the critique of practical reason-第10节

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　principle　than　that　now　proposed。　In　fact　all　possible　principles　of　determination　of　the　will　are　either　merely　subjective；　and　therefore　empirical；　or　are　also　objective　and　rational；　and　both　are　either　external　or　internal。

　　Practical　Material　Principles　of　Determination　taken　as　the　Foundation　of　Morality；　are：

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SUBJECTIVE。

　　　　　　　　　　　　EXTERNAL　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　INTERNAL　　　　　　　　　　　Education　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Physical　feeling　　　　　　　　　　　（Montaigne）　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Epicurus）　　　　　　　　　　　The　civil　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Moral　feeling　　　　　　　　　　　Constitution　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Hutcheson）　　　　　　　　　　　（Mandeville）

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　OBJECTIVE。

　　　　　　　　　　　　INTERNAL　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　EXTERNAL　　　　　　　　　　　Perfection　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Will　of　God　　　　　　　　　　　（Wolf　and　the　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Crusius　and　other　　　　　　　　　　　Stoics）　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　theological　Moralists）

　　Those　of　the　upper　table　are　all　empirical　and　evidently　incapable　of　furnishing　the　universal　principle　of　morality；　but　those　in　the　lower　table　are　based　on　reason　（for　perfection　as　a　quality　of　things；　and　the　highest　perfection　conceived　as　substance；　that　is；　God；　can　only　be　thought　by　means　of　rational　concepts）。　But　the　former　notion；　namely；　that　of　perfection；　may　either　be　taken　in　a　theoretic　signification；　and　then　it　means　nothing　but　the　completeness　of　each　thing　in　its　own　kind　（transcendental）；　or　that　of　a　thing　merely　as　a　thing　（metaphysical）；　and　with　that　we　are　not　concerned　here。　But　the　notion　of　perfection　in　a　practical　sense　is　the　fitness　or　sufficiency　of　a　thing　for　all　sorts　of　purposes。　This　perfection；　as　a　quality　of　man　and　consequently　internal；　is　nothing　but　talent　and；　what　strengthens　or　completes　this；　skill。　Supreme　perfection　conceived　as　substance；　that　is　God；　and　consequently　external　（considered　practically）；　is　the　sufficiency　of　this　being　for　all　ends。　Ends　then　must　first　be　given；　relatively　to　which　only　can　the　notion　of　perfection　（whether　internal　in　ourselves　or　external　in　God）　be　the　determining　principle　of　the　will。　But　an　end…　being　an　object　which　must　precede　the　determination　of　the　will　by　a　practical　rule　and　contain　the　ground　of　the　possibility　of　this　determination；　and　therefore　contain　also　the　matter　of　the　will；　taken　as　its　determining　principle…　such　an　end　is　always　empirical　and；　therefore；　may　serve　for　the　Epicurean　principle　of　the　happiness　theory；　but　not　for　the　pure　rational　principle　of　morality　and　duty。　Thus；　talents　and　the　improvement　of　them；　because　they　contribute　to　the　advantages　of　life；　or　the　will　of　God；　if　agreement　with　it　be　taken　as　the　object　of　the　will；　without　any　antecedent　independent　practical　principle；　can　be　motives　only　by　reason　of　the　happiness　expected　therefrom。　Hence　it　follows；　first；　that　all　the　principles　here　stated　are　material；　secondly；　that　they　include　all　possible　material　principles；　and；　finally；　the　conclusion；　that　since　material　principles　are　quite　incapable　of　furnishing　the　supreme　moral　law　（as　has　been　shown）；　the　formal　practical　principle　the　pure　reason　（according　to　which　the　mere　form　of　a　universal　legislation　must　constitute　the　supreme　and　immediate　determining　principle　of　the　will）　is　the　only　one　possible　which　is　adequate　to　furnish　categorical　imperatives；　that　is；　practical　laws　（which　make　actions　a　duty）；　and　in　general　to　serve　as　the　principle　of　morality；　both　in　criticizing　conduct　and　also　in　its　application　to　the　human　will　to　determine　it。

