the critique of practical reason-第20节

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　obstacle　opposes　itself。　Therefore　they　cannot　be　applied　to　the　Divine　will。　　　There　is　something　so　singular　in　the　unbounded　esteem　for　the　pure　moral　law；　apart　from　all　advantage；　as　it　is　presented　for　our　obedience　by　practical　reason；　the　voice　of　which　makes　even　the　boldest　sinner　tremble　and　compels　him　to　hide　himself　from　it；　that　we　cannot　wonder　if　we　find　this　influence　of　a　mere　intellectual　idea　on　the　feelings　quite　incomprehensible　to　speculative　reason　and　have　to　be　satisfied　with　seeing　so　much　of　this　a　priori　that　such　a　feeling　is　inseparably　connected　with　the　conception　of　the　moral　law　in　every　finite　rational　being。　If　this　feeling　of　respect　were　pathological；　and　therefore　were　a　feeling　of　pleasure　based　on　the　inner　sense；　it　would　be　in　vain　to　try　to　discover　a　connection　of　it　with　any　idea　a　priori。　But　＇it＇　is　a　feeling　that　applies　merely　to　what　is　practical；　and　depends　on　the　conception　of　a　law；　simply　as　to　its　form；　not　on　account　of　any　object；　and　therefore　cannot　be　reckoned　either　as　pleasure　or　pain；　and　yet　produces　an　interest　in　obedience　to　the　law；　which　we　call　the　moral　interest；　just　as　the　capacity　of　taking　such　an　interest　in　the　law　（or　respect　for　the　moral　law　itself）　is　properly　the　moral　feeling。　　　The　consciousness　of　a　free　submission　of　the　will　to　the　law；　yet　combined　with　an　inevitable　constraint　put　upon　all　inclinations；　though　only　by　our　own　reason；　is　respect　for　the　law。　The　law　that　demands　this　respect　and　inspires　it　is　clearly　no　other　than　the　moral　（for　no　other　precludes　all　inclinations　from　exercising　any　direct　influence　on　the　will）。　An　action　which　is　objectively　practical　according　to　this　law；　to　the　exclusion　of　every　determining　principle　of　inclination；　is　duty；　and　this　by　reason　of　that　exclusion　includes　in　its　concept　practical　obligation；　that　is；　a　determination　to　actions；　however　reluctantly　they　may　be　done。　The　feeling　that　arises　from　the　consciousness　of　this　obligation　is　not　pathological；　as　would　be　a　feeling　produced　by　an　object　of　the　senses；　but　practical　only；　that　is；　it　is　made　possible　by　a　preceding　（objective）　determination　of　the　will　and　a　causality　of　the　reason。　As　submission　to　the　law；　therefore；　that　is；　as　a　command　（announcing　constraint　for　the　sensibly　affected　subject）；　it　contains　in　it　no　pleasure；　but　on　the　contrary；　so　far；　pain　in　the　action。　On　the　other　hand；　however；　as　this　constraint　is　exercised　merely　by　the　legislation　of　our　own　reason；　it　also　contains　something　elevating；　and　this　subjective　effect　on　feeling；　inasmuch　as　pure　practical　reason　is　the　sole　cause　of　it；　may　be　called　in　this　respect　self…approbation；　since　we　recognize　ourselves　as　determined　thereto　solely　by　the　law　without　any　interest；　and　are　now　conscious　of　a　quite　different　interest　subjectively　produced　thereby；　and　which　is　purely　practical　and　free；　and　our　taking　this　interest　in　an　action　of　duty　is　not　suggested　by　any　inclination；　but　is　commanded　and　actually　brought　about　by　reason　through　the　practical　law；　whence　this　feeling　obtains　a　special　name；　that　of　respect。　　　The　notion　of　duty；　therefore；　requires　in　the　action；　objectively；　agreement　with　the　law；　and；　subjectively　in　its　maxim；　that　respect　for　the　law　shall　be　the　sole　mode　in　which　the　will　is　determined　thereby。　And　on　this　rests　the　distinction　between　the　consciousness　of　having　acted　according　to　duty　and　from　duty；　that　is；　from　respect　for　the　law。　The　former　（legality）　is　possible　even　if　inclinations　have　been　the　determining　principles　of　the　will；　but　the　latter　（morality）；　moral　worth；　can　be　placed　only　in　this；　that　the　action　is　done　from　duty；　that　is；　simply　for　the　sake　of　the　law。*

　　*If　we　examine　accurately　the　notion　of　respect　for　persons　as　it　has　been　already　laid　down；　we　shall　perceive　that　it　always　rests　on　the　consciousness　of　a　duty　which　an　example　shows　us；　and　that　respect；　therefore。　can　never　have　any　but　a　moral　ground；　and　that　it　is　very　good　and　even；　in　a　psychological　point　of　view；　very　useful　for　the　knowledge　of　mankind；　that　whenever　we　use　this　expression　we　should　attend　to　this　secret　and　marvellous；　yet　often　recurring；　regard　which　men　in　their　judgement　pay　to　the　moral　law。

