the critique of practical reason-第14节
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the theoretic use of reason； although a possible and thinkable； is yet an empty notion。 Now； I do not desire by means of this to understand theoretically the nature of a being； in so far as it has a pure will； it is enough for me to have thereby designated it as such； and hence to combine the notion of causality with that of freedom （and what is inseparable from it； the moral law； as its determining principle）。 Now； this right I certainly have by virtue of the pure； not…empirical origin of the notion of cause； since I do not consider myself entitled to make any use of it except in reference to the moral law which determines its reality； that is； only a practical use。 If； with Hume； I had denied to the notion of causality all objective reality in its ＇theoretic＇ use； not merely with regard to things in themselves （the supersensible）； but also with regard to the objects of the senses； it would have lost all significance； and being a theoretically impossible notion would have been declared to be quite useless； and since what is nothing cannot be made any use of； the practical use of a concept theoretically null would have been absurd。 But； as it is； the concept of a causality free from empirical conditions； although empty； i。e。； without any appropriate intuition）； is yet theoretically possible； and refers to an indeterminate object； but in compensation significance is given to it in the moral law and consequently in a practical sense。 I have； indeed； no intuition which should determine its objective theoretic reality； but not the less it has a real application； which is exhibited in concreto in intentions or maxims； that is； it has a practical reality which can be specified； and this is sufficient to justify it even with a view to noumena。 Now； this objective reality of a pure concept of the understanding in the sphere of the supersensible； once brought in； gives an objective reality also to all the other categories； although only so far as they stand in necessary connexion with the determining principle of the will （the moral law）； a reality only of practical application； which has not the least effect in enlarging our theoretical knowledge of these objects； or the discernment of their nature by pure reason。 So we shall find also in the sequel that these categories refer only to beings as intelligences； and in them only to the relation of reason to the will； consequently； always only to the practical； and beyond this cannot pretend to any knowledge of these beings； and whatever other properties belonging to the theoretical representation of supersensible things may be brought into connexion with these categories； this is not to be reckoned as knowledge； but only as a right （in a practical point of view； however； it is a necessity） to admit and assume such beings； even in the case where we ＇conceive＇ supersensible beings （e。g。； God） according to analogy； that is； a purely rational relation； of which we make a practical use with reference to what is sensible； and thus the application to the supersensible solely in a practical point of view does not give pure theoretic reason the least encouragement to run riot into the transcendent。 CHAPTER II。 Of the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason。
By a concept of the practical reason I understand the idea of an object as an effect possible to be produced through freedom。 To be an object of practical knowledge； as such； signifies； therefore； only the relation of the will to the action by which the object or its opposite would be realized； and to decide whether something is an object of pure practical reason or not is only to discern the possibility or impossibility of willing the action by which； if we had the required power （about which experience must decide）； a certain object would be realized。 If the object be taken as the determining principle of our desire； it must first be known whether it is physically possible by the free use of our powers； before we decide whether it is an object of practical reason or not。 On the other hand； if the law can be considered a priori as the determining principle of the action； and the latter therefore as determined by pure practical reason； the judgement whether a thing is an object of pure practical reason or not does not depend at all on the comparison with our physical power； and the question is only whether we should will an action that is directed to the existence of an object； if the object were in our power； hence the previous question is only as the moral possibility of the action； for in this case it is not the object； but the law of the will； that is the determining principle of the action。 The only objects of practical reason are therefore those of good and evil。 For by the former is meant an object necessarily desired according to a principle of reason； by the latter one necessarily shunned； also according to a principle of reason。 If the notion of good is not to be derived from an antecedent practical law； but； on the contrary； is to serve as its foundation； it can only be the notion of something whose existence promises pleasure； and thus determines the causality of the subject to produce it； that is to say； determines the faculty of desire。 Now； since it is impossible to discern a priori what idea will be accompanied with pleasure and what with pain； it will depend on experience alone to find out what is primarily good or evil。 The property of the subject； with reference to which alone this experiment can be made； is the feeling of pleasure and pain； a receptivity belonging to the internal sense； thus that only would be primarily good with which the sensation of pleasure is immediately connected； and that simply evil which immediately excites pain。 Since； however； this is opposed even to the usage of language； which distinguishes the pleasant from the good； the unpleasant from the evil； and requires that good and evil shall always be judged by reason； and； therefore； by concepts which can be communicated to everyone； and not by mere sensation； which is limited to individual ＇subjects＇ and their susceptibility； and； since nevertheless； pleasure or pain cannot be connected with any idea of an object a priori； the philosopher who thought himself obliged to make a feeling of pleasure the foundation of his practical judgements would call that good which is a means to the pleasant； and evil； what is a cause of unpleasantness and pain； for the judgement on the relation of means to ends certainly belongs to reason。 But； although reason is alone capable of discerning the connexion of means with their ends （so that the will might even be defined as the faculty of ends； since these are always determining principles of the desires）； yet the practical maxims which would follow from the aforesaid principle of the good being merely a means； would never contain as the object of the will anything good in itself； but only something good for something； the good would always be merely the useful； and that for which it is useful must always lie outside the will； in sensation。 Now if this as a pleasant sensation were to be distinguished from the notion of good； then there would be nothing primarily good at all； but the good would have to be sought only in the means to something else； namely； some pleasantness。 It is an old formula of the schools： Nihil appetimus nisi sub ratione boni； Nihil aversamur nisi sub ratione mali； and it is used often correctly； but often also in a manner injurious to philosophy； because the expressions boni and mali are ambiguous； owing to the poverty of language； in consequence of which they admit a double sense； and； therefore； inevitably bring the practical laws into ambiguity； and philosophy； which in employing them becomes aware of the different meanings in the same word； but can find no special expressions for them； is driven to subtile distinctions about which there is subsequently no unanimity； because the distinction could not be directly marked by any suitable expression。*
*Besides this； the expression sub ratione boni is also ambiguous。 For it may mean： 〃We represent something to ourselves as good； when and because we desire （will） it〃； or 〃We desire something because we represent it to ourselves as good；〃 so that either the desire determines the notion of the object as a good； or the notion of good determines the desire （the will）； so that in the first case sub ratione boni would mean； 〃We will something under the idea of the good〃； in the second； 〃In consequence of this idea；〃 which； as determining the volition； must precede it。
The German language has the good fortune to possess expressions which do not allow this difference to be overlooked。 It possesses two very distinct concepts and especially distinct expressions for that which the Latins express by a single word； bonum。 For bonum it has das Gute ＇good＇； and das Wohl ＇well； weal＇； for malum das Bose ＇evil＇； and das Ubel ＇ill； bad＇； or das Well ＇woe＇。 So that we express two quite distinct judgements when we consider in an action the good and evil of it； or our weal and woe （ill）。 Hence it already follows that the above quoted psychological proposition is at least very doubtful if it is translated： 〃We desire nothing except with a view to our
