the critique of practical reason-第3节

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otions　is　a　childish　effort　to　distinguish　oneself　from　the　crowd；　if　not　by　new　and　true　thoughts；　yet　by　new　patches　on　the　old　garment。　If；　therefore；　the　readers　of　that　work　know　any　more　familiar　expressions　which　are　as　suitable　to　the　thought　as　those　seem　to　me　to　be；　or　if　they　think　they　can　show　the　futility　of　these　thoughts　themselves　and　hence　that　of　the　expression；　they　would；　in　the　first　case；　very　much　oblige　me；　for　I　only　desire　to　be　understood：　and；　in　the　second　case；　they　would　deserve　well　of　philosophy。　But；　as　long　as　these　thoughts　stand；　I　very　much　doubt　that　suitable　and　yet　more　common　expressions　for　them　can　be　found。*

　　*I　am　more　afraid　in　the　present　treatise　of　occasional　misconception　in　respect　of　some　expressions　which　I　have　chosen　with　the　greatest　care　in　order　that　the　notion　to　which　they　point　may　not　be　missed。　Thus；　in　the　table　of　categories　of　the　Practical　reason　under　the　title　of　Modality；　the　Permitted；　and　forbidden　（in　a　practical　objective　point　of　view；　possible　and　impossible）　have　almost　the　same　meaning　in　common　language　as　the　next　category；　duty　and　contrary　to　duty。　Here；　however；　the　former　means　what　coincides　with；　or　contradicts；　a　merely　possible　practical　precept　（for　example；　the　solution　of　all　problems　of　geometry　and　mechanics）；　the　latter；　what　is　similarly　related　to　a　law　actually　present　in　the　reason；　and　this　distinction　is　not　quite　foreign　even　to　common　language；　although　somewhat　unusual。　For　example；　it　is　forbidden　to　an　orator；　as　such；　to　forge　new　words　or　constructions；　in　a　certain　degree　this　is　permitted　to　a　poet；　in　neither　case　is　there　any　question　of　duty。　For　if　anyone　chooses　to　forfeit　his　reputation　as　an　orator；　no　one　can　prevent　him。　We　have　here　only　to　do　with　the　distinction　of　imperatives　into　problematical；　assertorial；　and　apodeictic。　Similarly　in　the　note　in　which　I　have　pared　the　moral　ideas　of　practical　perfection　in　different　philosophical　schools；　I　have　distinguished　the　idea　of　wisdom　from　that　of　holiness；　although　I　have　stated　that　essentially　and　objectively　they　are　the　same。　But　in　that　place　I　understand　by　the　former　only　that　wisdom　to　which　man　（the　Stoic）　lays　claim；　therefore　I　take　it　subjectively　as　an　attribute　alleged　to　belong　to　man。　（Perhaps　the　expression　virtue；　with　which　also　the　made　great　show；　would　better　mark　the　characteristic　of　his　school。）　The　expression　of　a　postulate　of　pure　practical　reason　might　give　most　occasion　to　misapprehension　in　case　the　reader　confounded　it　with　the　signification　of　the　postulates　in　pure　mathematics；　which　carry　apodeictic　certainty　with　them。　These；　however；　postulate　the　possibility　of　an　action；　the　object　of　which　has　been　previously　recognized　a　priori　in　theory　as　possible；　and　that　with　perfect　certainty。　But　the　former　postulates　the　possibility　of　an　object　itself　（God　and　the　immortality　of　the　soul）　from　apodeictic　practical　laws；　and　therefore　only　for　the　purposes　of　a　practical　reason。　This　certainty　of　the　postulated　possibility　then　is　not　at　all　theoretic；　and　consequently　not　apodeictic；　that　is　to　say；　it　is　not　a　known　necessity　as　regards　the　object；　but　a　necessary　supposition　as　regards　the　subject；　necessary　for　the　obedience　to　its　objective　but　practical　laws。　It　is；　therefore；　merely　a　necessary　hypothesis。　I　could　find　no　better　expression　for　this　rational　necessity；　which　is　subjective；　but　yet　true　and　unconditional。

