches　Museum；　February；　1787；　there　is　a　dissertation　by　a　very　subtle　and　clear…headed　man；　the　late　Wizenmann；　whose　early　death　is　to　be　lamented；　in　which　he　disputes　the　right　to　argue　from　a　want　to　the　objective　reality　of　its　object；　and　illustrates　the　point　by　the　example　of　a　man　in　love；　who　having　fooled　himself　into　an　idea　of　beauty；　which　is　merely　a　chimera　of　his　own　brain；　would　fain　conclude　that　such　an　object　really　exists　somewhere。　I　quite　agree　with　him　in　this；　in　all　cases　where　the　want　is　founded　on　inclination；　which　cannot　necessarily　postulate　the　existence　of　its　object　even　for　the　man　that　is　affected　by　it；　much　less　can　it　contain　a　demand　valid　for　everyone；　and　therefore　it　is　merely　a　subjective　ground　of　the　wish。　But　in　the　present　case　we　have　a　want　of　reason　springing　from　an　objective　determining　principle　of　the　will；　namely；　the　moral　law；　which　necessarily　binds　every　rational　being；　and　therefore　justifies　him　in　assuming　a　priori　in　nature　the　conditions　proper　for　it；　and　makes　the　latter　inseparable　from　the　complete　practical　use　of　reason。　It　is　a　duty　to　realize　the　summum　bonum　to　the　utmost　of　our　power；　therefore　it　must　be　possible；　consequently　it　is　unavoidable　for　every　rational　being　in　the　world　to　assume　what　is　necessary　for　its　objective　possibility。　The　assumption　is　as　necessary　as　the　moral　law；　in　connection　with　which　alone　it　is　valid。

