the critique of practical reason-第26节

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the　concept　of　them。　I　presently　find　that　as　I　cannot　think　anything　without　a　category；　I　must　first　look　for　a　category　for　the　rational　idea　of　freedom　with　which　I　am　now　concerned；　and　this　is　the　category　of　causality；　and　although　freedom；　a　concept　of　the　reason；　being　a　transcendent　concept；　cannot　have　any　intuition　corresponding　to　it；　yet　the　concept　of　the　understanding…　for　the　synthesis　of　which　the　former　demands　the　unconditioned…　（namely；　the　concept　of　causality）　must　have　a　sensible　intuition　given；　by　which　first　its　objective　reality　is　assured。　Now；　the　categories　are　all　divided　into　two　classes…　the　mathematical；　which　concern　the　unity　of　synthesis　in　the　conception　of　objects；　and　the　dynamical；　which　refer　to　the　unity　of　synthesis　in　the　conception　of　the　existence　of　objects。　The　former　（those　of　magnitude　and　quality）　always　contain　a　synthesis　of　the　homogeneous；　and　it　is　not　possible　to　find　in　this　the　unconditioned　antecedent　to　what　is　given　in　sensible　intuition　as　conditioned　in　space　and　time；　as　this　would　itself　have　to　belong　to　space　and　time；　and　therefore　be　again　still　conditioned。　Whence　it　resulted　in　the　Dialectic　of　Pure　Theoretic　Reason　that　the　opposite　methods　of　attaining　the　unconditioned　and　the　totality　of　the　conditions　were　both　wrong。　The　categories　of　the　second　class　（those　of　causality　and　of　the　necessity　of　a　thing）　did　not　require　this　homogeneity　（of　the　conditioned　and　the　condition　in　synthesis）；　since　here　what　we　have　to　explain　is　not　how　the　intuition　is　compounded　from　a　manifold　in　it；　but　only　how　the　existence　of　the　conditioned　object　corresponding　to　it　is　added　to　the　existence　of　the　condition　（added；　namely；　in　the　understanding　as　connected　therewith）；　and　in　that　case　it　was　allowable　to　suppose　in　the　supersensible　world　the　unconditioned　antecedent　to　the　altogether　conditioned　in　the　world　of　sense　（both　as　regards　the　causal　connection　and　the　contingent　existence　of　things　themselves）；　although　this　unconditioned　remained　indeterminate；　and　to　make　the　synthesis　transcendent。　Hence；　it　was　found　in　the　Dialectic　of　the　Pure　Speculative　Reason　that　the　two　apparently　opposite　methods　of　obtaining　for　the　conditioned　the　unconditioned　were　not　really　contradictory；　e。g。；　in　the　synthesis　of　causality　to　conceive　for　the　conditioned　in　the　series　of　causes　and　effects　of　the　sensible　world；　a　causality　which　has　no　sensible　condition；　and　that　the　same　action　which；　as　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　is　always　sensibly　conditioned；　that　is；　mechanically　necessary；　yet　at　the　same　time　may　be　derived　from　a　causality　not　sensibly　conditioned…　being　the　causality　of　the　acting　being　as　belonging　to　the　supersensible　world…　and　may　consequently　be　conceived　as　free。　Now；　the　only　point　in　question　was　to　change　this　may　be　into　is；　that　is；　that　we　should　be　able　to　show　in　an　actual　case；　as　it　were　by　a　fact；　that　certain　actions　imply　such　a　causality　（namely；　the　intellectual；　sensibly　unconditioned）；　whether　they　are　actual　or　only　commanded；　that　is；　objectively　necessary　in　a　practical　sense。　We　could　not　hope　to　find　this　connections　in　actions　actually　given　in　experience　as　events　of　the　sensible　world；　since　causality　with　freedom　must　always　be　sought　outside　the　world　of　sense　in　the　world　of　intelligence。　But　things　of　sense　of　sense　in　the　world　of　intelligence。　But　things　of　sense　are　the　only　things　offered　to　our　perception　and　observation。　Hence；　nothing　remained　but　to　find　an　incontestable　objective　principle　of　causality　which　excludes　all　sensible　conditions：　that　is；　a　principle　in　which　reason　does　not　appeal　further　to　something　else　as　a　determining　ground　of　its　causality；　but　contains　this　determining　ground　itself　by　means　of　that　principle；　and　in　which　therefore　it　is　itself　as　pure　reason　practical。　Now；　this　principle　had　not　to　be　searched　for　or　discovered；　it　had　long　been　in　the　reason　of　all　men；　and　incorporated　in　their　nature；　and　is　the　principle　of　morality。　Therefore；　that　unconditioned　causality；　with　the　faculty　of　it；　namely；　freedom；　is　no　longer　merely　indefinitely　and　problematically　thought　（this　speculative　reason　could　prove　to　be　feasible）；　but　is　even　as　regards　the　law　of　its　causality　definitely　and　assertorially　known；　and　with　it　the　fact　that　a　being　（I　myself）；　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　belongs　also　to　the　supersensible　world；　this　is　also　positively　known；　and　thus　the　reality　of　the　supersensible　world　is　established　and　in　practical　respects　definitely　given；　and　this　definiteness；　which　for　theoretical　purposes　would　be　transcendent；　is　for　practical　purposes　immanent。　