the critique of practical reason-第17节

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ical；　that　is；　belong　to　the　experience　of　physical　nature；　hence；　it　seems　absurd　to　expect　to　find　in　the　world　of　sense　a　case　which；　while　as　such　it　depends　only　on　the　law　of　nature；　yet　admits　of　the　application　to　it　of　a　law　of　freedom；　and　to　which　we　can　apply　the　supersensible　idea　of　the　morally　good　which　is　to　be　exhibited　in　it　in　concreto。　Thus；　the　judgement　of　the　pure　practical　reason　is　subject　to　the　same　difficulties　as　that　of　the　pure　theoretical　reason。　The　latter；　however；　had　means　at　hand　of　escaping　from　these　difficulties；　because；　in　regard　to　the　theoretical　employment；　intuitions　were　required　to　which　pure　concepts　of　the　understanding　could　be　applied；　and　such　intuitions　（though　only　of　objects　of　the　senses）　can　be　given　a　priori　and；　therefore；　as　far　as　regards　the　union　of　the　manifold　in　them；　conforming　to　the　pure　a　priori　concepts　of　the　understanding　as　schemata。　On　the　other　hand；　the　morally　good　is　something　whose　object　is　supersensible；　for　which；　therefore；　nothing　corresponding　can　be　found　in　any　sensible　intuition。　Judgement　depending　on　laws　of　pure　practical　reason　seems；　therefore；　to　be　subject　to　special　difficulties　arising　from　this；　that　a　law　of　freedom　is　to　be　applied　to　actions；　which　are　events　taking　place　in　the　world　of　sense；　and　which；　so　far；　belong　to　physical　nature。　　　But　here　again　is　opened　a　favourable　prospect　for　the　pure　practical　judgement。　When　I　subsume　under　a　pure　practical　law　an　action　possible　to　me　in　the　world　of　sense；　I　am　not　concerned　with　the　possibility　of　the　action　as　an　event　in　the　world　of　sense。　This　is　a　matter　that　belongs　to　the　decision　of　reason　in　its　theoretic　use　according　to　the　law　of　causality；　which　is　a　pure　concept　of　the　understanding；　for　which　reason　has　a　schema　in　the　sensible　intuition。　Physical　causality；　or　the　condition　under　which　it　takes　place；　belongs　to　the　physical　concepts；　the　schema　of　which　is　sketched　by　transcendental　imagination。　Here；　however；　we　have　to　do；　not　with　the　schema　of　a　case　that　occurs　according　to　laws；　but　with　the　schema　of　a　law　itself　（if　the　word　is　allowable　here）；　since　the　fact　that　the　will　（not　the　action　relatively　to　its　effect）　is　determined　by　the　law　alone　without　any　other　principle；　connects　the　notion　of　causality　with　quite　different　conditions　from　those　which　constitute　physical　connection。　　　The　physical　law　being　a　law　to　which　the　objects　of　sensible　intuition；　as　such；　are　subject；　must　have　a　schema　corresponding　to　it…　that　is；　a　general　procedure　of　the　imagination　（by　which　it　exhibits　a　priori　to　the　senses　the　pure　concept　of　the　understanding　which　the　law　determines）。　But　the　law　of　freedom　（that　is；　of　a　causality　not　subject　to　sensible　conditions）；　and　consequently　the　concept　of　the　unconditionally　good；　cannot　have　any　intuition；　nor　consequently　any　schema　supplied　to　it　for　the　purpose　of　its　application　in　concreto。　Consequently　the　moral　law　has　no　faculty　but　the　understanding　to　aid　its　application　to　physical　objects　（not　the　imagination）；　and　the　understanding　for　the　purposes　of　the　judgement　can　provide　for　an　idea　of　the　reason；　not　a　schema　of　the　sensibility；　but　a　law；　though　only　as　to　its　form　as　law；　such　a　law；　however；　as　can　be　exhibited　in　concreto　in　objects　of　the　senses；　and　therefore　a　law　of　nature。　We　can　therefore　call　this　law　the　type　of　the　moral　law。　　　The　rule　of　the　judgement　according　to　laws　of　pure　practical　reason　is　this：　ask　yourself　whether；　if　the　action　you　propose　were　to　take　place　by　a　law　of　the　system　of　nature　of　which　you　were　yourself　a　part；　you　could　regard　it　as　possible　by　your　own　will。　Everyone　does；　in　fact；　decide　by　this　rule　whether　actions　are　morally　good　or　evil。　Thus；　people　say：　〃If　everyone　permitted　himself　to　deceive；　when　he　thought　it　to　his　advantage；　or　thought　himself　justified　in　shortening　his　life　as　soon　as　he　was　thoroughly　weary　of　it；　or　looked　with　perfect　indifference　on　the　necessity　of　others；　and　if　you　belonged　to　such　an　order　of　things；　would　you　do　so　with　the　assent　of　your　own　will？〃　Now　everyone　knows　well　that　if　he　secretly　allows　himself　to　deceive；　it　does　not　follow　that　everyone　else　does　so；　or　if；　unobserved；　he　is　destitute　of　compassion；　others　would　not　necessarily　be　so　to　him；　hence；　this　comparison　of　the　maxim　of　his　actions　with　a　universal　law　of　nature　is　not　the　determining　principle　of　his　will。　Such　a　law　is；　nevertheless；　a　type　of　the　estimation　of　the　maxim　on　moral　principles。　