the critique of practical reason-第24节

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that　it　ought　to　have　been　omitted；　that　is；　how　can　a　man　be　called　quite　free　at　the　same　moment；　and　with　respect　to　the　same　action　in　which　he　is　subject　to　an　inevitable　physical　necessity？　Some　try　to　evade　this　by　saying　that　the　causes　that　determine　his　causality　are　of　such　a　kind　as　to　agree　with　a　comparative　notion　of　freedom。　According　to　this；　that　is　sometimes　called　a　free　effect；　the　determining　physical　cause　of　which　lies　within　the　acting　thing　itself；　e。g。；　that　which　a　projectile　performs　when　it　is　in　free　motion；　in　which　case　we　use　the　word　freedom；　because　while　it　is　in　flight　it　is　not　urged　by　anything　external；　or　as　we　call　the　motion　of　a　clock　a　free　motion；　because　it　moves　its　hands　itself；　which　therefore　do　not　require　to　be　pushed　by　external　force；　so　although　the　actions　of　man　are　necessarily　determined　by　causes　which　precede　in　time；　we　yet　call　them　free；　because　these　causes　are　ideas　produced　by　our　own　faculties；　whereby　desires　are　evoked　on　occasion　of　circumstances；　and　hence　actions　are　wrought　according　to　our　own　pleasure。　This　is　a　wretched　subterfuge　with　which　some　persons　still　let　themselves　be　put　off；　and　so　think　they　have　solved；　with　a　petty　word…　jugglery；　that　difficult　problem；　at　the　solution　of　which　centuries　have　laboured　in　vain；　and　which　can　therefore　scarcely　be　found　so　completely　on　the　surface。　In　fact；　in　the　question　about　the　freedom　which　must　be　the　foundation　of　all　moral　laws　and　the　consequent　responsibility；　it　does　not　matter　whether　the　principles　which　necessarily　determine　causality　by　a　physical　law　reside　within　the　subject　or　without　him；　or　in　the　former　case　whether　these　principles　are　instinctive　or　are　conceived　by　reason；　if；　as　is　admitted　by　these　men　themselves；　these　determining　ideas　have　the　ground　of　their　existence　in　time　and　in　the　antecedent　state；　and　this　again　in　an　antecedent；　etc。　Then　it　matters　not　that　these　are　internal；　it　matters　not　that　they　have　a　psychological　and　not　a　mechanical　causality；　that　is；　produce　actions　by　means　of　ideas　and　not　by　bodily　movements；　they　are　still　determining　principles　of　the　causality　of　a　being　whose　existence　is　determinable　in　time；　and　therefore　under　the　necessitation　of　conditions　of　past　time；　which　therefore；　when　the　subject　has　to　act；　are　no　longer　in　his　power。　This　may　imply　psychological　freedom　（if　we　choose　to　apply　this　term　to　a　merely　internal　chain　of　ideas　in　the　mind）；　but　it　involves　physical　necessity　and；　therefore；　leaves　no　room　for　transcendental　freedom；　which　must　be　conceived　as　independence　on　everything　empirical；　and；　consequently；　on　nature　generally；　whether　it　is　an　object　of　the　internal　sense　considered　in　time　only；　or　of　the　external　in　time　and　space。　Without　this　freedom　（in　the　latter　and　true　sense）；　which　alone　is　practical　a　priori；　no　moral　law　and　no　moral　imputation　are　possible。　just　for　this　reason　the　necessity　of　events　in　time；　according　to　the　physical　law　of　causality；　may　be　called　the　mechanism　of　nature；　although　we　do　not　mean　by　this　that　things　which　are　subject　to　it　must　be　really　material　machines。　We　look　here　only　to　the　necessity　of　the　connection　of　events　in　a　time…series　as　it　is　developed　according　to　the　physical　law；　whether　the　subject　in　which　this　development　takes　place　is　called　automaton　materiale　when　the　mechanical　being　is　moved　by　matter；　or　with　Leibnitz　spirituale　when　it　is　impelled　by　ideas；　and　if　the　freedom　of　our　will　were　no　other　than　the　latter　（say　the　psychological　and　comparative；　not　also　transcendental；　that　is；　absolute）；　then　it　would　at　bottom　be　nothing　better　than　the　freedom　of　a　turnspit；　which；　when　once　it　is　wound　up；　accomplishes　its　motions　of　itself。　　　Now；　in　order　to　remove　in　the　supposed　case　the　apparent　contradiction　between　freedom　and　the　mechanism　of　nature　in　one　and　the　same　action；　we　must　remember　what　was　said　in　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason；　or　what　follows　therefrom；　viz。；　that　the　necessity　of　nature；　which　cannot　co…exist　with　the　freedom　of　the　subject；　appertains　only　to　the　attributes　of　the　thing　that　is　subject　to　time…conditions；　consequently　only　to　those　of　the　acting　subject　as　a　phenomenon；　that　therefore　in　this　respect　the　determining　principles　of　every　action　of　the　same　reside　in　what　belongs　to　past　time　and　is　no　longer　in　his　power　（in　which　must　be　included　his　own　past　actions　and　the　character　that　these　may　determine　for　him　in　his　own　eyes　as　a　phenomenon）。　