We　could　not；　however；　make　a　similar　step　as　regards　the　second　dynamical　idea；　namely；　that　of　a　necessary　being。　We　could　not　rise　to　it　from　the　sensible　world　without　the　aid　of　the　first　dynamical　idea。　For　if　we　attempted　to　do　so；　we　should　have　ventured　to　leave　at　a　bound　all　that　is　given　to　us；　and　to　leap　to　that　of　which　nothing　is　given　us　that　can　help　us　to　effect　the　connection　of　such　a　supersensible　being　with　the　world　of　sense　（since　the　necessary　being　would　have　to　be　known　as　given　outside　ourselves）。　On　the　other　hand；　it　is　now　obvious　that　this　connection　is　quite　possible　in　relation　to　our　own　subject；　inasmuch　as　I　know　myself　to　be　on　the　one　side　as　an　intelligible　＇supersensible＇　being　determined　by　the　moral　law　（by　means　of　freedom）；　and　on　the　other　side　as　acting　in　the　world　of　sense。　It　is　the　concept　of　freedom　alone　that　enables　us　to　find　the　unconditioned　and　intelligible　for　the　conditioned　and　sensible　without　going　out　of　ourselves。　For　it　is　our　own　reason　that　by　means　of　the　supreme　and　unconditional　practical　law　knows　that　itself　and　the　being　that　is　conscious　of　this　law　（our　own　person）　belong　to　the　pure　world　of　understanding；　and　moreover　defines　the　manner　in　which；　as　such；　it　can　be　active。　In　this　way　it　can　be　understood　why　in　the　whole　faculty　of　reason　it　is　the　practical　reason　only　that　can　help　us　to　pass　beyond　the　world　of　sense　and　give　us　knowledge　of　a　supersensible　order　and　connection；　which；　however；　for　this　very　reason　cannot　be　extended　further　than　is　necessary　for　pure　practical　purposes。　　　Let　me　be　permitted　on　this　occasion　to　make　one　more　remark；　namely；　that　every　step　that　we　make　with　pure　reason；　even　in　the　practical　sphere　where　no　attention　is　paid　to　subtle　speculation；　nevertheless　accords　with　all　the　material　points　of　the　Critique　of　the　Theoretical　Reason　as　closely　and　directly　as　if　each　step　had　been　thought　out　with　deliberate　purpose　to　establish　this　confirmation。　Such　a　thorough　agreement；　wholly　unsought　for　and　quite　obvious　（as　anyone　can　convince　himself；　if　he　will　only　carry　moral　inquiries　up　to　their　principles）；　between　the　most　important　proposition　of　practical　reason　and　the　often　seemingly　too　subtle　and　needless　remarks　of　the　Critique　of　the　Speculative　Reason；　occasions　surprise　and　astonishment；　and　confirms　the　maxim　already　recognized　and　praised　by　others；　namely；　that　in　every　scientific　inquiry　we　should　pursue　our　way　steadily　with　all　possible　exactness　and　frankness；　without　caring　for　any　objections　that　may　be　raised　from　outside　its　sphere；　but；　as　far　as　we　can；　to　carry　out　our　inquiry　truthfully　and　completely　by　itself。　Frequent　observation　has　convinced　me　that；　when　such　researches　are　concluded；　that　which　in　one　part　of　them　appeared　to　me　very　questionable；　considered　in　relation　to　other　extraneous　doctrines；　when　I　left　this　doubtfulness　out　of　sight　for　a　time　and　only　attended　to　the　business　in　hand　until　it　was　completed；　at　last　was　unexpectedly　found　to　agree　perfectly　with　what　had　been　discovered　separately　without　the　least　regard　to　those　doctrines；　and　without　any　partiality　or　prejudice　for　them。　Authors　would　save　themselves　many　errors　and　much　labour　lost　（because　spent　on　a　delusion）　if　they　could　only　resolve　to　go　to　work　with　more　frankness。　　　　　　　　　BOOK　II。　Dialectic　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　CHAPTER　I。　Of　a　Dialectic　of　Pure　Practical　Reason　Generally。

　　Pure　reason　always　has　its　dialetic；　whether　it　is　considered　in　its　speculative　or　its　practical　employment；　for　it　requires　the　absolute　totality　of　the　'conditions　of　what　is　given　conditioned；　and　this　can　only　be　found　in　things　in　themselves。　But　as　all　conceptions　of　things　in　themselves　must　be　referred　to　intuitions；　and　with　us　men　these　can　never　be　other　than　sensible　and　hence　can　never　enable　us　to　know　objects　as　things　in　themselves　but　only　as　appearances；　and　since　the　unconditioned　can　never　be　found　in　this　chain　of　appearances　which　consists　only　of　conditioned　and　conditions；　thus　from　applying　this　rational　idea　of　the　totality　of　the　conditions　（in　other　words　of　the　unconditioned）　to　appearances；　there　arises　an　inevitable　illusion；　as　if　these　latter　were　things　in　themselves　（for　in　the　absence　of　a　warning　critique　they　are　always　regarded　as　such）。　This　illusion　would　never　be　noticed　as　delusive　if　it　did　not　betray　itself　by　a　conflict　of　reason　with　itself；　when　it　applies　to　appearances　its　fundamental　principle　of　presupposing　the　unconditioned　to　everything　cond