　　In　order　to　prevent　misconception　in　the　use　of　a　notion　as　yet　so　unusual　as　that　of　a　faith　of　pure　practical　reason；　let　me　be　permitted　to　add　one　more　remark。　It　might　almost　seem　as　if　this　rational　faith　were　here　announced　as　itself　a　command；　namely；　that　we　should　assume　the　summum　bonum　as　possible。　But　a　faith　that　is　commanded　is　nonsense。　Let　the　preceding　analysis；　however；　be　remembered　of　what　is　required　to　be　supposed　in　the　conception　of　the　summum　bonum；　and　it　will　be　seen　that　it　cannot　be　commanded　to　assume　this　possibility；　and　no　practical　disposition　of　mind　is　required　to　admit　it；　but　that　speculative　reason　must　concede　it　without　being　asked；　for　no　one　can　affirm　that　it　is　impossible　in　itself　that　rational　beings　in　the　world　should　at　the　same　time　be　worthy　of　happiness　in　conformity　with　the　moral　law　and　also　possess　this　happiness　proportionately。　Now　in　respect　of　the　first　element　of　the　summum　bonum；　namely；　that　which　concerns　morality；　the　moral　law　gives　merely　a　command；　and　to　doubt　the　possibility　of　that　element　would　be　the　same　as　to　call　in　question　the　moral　law　itself。　But　as　regards　the　second　element　of　that　object；　namely；　happiness　perfectly　proportioned　to　that　worthiness；　it　is　true　that　there　is　no　need　of　a　command　to　admit　its　possibility　in　general；　for　theoretical　reason　has　nothing　to　say　against　it；　but　the　manner　in　which　we　have　to　conceive　this　harmony　of　the　laws　of　nature　with　those　of　freedom　has　in　it　something　in　respect　of　which　we　have　a　choice；　because　theoretical　reason　decides　nothing　with　apodeictic　certainty　about　it；　and　in　respect　of　this　there　may　be　a　moral　interest　which　turns　the　scale。　　　I　had　said　above　that　in　a　mere　course　of　nature　in　the　world　an　accurate　correspondence　between　happiness　and　moral　worth　is　not　to　be　expected　and　must　be　regarded　as　impossible；　and　that　therefore　the　possibility　of　the　summum　bonum　cannot　be　admitted　from　this　side　except　on　the　supposition　of　a　moral　Author　of　the　world。　I　purposely　reserved　the　restriction　of　this　judgement　to　the　subjective　conditions　of　our　reason；　in　order　not　to　make　use　of　it　until　the　manner　of　this　belief　should　be　defined　more　precisely。　The　fact　is　that　the　impossibility　referred　to　is　merely　subjective；　that　is；　our　reason　finds　it　impossible　for　it　to　render　conceivable　in　the　way　of　a　mere　course　of　nature　a　connection　so　exactly　proportioned　and　so　thoroughly　adapted　to　an　end；　between　two　sets　of　events　happening　according　to　such　distinct　laws；　although；　as　with　everything　else　in　nature　that　is　adapted　to　an　end；　it　cannot　prove；　that　is；　show　by　sufficient　objective　reason；　that　it　is　not　possible　by　universal　laws　of　nature。　　　Now；　however；　a　deciding　principle　of　a　different　kind　comes　into　play　to　turn　the　scale　in　this　uncertainty　of　speculative　reason。　The　command　to　promote　the　summum　bonum　is　established　on　an　objective　basis　（in　practical　reason）；　the　possibility　of　the　same　in　general　is　likewise　established　on　an　objective　basis　（in　theoretical　reason；　which　has　nothing　to　say　against　it）。　But　reason　cannot　decide　objectively　in　what　way　we　are　to　conceive　this　possibility；　whether　by　universal　laws　of　nature　without　a　wise　Author　presiding　over　nature；　or　only　on　supposition　of　such　an　Author。　Now　here　there　comes　in　a　subjective　condition　of　reason；　the　only　way　theoretically　possible　for　it；　of　conceiving　the　exact　harmony　of　the　kingdom　of　nature　with　the　kingdom　of　morals；　which　is　the　condition　of　the　possibility　of　the　summum　bonum；　and　at　the　same　time　the　only　one　conducive　to　morality　（which　depends　on　an　objective　law　of　reason）。　Now　since　the　promotion　of　this　summum　bonum；　and　therefore　the　supposition　of　its　possibility；　are　objectively　necessary　（though　only　as　a　result　of　practical　reason）；　while　at　the　same　time　the　manner　in　which　we　would　conceive　it　rests　with　our　own　choice；　and　in　this　choice　a　free　interest　of　pure　practical　reason　decides　for　the　assumption　of　a　wise　Author　of　the　world；　it　is　clear　that　the　principle　that　herein　determines　our　judgement；　though　as　a　want　it　is　subjective；　yet　at　the　same　time　being　the　means　of　promoting　what　is　objectively　（practically）　necessary；　is　the　foundation　of　a　maxim　of　belief　in　a　moral　point　of　view；　that　is；　a　faith　of　pure　practical　reason。　This；　then；　is　not　commanded；　but　being　a　voluntary　determination　of　our　judgement；　conducive　to　the　moral　（commanded）　purpose；　and　moreover　harmonizing　with　the　theoretical　requirement　of　reason；　to　assume　that　existence　and　to　make　it　the　foundation　of　our　further　employment　of　reason；　it　has　itself　sprung　from　the　moral　disposition　of　mind；　it　may　therefore　at　times　waver　even　in　the　well…disposed；　but　can　never　be　reduced　to　unbelief。

　　　　IX。　Of　the　Wise　Adaptation　of　Man's　Cognitive　Faculties　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　to　his　Practical　Destination。

　　If　human　nature　is　destined　to　endeavour　after　the　summum　bonum；　we　must　suppose　also　that　the　measure　of　its　cognitive　faculties；　and　particularly　their　relation　to　one　another；　is　suitable　to　this　end。　Now　the　Critique　of　Pure　Speculative　Reason　proves　that　this　is　incapable　of　solving　satisfactorily　the　most　weighty　problems　that　are　proposed　to　it；　although　it