the critique of practical reason-第30节

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condly；　in　that　which　is　not　in　our　power；　but　which　reason　presents　to　us　as　the　supplement　of　our　impotence；　for　the　realization　of　the　summum　bonum　（which　by　practical　principles　is　necessary）。

　　　　III。　Of　the　Primacy　of　Pure　Practical　Reason　in　its　　　　　　　　　　　　Union　with　the　Speculative　Reason。

　　By　primacy　between　two　or　more　things　connected　by　reason；　I　understand　the　prerogative；　belonging　to　one；　of　being　the　first　determining　principle　in　the　connection　with　all　the　rest。　In　a　narrower　practical　sense　it　means　the　prerogative　of　the　interest　of　one　in　so　far　as　the　interest　of　the　other　is　subordinated　to　it；　while　it　is　not　postponed　to　any　other。　To　every　faculty　of　the　mind　we　can　attribute　an　interest；　that　is；　a　principle；　that　contains　the　condition　on　which　alone　the　former　is　called　into　exercise。　Reason；　as　the　faculty　of　principles；　determines　the　interest　of　all　the　powers　of　the　mind　and　is　determined　by　its　own。　The　interest　of　its　speculative　employment　consists　in　the　cognition　of　the　object　pushed　to　the　highest　a　priori　principles：　that　of　its　practical　employment；　in　the　determination　of　the　will　in　respect　of　the　final　and　complete　end。　As　to　what　is　necessary　for　the　possibility　of　any　employment　of　reason　at　all；　namely；　that　its　principles　and　affirmations　should　not　contradict　one　another；　this　constitutes　no　part　of　its　interest；　but　is　the　condition　of　having　reason　at　all；　it　is　only　its　development；　not　mere　consistency　with　itself；　that　is　reckoned　as　its　interest。　　　If　practical　reason　could　not　assume　or　think　as　given　anything　further　than　what　speculative　reason　of　itself　could　offer　it　from　its　own　insight；　the　latter　would　have　the　primacy。　But　supposing　that　it　had　of　itself　original　a　priori　principles　with　which　certain　theoretical　positions　were　inseparably　connected；　while　these　were　withdrawn　from　any　possible　insight　of　speculative　reason　（which；　however；　they　must　not　contradict）；　then　the　question　is：　Which　interest　is　the　superior　（not　which　must　give　way；　for　they　are　not　necessarily　conflicting）；　whether　speculative　reason；　which　knows　nothing　of　all　that　the　practical　offers　for　its　acceptance；　should　take　up　these　propositions　and　（although　they　transcend　it）　try　to　unite　them　with　its　own　concepts　as　a　foreign　possession　handed　over　to　it；　or　whether　it　is　justified　in　obstinately　following　its　own　separate　interest　and；　according　to　the　canonic　of　Epicurus；　rejecting　as　vain　subtlety　everything　that　cannot　accredit　its　objective　reality　by　manifest　examples　to　be　shown　in　experience；　even　though　it　should　be　never　so　much　interwoven　with　the　interest　of　the　practical　（pure）　use　of　reason；　and　in　itself　not　contradictory　to　the　theoretical；　merely　because　it　infringes　on　the　interest　of　the　speculative　reason　to　this　extent；　that　it　removes　the　bounds　which　this　latter　had　set　to　itself；　and　gives　it　up　to　every　nonsense　or　delusion　of　imagination？　　　In　fact；　so　far　as　practical　reason　is　taken　as　dependent　on　pathological　conditions；　that　is；　as　merely　regulating　the　inclinations　under　the　sensible　principle　of　happiness；　we　could　not　require　speculative　reason　to　take　its　principles　from　such　a　source。　Mohammed's　paradise；　or　the　absorption　into　the　Deity　of　the　theosophists　and　mystics　would　press　their　monstrosities　on　the　reason　according　to　the　taste　of　each；　and　one　might　as　well　have　no　reason　as　surrender　it　in　such　fashion　to　all　sorts　of　dreams。　But　if　pure　reason　of　itself　can　be　practical　and　is　actually　so；　as　the　consciousness　of　the　moral　law　proves；　then　it　is　still　only　one　and　the　same　reason　which；　whether　in　a　theoretical　or　a　practical　point　of　view；　judges　according　to　a　priori　principles；　and　then　it　is　clear　that　although　it　is　in　the　first　point　of　view　incompetent　to　establish　certain　propositions　positively；　which；　however；　do　not　contradict　it；　then；　as　soon　as　these　propositions　are　inseparably　attached　to　the　practical　interest　of　pure　reason；　it　must　accept　them；　though　it　be　as　something　offered　to　it　from　a　foreign　source；　something　that　has　not　grown　on　its　own　ground；　but　yet　is　sufficiently　authenticated；　and　it　must　try　to　compare　and　connect　them　with　everything　that　it　has　in　its　power　as　speculative　reason。　It　must　remember；　however；　that　these　are　not　additions　to　its　insight；　but　yet　are　extensions　of　its　employment　in　another；　namely；　a　practical　aspect；　and　this　is　not　in　the　least　opposed　to　its　interest；　which　consists　in　the　restriction　of　wild　speculation。　　　Thus；　when　pure　speculative　and　pure　practical　reason　are　combined　in　one　cognition；　the　latter　has　the　primacy；　provided；　namely；　that　this　combination　is　not　contingent　and　arbitrary；　but　founded　a　priori　on　reason　itself　and　therefore　necessary。　For　without　this　subordination　there　would　arise　a　conflict　of　reason　with　itself；　since；　if　they　were　merely　co…ordinate；　the　former　would　close　its　boundaries　strictly　and　admit　nothing　from　the　latter　into　its　domain；　while　the　latter　would　extend　its　bounds　over　everything　and　when　its　needs　required　would　seek　to　embrace　the　former　within　them。　Nor　could　we　reverse　the　order　and　require　pure　practical　reason　to　be　subordinate　to　the　speculative；　since　all　interest　is　ultimately　practical；　and　even　that　of　speculative　reason　is　conditional；　and　it　is　only　in　the　practical　employment　of　reason　that　it　is　complete。