But　the　very　same　subject；　being　on　the　other　side　conscious　of　himself　as　a　thing　in　himself；　considers　his　existence　also　in　so　far　as　it　is　not　subject　to　time…conditions；　and　regards　himself　as　only　determinable　by　laws　which　he　gives　himself　through　reason；　and　in　this　his　existence　nothing　is　antecedent　to　the　determination　of　his　will；　but　every　action；　and　in　general　every　modification　of　his　existence；　varying　according　to　his　internal　sense；　even　the　whole　series　of　his　existence　as　a　sensible　being　is　in　the　consciousness　of　his　supersensible　existence　nothing　but　the　result；　and　never　to　be　regarded　as　the　determining　principle；　of　his　causality　as　a　noumenon。　In　this　view　now　the　rational　being　can　justly　say　of　every　unlawful　action　that　he　performs；　that　he　could　very　well　have　left　it　undone；　although　as　appearance　it　is　sufficiently　determined　in　the　past；　and　in　this　respect　is　absolutely　necessary；　for　it；　with　all　the　past　which　determines　it；　belongs　to　the　one　single　phenomenon　of　his　character　which　he　makes　for　himself；　in　consequence　of　which　he　imputes　the　causality　of　those　appearances　to　himself　as　a　cause　independent　of　sensibility。　　　With　this　agree　perfectly　the　judicial　sentences　of　that　wonderful　faculty　in　us　which　we　call　conscience。　A　man　may　use　as　much　art　as　he　likes　in　order　to　paint　to　himself　an　unlawful　act；　that　he　remembers；　as　an　unintentional　error；　a　mere　oversight；　such　as　one　can　never　altogether　avoid；　and　therefore　as　something　in　which　he　was　carried　away　by　the　stream　of　physical　necessity；　and　thus　to　make　himself　out　innocent；　yet　he　finds　that　the　advocate　who　speaks　in　his　favour　can　by　no　means　silence　the　accuser　within；　if　only　he　is　conscious　that　at　the　time　when　he　did　this　wrong　he　was　in　his　senses；　that　is；　in　possession　of　his　freedom；　and；　nevertheless；　he　accounts　for　his　error　from　some　bad　habits；　which　by　gradual　neglect　of　attention　he　has　allowed　to　grow　upon　him　to　such　a　degree　that　he　can　regard　his　error　as　its　natural　consequence；　although　this　cannot　protect　him　from　the　blame　and　reproach　which　he　casts　upon　himself。　This　is　also　the　ground　of　repentance　for　a　long　past　action　at　every　recollection　of　it；　a　painful　feeling　produced　by　the　moral　sentiment；　and　which　is　practically　void　in　so　far　as　it　cannot　serve　to　undo　what　has　been　done。　（Hence　Priestley；　as　a　true　and　consistent　fatalist；　declares　it　absurd；　and　he　deserves　to　be　commended　for　this　candour　more　than　those　who；　while　they　maintain　the　mechanism　of　the　will　in　fact；　and　its　freedom　in　words　only；　yet　wish　it　to　be　thought　that　they　include　it　in　their　system　of　compromise；　although　they　do　not　explain　the　possibility　of　such　moral　imputation。）　But　the　pain　is　quite　legitimate；　because　when　the　law　of　our　intelligible　＇supersensible＇　existence　（the　moral　law）　is　in　question；　reason　recognizes　no　distinction　of　time；　and　only　asks　whether　the　event　belongs　to　me；　as　my　act；　and　then　always　morally　connects　the　same　feeling　with　it；　whether　it　has　happened　just　now　or　long　ago。　For　in　reference　to　the　supersensible　consciousness　of　its　existence　（i。e。；　freedom）　the　life　of　sense　is　but　a　single　phenomenon；　which；　inasmuch　as　it　contains　merely　manifestations　of　the　mental　disposition　with　regard　to　the　moral　law　（i。e。；　of　the　character）；　must　be　judged　not　according　to　the　physical　necessity　that　belongs　to　it　as　phenomenon；　but　according　to　the　absolute　spontaneity　of　freedom。　It　may　therefore　be　admitted　that；　if　it　were　possible　to　have　so　profound　an　insight　into　a　man's　mental　character　as　shown　by　internal　as　well　as　external　actions　as　to　know　all　its　motives；　even　the　smallest；　and　likewise　all　the　external　occasions　that　can　influence　them；　we　could　calculate　a　man's　conduct　for　the　future　with　as　great　certainty　as　a　lunar　or　solar　eclipse；　and　nevertheless　we　may　maintain　that　the　man　is　free。　In　fact；　if　we　were　capable　of　a　further　glance；　namely；　an　intellectual　intuition　of　the　same　subject　（which　indeed　is　not　granted　to　us；　and　instead　of　it　we　have　only　the　rational　concept）；　then　we　should　perceive　that　this　whole　chain　of　appearances　in　regard　to　all　that　concerns　the　moral　laws　depends　on　the　spontaneity　of　the　subject　as　a　thing　in　itself；　of　the　determination　of　which　no　physical　explanation　can　be　given。　In　default　of　this　intuition；　the　moral　law　assures　us　of　this　distinction　between　the　relation　of　our　actions　as　appearance　to　our　sensible　nature；　and　the　relation　of　this　sensible　nature　to　the　supersensible　substratum　in　us。　In　this　view；　which　is　natural　to　our　reason；　though　inexplicable；　we　can　also　justify　some　judgements　which　we　passed　with　all　conscientiousness；　and　which　yet　at　first　sight　seem　q