　　I。　Of　the　Deduction　of　the　Fundamental　Principles　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　This　Analytic　shows　that　pure　reason　can　be　practical；　that　is；　can　of　itself　determine　the　will　independently　of　anything　empirical；　and　this　it　proves　by　a　fact　in　which　pure　reason　in　us　proves　itself　actually　practical；　namely；　the　autonomy　shown　in　the　fundamental　principle　of　morality；　by　which　reason　determines　the　will　to　action。　　　It　shows　at　the　same　time　that　this　fact　is　inseparably　connected　with　the　consciousness　of　freedom　of　the　will；　nay；　is　identical　with　it；　and　by　this　the　will　of　a　rational　being；　although　as　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense　it　recognizes　itself　as　necessarily　subject　to　the　laws　of　causality　like　other　efficient　causes；　yet；　at　the　same　time；　on　another　side；　namely；　as　a　being　in　itself；　is　conscious　of　existing　in　and　being　determined　by　an　intelligible　order　of　things；　conscious　not　by　virtue　of　a　special　intuition　of　itself；　but　by　virtue　of　certain　dynamical　laws　which　determine　its　causality　in　the　sensible　world；　for　it　has　been　elsewhere　proved　that　if　freedom　is　predicated　of　us；　it　transports　us　into　an　intelligible　order　of　things。　　　Now；　if　we　compare　with　this　the　analytical　part　of　the　critique　of　pure　speculative　reason；　we　shall　see　a　remarkable　contrast。　There　it　was　not　fundamental　principles；　but　pure；　sensible　intuition　（space　and　time）；　that　was　the　first　datum　that　made　a　priori　knowledge　possible；　though　only　of　objects　of　the　senses。　Synthetical　principles　could　not　be　derived　from　mere　concepts　without　intuition；　on　the　contrary；　they　could　only　exist　with　reference　to　this　intuition；　and　therefore　to　objects　of　possible　experience；　since　it　is　the　concepts　of　the　understanding；　united　with　this　intuition；　which　alone　make　that　knowledge　possible　which　we　call　experience。　Beyond　objects　of　experience；　and　therefore　with　regard　to　things　as　noumena；　all　positive　knowledge　was　rightly　disclaimed　for　speculative　reason。　This　reason；　however；　went　so　far　as　to　establish　with　certainty　the　concept　of　noumena；　that　is；　the　possibility；　nay；　the　necessity；　of　thinking　them；　for　example；　it　showed　against　all　objections　that　the　supposition　of　freedom；　negatively　considered；　was　quite　consistent　with　those　principles　and　limitations　of　pure　theoretic　reason。　But　it　could　not　give　us　any　definite　enlargement　of　our　knowledge　with　respect　to　such　objects；　but；　on　the　contrary；　cut　off　all　view　of　them　altogether。　　　On　the　other　hand；　the　moral　law；　although　it　gives　no　view；　yet　gives　us　a　fact　absolutely　inexplicable　from　any　data　of　the　sensible　world；　and　the　whole　compass　of　our　theoretical　use　of　reason；　a　fact　which　points　to　a　pure　world　of　the　understanding；　nay；　even　defines　it　positively　and　enables　us　to　know　something　of　it；　namely；　a　law。　　　This　law　（as　far　as　rational　beings　are　concerned）　gives　to　the　world　of　sense；　which　is　a　sensible　system　of　nature；　the　form　of　a　world　of　the　understanding；　that　is；　of　a　supersensible　system　of　nature；　without　interfering　with　its　mechanism。　Now；　a　system　of　nature；　in　the　most　general　sense；　is　the　existence　of　things　under　laws。　The　sensible　nature　of　rational　beings　in　general　is　their　existence　under　laws　empirically　conditioned；　which；　from　the　point　of　view　of　reason；　is　heteronomy。　The　supersensible　nature　of　the　same　beings；　on　the　other　hand；　is　their　existence　according　to　laws　which　are　independent　of　every　empirical　condition　and；　therefore；　belong　to　the　autonomy　of　pure　reason。　And；　since　the　laws　by　which　the　existence　of　things　depends　on　cognition　are　practical；　supersensible　nature；　so　far　as　we　can　form　any　notion　of　it；　is　nothing　else　than　a　system　of　nature　under　the　autonomy　of　pure　practical　reason。　Now；　the　law　of　this　autonomy　is　the　moral　law；　which；　therefore；　is　the　fundamental　law　of　a　supersensible　nature；　and　of　a　pure　world　of　understanding；　whose　counterpart　must　exist　in　the　world　of　sense；　but　without　interfering　with　its　laws。　We　might　call　the　former　the　archetypal　world　（natura　archetypa）；　which　we　only　know　in　the　reason；　and　the　latter　the　ectypal　world　（natura　ectypa）；　because　it　contains　the　possible　effect　of　the　idea　of　the　former　which　is　the　determining　principle　of　the　will。　For　the　moral　law；　in　fact；　transfers　us　ideally　into　a　system　in　which　pure　reason；　if　it　were　accompanied　with　adequate　physical　power；　would　produce　the　summum　bonum；　and　it　determines　our　will　to　give　the　sensible　world　the　form　of　a　system　of　rational　beings。　　　The　least　attention　to　oneself　proves　that　this　idea　really　serves　as　the　model　for　the　determinations　of　our　will。　　　When　the　maxim　which　I　am　disposed　to　follow　in　giving　testimony　is　tested　by　the　practical　reason；　I　always　consider　what　it　would　be　if　it　were　to　hold　as　a　universal　law　of　nature。　It　is　manifest　that　in　this　view　it　would　oblige　everyone　to　speak　the　truth。　For　it　cannot　hold　as　a　universal　law　of　nature　that　statements　should　be　allowed　to　have　the　force　of　proof　and　yet　to　be　purposely　untrue。　Similarly；　the　maxim　which　I　adopt　with　respect　to　disposing　freely　of　my　life　is　at　once　determined；　when　I　ask　myself　what　it　should　be；　in　order　that　a　system；　of　which　it　is　the　law；　should　maintain　itself。　It　is　obvious　that　in　such　a　system　no　one　could　arbitrarily　put　an　end　to　his　own　life；　for　such　an　arrangement　would　not　be　a　permanent　order　of　things。　And　so　in　all　similar　cases。　Now；　in　nature；　as　it　actually　is　an　object　of　experience；　the　free　will　is　not　of　itself　determined　to　maxims　which　could　of　themselves　be　the　foundation　of　a　natural　system　of　universal　laws；　or　which　could　even　be　adapted　to　a　system　so　constituted；　on　the　contrary；　its　maxims　are　private　inclinations