　　　　　IV。　The　Immortality　of　the　Soul　as　a　Postulate　of　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　The　realization　of　the　summum　bonum　in　the　world　is　the　necessary　object　of　a　will　determinable　by　the　moral　law。　But　in　this　will　the　perfect　accordance　of　the　mind　with　the　moral　law　is　the　supreme　condition　of　the　summum　bonum。　This　then　must　be　possible；　as　well　as　its　object；　since　it　is　contained　in　the　command　to　promote　the　latter。　Now；　the　perfect　accordance　of　the　will　with　the　moral　law　is　holiness；　a　perfection　of　which　no　rational　being　of　the　sensible　world　is　capable　at　any　moment　of　his　existence。　Since；　nevertheless；　it　is　required　as　practically　necessary；　it　can　only　be　found　in　a　progress　in　infinitum　towards　that　perfect　accordance；　and　on　the　principles　of　pure　practical　reason　it　is　necessary　to　assume　such　a　practical　progress　as　the　real　object　of　our　will。　　　Now；　this　endless　progress　is　only　possible　on　the　supposition　of　an　endless　duration　of　the　existence　and　personality　of　the　same　rational　being　（which　is　called　the　immortality　of　the　soul）。　The　summum　bonum；　then；　practically　is　only　possible　on　the　supposition　of　the　immortality　of　the　soul；　consequently　this　immortality；　being　inseparably　connected　with　the　moral　law；　is　a　postulate　of　pure　practical　reason　（by　which　I　mean　a　theoretical　proposition；　not　demonstrable　as　such；　but　which　is　an　inseparable　result　of　an　unconditional　a　priori　practical　law。　　　This　principle　of　the　moral　destination　of　our　nature；　namely；　that　it　is　only　in　an　endless　progress　that　we　can　attain　perfect　accordance　with　the　moral　law；　is　of　the　greatest　use；　not　merely　for　the　present　purpose　of　supplementing　the　impotence　of　speculative　reason；　but　also　with　respect　to　religion。　In　default　of　it；　either　the　moral　law　is　quite　degraded　from　its　holiness；　being　made　out　to　be　indulgent　and　conformable　to　our　convenience；　or　else　men　strain　their　notions　of　their　vocation　and　their　expectation　to　an　unattainable　goal；　hoping　to　acquire　complete　holiness　of　will；　and　so　they　lose　themselves　in　fanatical　theosophic　dreams；　which　wholly　contradict　self…knowledge。　In　both　cases　the　unceasing　effort　to　obey　punctually　and　thoroughly　a　strict　and　inflexible　command　of　reason；　which　yet　is　not　ideal　but　real；　is　only　hindered。　For　a　rational　but　finite　being；　the　only　thing　possible　is　an　endless　progress　from　the　lower　to　higher　degrees　of　moral　perfection。　The　Infinite　Being；　to　whom　the　condition　of　time　is　nothing；　sees　in　this　to　us　endless　succession　a　whole　of　accordance　with　the　moral　law；　and　the　holiness　which　his　command　inexorably　requires；　in　order　to　be　true　to　his　justice　in　the　share　which　He　assigns　to　each　in　the　summum　bonum；　is　to　be　found　in　a　single　intellectual　intuition　of　the　whole　existence　of　rational　beings。　All　that　can　be　expected　of　the　creature　in　respect　of　the　hope　of　this　participation　would　be　the　consciousness　of　his　tried　character；　by　which　from　the　progress　he　has　hitherto　made　from　the　worse　to　the　morally　better；　and　the　immutability　of　purpose　which　has　thus　become　known　to　him；　he　may　hope　for　a　further　unbroken　continuance　of　the　same；　however　long　his　existence　may　last；　even　beyond　this　life；*　and　thus　he　may　hope；　not　indeed　here；　nor　in　any　imaginable　point　of　his　future　existence；　but　only　in　the　endlessness　of　his　duration　（which　God　alone　can　survey）　to　be　perfectly　adequate　to　his　will　（without　indulgence　or　excuse；　which　do　not　harmonize　with　justice）。

　　*It　seems；　nevertheless；　impossible　for　a　creature　to　have　the　conviction　of　his　unwavering　firmness　of　mind　in　the　progress　towards　goodness。　On　this　account　the　Christian　religion　makes　it　come　only　from　the　same　Spirit　that　works　sanctification；　that　is；　this　firm　purpose；　and　with　it　the　consciousness　of　steadfastness　in　the　moral　progress。　But　natural