　　In　this　manner；　then；　the　a　priori　principles　of　two　faculties　of　the　mind；　the　faculty　of　cognition　and　that　of　desire；　would　be　found　and　determined　as　to　the　conditions；　extent；　and　limits　of　their　use；　and　thus　a　sure　foundation　be　paid　for　a　scientific　system　of　philosophy；　both　theoretic　and　practical。　　　Nothing　worse　could　happen　to　these　labours　than　that　anyone　should　make　the　unexpected　discovery　that　there　neither　is；　nor　can　be；　any　a　priori　knowledge　at　all。　But　there　is　no　danger　of　this。　This　would　be　the　same　thing　as　if　one　sought　to　prove　by　reason　that　there　is　no　reason。　For　we　only　say　that　we　know　something　by　reason；　when　we　are　conscious　that　we　could　have　known　it；　even　if　it　had　not　been　given　to　us　in　experience；　hence　rational　knowledge　and　knowledge　a　priori　are　one　and　the　same。　It　is　a　clear　contradiction　to　try　to　extract　necessity　from　a　principle　of　experience　（ex　pumice　aquam）；　and　to　try　by　this　to　give　a　judgement　true　universality　（without　which　there　is　no　rational　inference；　not　even　inference　from　analogy；　which　is　at　least　a　presumed　universality　and　objective　necessity）。　To　substitute　subjective　necessity；　that　is；　custom；　for　objective；　which　exists　only　in　a　priori　judgements；　is　to　deny　to　reason　the　power　of　judging　about　the　object；　i。e。；　of　knowing　it；　and　what　belongs　to　it。　It　implies；　for　example；　that　we　must　not　say　of　something　which　often　or　always　follows　a　certain　antecedent　state　that　we　can　conclude　from　this　to　that　（for　this　would　imply　objective　necessity　and　the　notion　of　an　a　priori　connexion）；　but　only　that　we　may　expect　similar　cases　（just　as　animals　do）；　that　is　that　we　reject　the　notion　of　cause　altogether　as　false　and　a　mere　delusion。　As　to　attempting　to　remedy　this　want　of　objective　and　consequently　universal　validity　by　saying　that　we　can　see　no　ground　for　attributing　any　other　sort　of　knowledge　to　other　rational　beings；　if　this　reasoning　were　valid；　our　ignorance　would　do　more　for　the　enlargement　of　our　knowledge　than　all　our　meditation。　For；　then；　on　this　very　ground　that　we　have　no　knowledge　of　any　other　rational　beings　besides　man；　we　should　have　a　right　to　suppose　them　to　be　of　the　same　nature　as　we　know　ourselves　to　be：　that　is；　we　should　really　know　them。　I　omit　to　mention　that　universal　assent　does　not　prove　the　objective　validity　of　a　judgement　（i。e。；　its　validity　as　a　cognition）；　and　although　this　universal　assent　should　accidentally　happen；　it　could　furnish　no　proof　of　agreement　with　the　object；　on　the　contrary；　it　is　the　objective　validity　which　alone　constitutes　the　basis　of　a　necessary　universal　consent。　　　Hume　would　be　quite　satisfied　with　this　system　of　universal　empiricism；　for；　as　is　well　known；　he　desired　nothing　more　than　that；　instead　of　ascribing　any　objective　meaning　to　the　necessity　in　the　concept　of　cause；　a　merely　subjective　one　should　be　assumed；　viz。；　custom；　in　order　to　deny　that　reason　could　judge　about　God；　freedom；　and　immortality；　and　if　once　his　principles　were　granted；　he　was　certainly　well　able　to　deduce　his　conclusions　therefrom；　with　all　logical　coherence。　But　even　Hume　did　not　make　his　empiricism　so　universal　as　to　include　mathematics。　He　holds　the　principles　of　mathematics　to　be　analytical；　and　if　his　were　correct；　they　would　certainly　be　apodeictic　also：　but　we　could　not　infer　from　this　that　reason　has　the　faculty　of　forming　apodeictic　judgements　in　philosophy　also…　that　is　to　say；　those　which　are　synthetical　judgements；　like　the　judgement　of　causality。　But　if　we　adopt　a　universal　empiricism；　then　mathematics　will　be　included。　　　Now　if　this　science　is　in　contradiction　with　a　reason　that　admits　only　empirical　principles；　as　it　inevitably　is　in　the　antinomy　in　which　mathematics　prove　the　infinite　divisibility　of　space；　which　empiricism　cannot　admit；　then　the　greatest　possible　evidence　of　demonstration　is　in　manifest　contradiction　with　the　alleged　conclusions　from　experience；　and　we　are　driven　to　ask；　like　Cheselden's　blind　patient；　〃Which　deceives　me；　sight　or　touch？〃　（for　empiricism　is　based　on　a　necessity　felt；　rationalism　on　a　necessity　seen）。　And　thus　universal　empiricism　reveals　itself　as　absolute　scepticism。　It　is　erroneous　to　attribute　this　in　such　an　unqualified　sense　to　Hume；*　since　he　left　at　least　one　certain　touchstone　（which　can　only　be　found　in　a　priori　principles）；　although　experience　consists　not　only　of　feelings；　but　also　of　judgements。

　　*Names　that　designate　the　followers　of　a　sect　have　always　been　accompanied　with　much　injustice；　just　as　if　one　said；　〃N　is　an　Idealist。〃　For　although　he　not　only　admits；　but　even　insists；　that　our　ideas　of　external　things　have　actual　objects　of　external　things　corresponding　to　them；　yet　he　holds　that　the　form　of　the　intuition　does　not　depend　on　them　but　on　the　human　mind。

　　However；　as　in　this　philosophical　and　critical　age　such　empiricism　can　scarcely　be　serious；　and　it　is　probably　put　forward　only　as　an　intellectual　exercise　and　for　the　purpose　of　putting　in　a　clearer　light；　by　contrast；　the　necessity　of　rational　a　priori　principles；　we　can　only　be　grateful　to　those　who　employ　themselves　in　this　otherwise　uninstructive　labour。　INTRODUCTION　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　INTRODUCTION。

　　　　　　　Of　the　Idea　of　a　Critique　of　Practical　Reason。

　　The　theoretical　use　of　reason　was　concerned　with　objects　of　the　cognitive　faculty　only；　and　a　critical　examination　of　it　with　reference　to　this　use　applied　properly　only　to　the　pure　faculty　of　cognition；　because　this　raised　the　suspicion；　which　was　afterwards　confirmed；　that　it　might　easily　pass　beyond　its　limits；　and　be　lost　among　unattainable　objects；　or　even　contradictory　notions。　It　is　quite　different　with　the　practical　use　of　reason。　In　this；　reason　is　concerned　with　the　grounds　of　determination　of　the