abraham lincoln and the union-第15节

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With　regard　to　the　Confederacy；　Seward's　policy　was　one　of　non…resistance。　　For　this　he　had　two　reasons。　　The　first　of　these　was　his　rooted　delusion　that　the　bulk　of　the　Southerners　were　opposed　to　secession　and；　if　let　alone；　would　force　their　leaders　to　reconsider　their　action。　　He　might　have　quoted　the　nursery　rhyme；　〃Let　them　alone　and　they'll　come　home〃；　it　would　have　been　like　him　and　in　tune　with　a　frivolous　side　of　his　nature。　　He　was　quite　as　irresponsible　when　he　complacently　assured　the　North　that　the　trouble　would　all　blow　over　within　ninety　days。　　He　also　believed　that　any　display　of　force　would　convert　these　hypothetical　Unionists　of　the　South　from　friends　to　enemies　and　would　consolidate　opinion　in　the　Confederacy　to　produce　war。　　In　justice　to　Seward　it　must　be　remembered　that　on　this　point　time　justified　his　fears。

His　dealings　with　the　Confederate　commissioners　show　that　he　was　playing　to　gain　time；　not　with　intent　to　deceive　the　Southerners　but　to　acquire　that　domination　over　Lincoln　which　he　felt　was　his　by　natural　right。　　Intending　to　institute　a　peace　policy　the　moment　he　gained　this　ascendency；　he　felt　perfectly　safe　in　making　promises　to　the　commissioners　through　mutual　friends。　　He　virtually　told　them　that　Sumter　would　eventually　be　given　up　and　that　all　they　need　do　was　to　wait。

Seward　brought　to　bear　upon　the　President　the　opinions　of　various　military　men　who　thought　the　time　had　passed　when　any　expedition　for　the　relief　of　Sumter　could　succeed。　　For　some　time　Lincoln　seemed　about　to　consent；　though　reluctantly；　to　Seward's　lead　in　the　matter　of　the　forts。　　He　was　pulled　up　standing；　however；　by　the　threatened　resignation　of　the　Postmaster…General；　Blair。　After　a　conference　with　leading　Republican　politicians　the　President　announced　to　his　Cabinet　that　his　policy　would　include　the　relief　of　Sumter。　　〃Seward；〃　says　Welles；　〃。。。was　evidently　displeased。〃

Seward　now　took　a　new　tack。　　Fort　Pickens；　at　Pensacola；　was　a　problem　similar　to　that　of　Sumter　at　Charleston。　　Both　were　demanded　by　the　Confederates；　and　both　were　in　need　of　supplies。　But　Fort　Pickens　lay　to　one　side；　so　to　speak；　of　the　public　mind；　and　there　was　not　conspicuously　in　the　world's　eye　the　square　issue　over　it　that　there　was　over　Sumter。　　Seward　conceived　the　idea　that；　if　the　President's　attention　were　diverted　from　Sumter　to　Pickens　and　a　relief　expedition　were　sent　to　the　latter　but　none　to　the　former；　his　private　negotiations　with　the　Confederates　might　still　be　kept　going；　Lincoln　might　yet　be　hypnotized；　and　at　last　all　would　be　well。

On　All…Fools'　Day；　1861；　in　the　midst　of　a　press　of　business；　he　obtained　Lincoln's　signature　to　some　dispatches；　which　Lincoln；　it　seems；　discussed　with　him　hurriedly　and　without　detailed　consideration。　　There　were　now　in　preparation　two　relief　expeditions；　one　to　carry　supplies　to　Pensacola；　the　other　to　Charleston。　　Neither　was　to　fight　if　it　was　not　molested。　　Both　were　to　be　strong　enough　to　fight　if　their　commanders　deemed　it　necessary。　　As　flagship　of　the　Charleston　expedition；　Welles　had　detailed　the　powerful　warship　Powhatan；　which　was　rapidly　being　made　ready　at　the　Brooklyn　Navy　Yard。　　Such　was　the　situation　as　Welles　understood　it　when　he　was　thinking　of　bed　late　on　the　night　of　the　6th　of　April。　　Until　then　he　had　not　suspected　that　there　was　doubt　and　bewilderment　about　the　Powhatan　at　Brooklyn。　One　of　those　dispatches　which　Lincoln　had　so　hastily　signed　provided　for　detaching　the　Powhatan　from　the　Charleston　expedition　and　sending　it　safe　out　of　harm's　way　to　Pensacola。　　The　commander　of　the　ship　had　before　him　the　conflicting　orders；　one　from　the　President；　one　from　the　Secretary　of　the　Navy。　　He　was　about　to　sail　under　the　President's　orders　for　Pensacola；　but　wishing　to　make　sure　of　his　authority；　he　had　telegraphed　to　Washington。　Gideon　Welles　was　a　pugnacious　man。　　His　dislike　for　Seward　was　deepseated。　　Imagine　his　state　of　mind　when　it　was　accidently　revealed　to　him　that　Seward　had　gone　behind　his　back　and　had　issued　to　naval　officers　orders　which　were　contradictory　to　his　own！　　The　immediate　result　was　an　interview　that　same　night　between　Seward　and　Welles　in　which；　as　Welles　coldly　admitted　in　after　days；　the　Secretary　of　the　Navy　showed　〃some　excitement。〃　Together　they　went；　about　midnight；　to　the　White　House。　　Lincoln　had　some　difficulty　recalling　the　incident　of　the　dispatch　on　the　1st　of　April；　but　when　he　did　remember；　he　took　the　responsibility　entirely　upon　himself；　saying　he　had　had　no　purpose　but　to　strengthen　the　Pickens　expedition；　and　no　thought　of　weakening　the　expedition　to　Charleston。　　He　directed　Seward　to　telegraph　immediately　cancelling　the　order　detaching　the　Powhatan。　Seward　made　a　desperate　attempt　to　put　him　off；　protesting；　it　was　too　late　to　send　a　telegram　that　night。　　〃But　the　President　was　imperative；〃　writes　Secretary　Welles；　in　describing　the　incident；　and　a　dispatch　was　sent。