　　It　is　of　the　greatest　importance　to　attend　with　the　utmost　exactness　in　all　moral　judgements　to　the　subjective　principle　of　all　maxims；　that　all　the　morality　of　actions　may　be　placed　in　the　necessity　of　acting　from　duty　and　from　respect　for　the　law；　not　from　love　and　inclination　for　that　which　the　actions　are　to　produce。　For　men　and　all　created　rational　beings　moral　necessity　is　constraint；　that　is　obligation；　and　every　action　based　on　it　is　to　be　conceived　as　a　duty；　not　as　a　proceeding　previously　pleasing；　or　likely　to　be　Pleasing　to　us　of　our　own　accord。　As　if　indeed　we　could　ever　bring　it　about　that　without　respect　for　the　law；　which　implies　fear；　or　at　least　apprehension　of　transgression；　we　of　ourselves；　like　the　independent　Deity；　could　ever　come　into　possession　of　holiness　of　will　by　the　coincidence　of　our　will　with　the　pure　moral　law　becoming　as　it　were　part　of　our　nature；　never　to　be　shaken　（in　which　case　the　law　would　cease　to　be　a　command　for　us；　as　we　could　never　be　tempted　to　be　untrue　to　it）。　　　The　moral　law　is　in　fact　for　the　will　of　a　perfect　being　a　law　of　holiness；　but　for　the　will　of　every　finite　rational　being　a　law　of　duty；　of　moral　constraint；　and　of　the　determination　of　its　actions　by　respect　for　this　law　and　reverence　for　its　duty。　No　other　subjective　principle　must　be　assumed　as　a　motive；　else　while　the　action　might　chance　to　be　such　as　the　law　prescribes；　yet；　as　does　not　proceed　from　duty；　the　intention；　which　is　the　thing　properly　in　question　in　this　legislation；　is　not　moral。　　　It　is　a　very　beautiful　thing　to　do　good　to　men　from　love　to　them　and　from　sympathetic　good　will；　or　to　be　just　from　love　of　order；　but　this　is　not　yet　the　true　moral　maxim　of　our　conduct　which　is　suitable　to　our　position　amongst　rational　beings　as　men；　when　we　pretend　with　fanciful　pride　to　set　ourselves　above　the　thought　of　duty；　like　volunteers；　and；　as　if　we　were　independent　on　the　command；　to　want　to　do　of　our　own　good　pleasure　what　we　think　we　need　no　command　to　do。　We　stand　under　a　discipline　of　reason　and　in　all　our　maxims　must　not　forget　our　subjection　to　it；　nor　withdraw　anything　therefrom；　or　by　an　egotistic　presumption　diminish　aught　of　the　authority　of　the　law　（although　our　own　reason　gives　it）　so　as　to　set　the　determining　principle　of　our　will；　even　though　the　law　be　conformed　to；　anywhere　else　but　in　the　law　itself　and　in　respect　for　this　law。　Duty　and　obligation　are　the　only　names　that　we　must　give　to　our　relation　to　the　moral　law。　We　are　indeed　legislative　members　of　a　moral　kingdom　rendered　possible　by　freedom；　and　presented　to　us　by　reason　as　an　object　of　respect；　but　yet　we　are　subjects　in　it；　not　the　sovereign；　and　to　mistake　our　inferior　position　as　creatures；　and　presumptuously　to　reject　the　authority　of　the　moral　law；　is　already　to　revolt　from　it　in　spirit；　even　though　the　letter　of　it　is　fulfilled。　　　With　this　agrees　very　well　the　possibility　of　such　a　command　as：　Love　God　above　everything；　and　thy　neighbour　as　thyself。*　For　as　a　command　it　requires　respect　for　a　law　which　commands　love　and　does　not　leave　it　to　our　own　arbitrary　choice　to　make　this　our　principle。　Love　to　God；　however；　considered　as　an　inclination　（pathological　love）；　is　impossible；　for　He　is　not　an　object　of　the　senses。　The　same　affection　towards　men　is　possible　no　doubt；　but　cannot　be　commanded；　for　it　is　not　in　the　power　of　any　man　to　love　anyone　at　command；　therefore　it　is　only　practical　love　that　is　meant　in　that　pith　of　all　laws。　To　love　God　means；　in　this　sense；　to　like　to　do　His　commandments；　to　love　one's　neighbour　means　to　like　to　practise　all　duties　towards　him。　But　the　command　that　makes　this　a　rule　cannot　command　us　to　have　this　disposition　in　actions　conformed　to　duty；　but　only　to　endeavour　after　it。　For　a　command　to　like　to　do　a　thing　is　in　itself　contradictory；　because　if　we　already　know　of　ourselves　what　we　are　bound　to　do；　and　if　further　we　are　conscious　of　liking　to　do　it；　a　command　would　be　quite　needless；　and　if　we　do　it　not　willingly；　but　only　out　of　respect　for　the　law；　a　command　that　makes　this　respect　the　motive　of　our　maxim　would　directly　counteract　the　disposition　commanded。　That　law　of　all　laws；　therefore；　like　all　the　moral　precepts　of　the　Gospel；　exhibits　the　moral　disposition　in　all　its　perfection；　in　which；　viewed　as　an　ideal　of　holiness；　it　is　not　attainable　by　any　creature；　but　yet　is　the　pattern　which　we　should　strive　to　approach；　and　in　an　uninterrupted　but　infinite　progress　become　like　to。　In　fact；　if　a　rational　creature　could　ever　reach　this　point；　that　he　thoroughly　likes　to　do　all　moral　laws；　this　would　mean　that　there　does　not　exist　in　him　even　the　possibility　of　a　desire　that　would　tempt　him　to　deviate　from　them；　for　to　overcome　such　a　desire　always　costs　the　subject　some　sacrifice　and　therefore　requires　self…compulsion；　that　is；　inward　constraint　to　something　that　one　does　not　quite　like　to　do；　and　no　creature　can　ever　reach　this　stage　of　moral　disposition。　For；　being　a　creature；