If　the　maxim　of　the　action　is　not　such　as　to　stand　the　test　of　the　form　of　a　universal　law　of　nature；　then　it　is　morally　impossible。　This　is　the　judgement　even　of　common　sense；　for　its　ordinary　judgements；　even　those　of　experience；　are　always　based　on　the　law　of　nature。　It　has　it　therefore　always　at　hand；　only　that　in　cases　where　causality　from　freedom　is　to　be　criticised；　it　makes　that　law　of　nature　only　the　type　of　a　law　of　freedom；　because；　without　something　which　it　could　use　as　an　example　in　a　case　of　experience；　it　could　not　give　the　law　of　a　pure　practical　reason　its　proper　use　in　practice。　　　It　is　therefore　allowable　to　use　the　system　of　the　world　of　sense　as　the　type　of　a　supersensible　system　of　things；　provided　I　do　not　transfer　to　the　latter　the　intuitions；　and　what　depends　on　them；　but　merely　apply　to　it　the　form　of　law　in　general　（the　notion　of　which　occurs　even　in　the　commonest　use　of　reason；　but　cannot　be　definitely　known　a　priori　for　any　other　purpose　than　the　pure　practical　use　of　reason）；　for　laws；　as　such；　are　so　far　identical；　no　matter　from　what　they　derive　their　determining　principles。　　　Further；　since　of　all　the　supersensible　absolutely　nothing　＇is　known＇　except　freedom　（through　the　moral　law）；　and　this　only　so　far　as　it　is　inseparably　implied　in　that　law；　and　moreover　all　supersensible　objects　to　which　reason　might　lead　us；　following　the　guidance　of　that　law；　have　still　no　reality　for　us；　except　for　the　purpose　of　that　law；　and　for　the　use　of　mere　practical　reason；　and　as　reason　is　authorized　and　even　compelled　to　use　physical　nature　（in　its　pure　form　as　an　object　of　the　understanding）　as　the　type　of　the　judgement；　hence；　the　present　remark　will　serve　to　guard　against　reckoning　amongst　concepts　themselves　that　which　belongs　only　to　the　typic　of　concepts。　This；　namely；　as　a　typic　of　the　judgement；　guards　against　the　empiricism　of　practical　reason；　which　founds　the　practical　notions　of　good　and　evil　merely　on　experienced　consequences　（so…called　happiness）。　No　doubt　happiness　and　the　infinite　advantages　which　would　result　from　a　will　determined　by　self…love；　if　this　will　at　the　same　time　erected　itself　into　a　universal　law　of　nature；　may　certainly　serve　as　a　perfectly　suitable　type　of　the　morally　good；　but　it　is　not　identical　with　it。　The　same　typic　guards　also　against　the　mysticism　of　practical　reason；　which　turns　what　served　only　as　a　symbol　into　a　schema；　that　is；　proposes　to　provide　for　the　moral　concepts　actual　intuitions；　which；　however；　are　not　sensible　（intuitions　of　an　invisible　Kingdom　of　God）；　and　thus　plunges　into　the　transcendent。　What　is　befitting　the　use　of　the　moral　concepts　is　only　the　rationalism　of　the　judgement；　which　takes　from　the　sensible　system　of　nature　only　what　pure　reason　can　also　conceive　of　itself；　that　is；　conformity　to　law；　and　transfers　into　the　supersensible　nothing　but　what　can　conversely　be　actually　exhibited　by　actions　in　the　world　of　sense　according　to　the　formal　rule　of　a　law　of　nature。　However；　the　caution　against　empiricism　of　practical　reason　is　much　more　important；　for　mysticism　is　quite　reconcilable　with　the　purity　and　sublimity　of　the　moral　law；　and；　besides；　it　is　not　very　natural　or　agreeable　to　common　habits　of　thought　to　strain　one's　imagination　to　supersensible　intuitions；　and　hence　the　danger　on　this　side　is　not　so　general。　Empiricism；　on　the　contrary；　cuts　up　at　the　roots　the　morality　of　intentions　（in　which；　and　not　in　actions　only；　consists　the　high　worth　that　men　can　and　ought　to　give　to　themselves）；　and　substitutes　for　duty　something　quite　different；　namely；　an　empirical　interest；　with　which　the　inclinations　generally　are　secretly　leagued；　and　empiricism；　moreover；　being　on　this　account　allied　with　all　the　inclinations　which　（no　matter　what　fashion　they　put　on）　degrade　humanity　when　they　are　raised　to　the　dignity　of　a　supreme　practical　principle；　and　as　these；　nevertheless；　are　so　favourable　to　everyone's　feelings；　it　is　for　that　reason　much　more　dangerous　than　mysticism；　which　can　never　constitute　a　lasting　condition　of　any　great　number　of　persons。　　　　　CHAPTER　III。　Of　the　Motives　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　What　is　essential　in　the　moral　worth　of　actions　is　that　the　moral　law　should　directly　determine　the　will。　If　the　determination　of　the　will　takes　place　in　conformity　indeed　to　the　moral　law；　but　only　by　means　of　a　feeling；　no　matter　of　what　kind；　which　has　to　be　presupposed　in　order　that　the　law　may　be　sufficient　to　determine　the　will；　and　therefore　not　for　the　sake　of　the　law；　then　the　action　will　possess　legality；　but　not　morality。　Now；　if　we　understand　by　motive　（elater　animi）　the　subjective　ground　of　determination　of　the　will　of　a　being　whose　reason　does　not　necessarily　con