Seward　then；　doubtless　in　his　agitation；　did　a　strange　thing。　Instead　of　telegraphing　in　the　President's　name；　the　dispatch　which　he　sent　read　merely；　〃Give　up　the　Powhatan。。。Seward。〃　　When　this　dispatch　was　received　at　Brooklyn；　the　Powhatan　was　already　under　way　and　had　to　be　overtaken　by　a　fast　tug。　　In　the　eyes　of　her　commander；　however；　a　personal　telegram　from　the　Secretary　of　State　appeared　as　of　no　weight　against　the　official　orders　of　the　President；　and　he　continued　his　voyage　to　Pensacola。

The　mercurial　temper　of　Seward　comes　out　even　in　the　caustic　narrative　written　afterwards　by　Welles。　　Evidently　Seward　was　deeply　mortified　and　depressed　by　the　incident。　　He　remarked；　says　Welles；　that　old　as　he　was　he　had　learned　a　lesson；　and　that　was　that　he　had　better　attend　to　his　own　business。　　〃To　this；〃　commented　his　enemy；　〃I　cordially　assented。〃

Nevertheless　Seward's　loss　of　faith　in　himself　was　only　momentary。　A　night's　sleep　was　sufficient　to　restore　it。　　His　next　communication　to　the　commissioners　shows　that　he　was　himself　again；　sure　that　destiny　owed　him　the　control　of　the　situation。　　On　the　following　day　the　commissioners　had　got　wind　of　the　relief　expedition　and　pressed　him　for　information；　recalling　his　assurance　that　nothing　would　be　done　to　their　disadvantage。　　In　reply；　still　through　a　third　person；　Seward　sent　them　the　famous　message；　over　the　precise　meaning　of　which　great　debate　has　raged：　〃Faith　as　to　Sumter　fully　kept；　wait　and　see。〃　　If　this　infatuated　dreamer　still　believed　he　could　dominate　Lincoln；　still　hoped　at　the　last　moment　to　arrest　the　expedition　to　Charleston；　he　was　doomed　to　bitterest　disappointment。

On　the　9th　of　April；　the　expedition　to　Fort　Sumter　sailed；　but　without；　as　we　have　seen；　the　assistance　of　the　much　needed　warship；　the　Powhatan。　　As　all　the　world　knows；　the　expedition　had　been　too　long　delayed　and　it　accomplished　nothing。　　Before　it　arrived；　the　surrender　of　Sumter　had　been　demanded　and　refused　and　war　had　begun。　　During　the　bombardment　of　Sumter；　the　relief　expedition　appeared　beyond　the　bar；　but　its　commander　had　no　vessels　of　such　a　character　as　to　enable　him　to　carry　aid　to　the　fortress。　　Furthermore；　he　had　not　been　informed　that　the　Powhatan　had　been　detached　from　his　squadron；　and　he　expected　to　meet　her　at　the　mouth　of　the　harbor。　　There　his　ships　lay　idle　until　the　fort　was　surrendered；　waiting　for　the　Powhatanfor　whose　detachment　from　the　squadron　Seward　was　responsible。

To　return　to　the　world　of　intrigue　at　Washington；　however；　it　must　not　be　supposed；　as　is　so　often　done；　that　Fort　Sumter　was　the　one　concern　of　the　new　government　during　its　first　six　weeks。　　In　fact；　the　subject　occupied　but　a　fraction　of　Lincoln's　time。　　Scarcely　second　in　importance　was　that　matter　so　curiously　bound　up　with　the　relief　of　the　fortsthe　getting　in　hand　of　the　strangely　vain　glorious　Secretary　of　State。　　Mention　has　already　been　made　of　All…Fools'　Day；　1861。　　Several　marvelous　things　took　place　on　that　day。　Strangest　of　all　was　the　presentation　of　a　paper　by　the　Secretary　of　State　to　his　chief；　entitled　〃Thoughts　for　the　President's　Consideration〃。　　Whether　it　be　regarded　as　a　state　paper　or　as　a　biographical　detail　in　the　career　of　Seward；　it　proves　to　be　quite　the　most　astounding　thing　in　the　whole　episode。　　The　〃Thoughts〃　outlined　a　course　of　policy　by　which　the　buoyant　Secretary　intended　to　make　good　his　prophecy　of　domestic　peace　within　ninety　days。　Besides　calmly　patronizing　Lincoln；　assuring　him　that　his　lack　of　〃a　policy　either　domestic　or　foreign〃　was　〃not　culpable　and。。。even　unavoidable；〃　the　paper　warned　him　that　〃policies。。。both　domestic　and　foreign〃　must　immediately　be　adopted；　and　it　proceeded　to　point　out　what　they　ought　to　be。　　Briefly　stated；　the　one　true　policy　which　he　advocated　at　home　was　to　evacuate　Sumter　（though　Pickens　for　some　unexplained　reason　might　be　safely　retained）　and　then；　in　order　to　bring　the　Southerners　back　into　the　Union；　to　pick　quarrels　with　both　Spain　and　France；　to　proceed　as　quickly　as　possible　to　war　with　both　powers；　and　to　have　the　ultimate　satisfaction　of　beholding　the　reunion　of　the　country　through　the　general　enthusiasm　that　was　bound　to　come。　　Finally；　the　paper　intimated　that　the　Secretary　of　State　was　the　man　to　carry　this　project　through　to　success。

All　th