captains of the civil war-第10节

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and　some　foreign　help；　the　South　managed　to　contrive　the　makeshift　parts　of　what　might　have　become　a　navy　if　the　North　had　only　let　it　grow。　The　North；　however；　did　not　let　it　grow。

The　regular　navy　of　the　United　States；　though　very　small　to　start　with；　was　always　strong　enough　to　keep　the　command　of　the　sea　and　to　prevent　the　makeshift　Southern　parts　of　a　navy　from　ever　becoming　a　whole。　Privateers　took　out　letters　of　marque　to　prey　on　Northern　shipping。　But　privateering　soon　withered　off；　because　prizes　could　not　be　run　through　the　blockade　in　sufficient　numbers　to　make　it　pay；　and　no　prize　would　be　recognized　except　in　a　Southern　port。　Raiders　did　better　and　for　a　much　longer　time。　The　Shenandoah　was　burning　Northern　whalers　in　Bering　Sea　at　the　end　of　the　war。　The　Sumter　and　the　Florida　cut　a　wide　swath　under　instructions　which　〃left　much　to　discretion　and　more　to　the　torch。〃　The　famous　Alabama　only　succumbed　to　the　U。S。S。　Kearsarge　after　sinking　the　Hatteras　man…of…war　and　raiding　seventy　other　vessels。　Yet　still　the　South；　in　spite　of　her　ironclads；　raiders；　and　rams；　in　spite　of　her　river　craft；　of　the　home　ships　or　foreigners　that　ran　the　blockade；　and　of　all　her　other　efforts；　was　a　landsman's　country　that　could　make　no　real　headway　against　the　native　seapower　of　the　North。

Perhaps　the　worst　of　all　the　disabilities　under　which　the　abortive　Southern　navy　suffered　was　lubberly　administration　and　gross　civilian　interference。　The　Administration　actually　refused　to　buy　the　beginnings　of　a　ready…made　sea…going　fleet　when　it　had　the　offer　of　ten　British　East　Indiamen　specially　built　for　rapid　conversion　into　men…of…war。　Forty　thousand　bales　of　cotton　would　have　bought　the　lot。　The　Mississippi　record　was　even　worse。　Five　conflicting　authorities　divided　the　undefined　and　overlapping　responsibilities　between　them：　the　Confederate　Government；　the　State　governments；　the　army；　the　navy；　and　the　Mississippi　skippers。　A　typical　result　may　be　seen　in　the　fate　of　the　fourteen　〃rams〃　which　were　absurdly　mishandled　by　fourteen　independent　civilian　skippers　with　two　civilian　commodores。　This　〃River　Defense　Fleet〃　was　〃backed　by　the　whole　Missouri　delegation〃　at　Richmond；　and　blessed　by　the　Confederate　Secretary　of　War；　Judah　P。　Benjamin；　that　very　clever　lawyer…politician　and　eversmiling　Jew。　Six　of　the　fourteen　〃rams〃　were　lost；　with　sheer　futility；　at　New　Orleans　in　April；　'62；　the　rest　at　Memphis　the　following　June。

As　a　matter　of　fact　the　Confederate　navy　never　had　but　one　real　man…of…war；　the　famous　Merrimac；　and　she　was　a　mere　razee；　cut　down　for　a　special　purpose；　and　too　feebly　engined　to　keep　the　sea。　Even　the　equally　famous　Alabama　was　only　a　raider；　never　meant　for　action　with　a　fleet。　Over　three　hundred　officers　left　the　United　States　Navy　for　the　South；　but；　as　in　the　case　of　the　Army；　they　were　followed　by　very　few　men。　The　total　personnel　of　the　regular　Confederate　navy　never　exceeded　four　thousand　at　any　one　time。　The　irregular　forces　afloat　often　did　gallant；　and　sometimes　even　skillful；　service　in　little　isolated　ways。　But　when　massed　together　they　were　always　at　sixes　and　sevens；　and　they　could　never　do　more　than　make　the　best　of　a　very　bad　business　indeed。　The　Secretary　of　the　Confederate　navy；　Stephen　R。　Mallory；　was　not　to　blame。　He　was　one　of　the　very　few　civilians　who　understood　and　tried　to　follow　any　naval　principles　at　all。　He　had　done　good　work　as　chairman　of　the　Naval　Committee　in　the　Senate　before　the　war；　and　had　learnt　a　good　deal　more　than　his　Northern　rival；　Gideon　Welles。　He　often　saw　what　should　have　been　done。　But　men　and　means　were　lacking。

Men　and　means　were　also　lacking　in　the　naval　North　at　the　time　the　war　began。　But　the　small　regular　navy　was　invincible　against　next　to　none；　and　it　enjoyed　many　means　of　expansion　denied　to　the　South。

On　the　outbreak　of　hostilities　the　United　States　Navy　had　ninety　ships　and　about　nine　thousand　menall　ranks　and　ratings　（with　marines）　included。　The　age　of　steam　had　come。　But　fifty　vessels　had　no　steam　at　all。　Of　the　rest　one　was　on　the　Lakes；　five　were　quite　unserviceable；　and　thirty…four　were　scattered　about　the　world　without　the　slightest　thought　of　how　to　mobilize　a　fleet　at　home。　The　age　of　ironclads　had　begun　already　overseas。　But　in　his　report　to　Congress　on　July　4；　1861；　Gideon　Welles；　Secretary　of　the　Navy；　only　made　some　wholly　non…committal　observations　in　ponderous　〃officialese。〃　In　August　he　appointed　a　committee　which　began　its　report　in　September　with　the　sage　remark　that　〃Opinions　differ　amongst　naval　and　scientific　men　as　to　the　policy　of　adopting　the　iron　armament　for　ships…of…war。〃　In　December　Welles　transmitted　this　report　to　Congress　with　the　still　sager　remark　that　〃The　subject　of　iron　armature　for　ships　is　one　of　great　general　interest；　not　only　to　the　navy　and　country；　but　is　engaging　the　attention　of　the　civilized　world。〃　Such　was　the　higher　administrative　preparation　for　the　ironclad　battle　of　the　following　year。

It　was　the　same　in　everything。　The　people　had　taken　no　interest　in　the　navy　and　Congress　had　faithfully　represented　them　by　denying　the　service　all　chance　of　preparing　for　war　till　after　war　had　broken　out。　Then　there　was　the　usual　hurry　and　horrible　waste。　Fortunately　for　all　concerned；　Gideon　Welles；　after　vainly　groping　about　the　administrative　maze　for　the　first　five　months；　called　Gustavus　V。　Fox　to　his　assistance。　Fox　had　been　a　naval　officer　of　exceptional　promise；　who　had　left　the　service　to　go　into　business；　who　had　a　natural　turn　for　administration；　and　who　now　made　an　almost　ideal　Assistant　Secretary　of　the　Navy。　He　was；　indeed；　far　more　than　this；　for；　in　most　essentials；　he　acted　throughout　the　war　as　a　regular　Chief　of　Staff。

One　of　the　greatest　troubles　was　the　glut　of　senior　officers　who　were　too　old　and　the　alarming　dearth　of　juniors　fit　for　immediate　work　afloat。　It　was　only　after　the　disaster　at　Bull　Run　that　Congress　authorized　the　formation　of　a　Promotion　Board　to　see　what　could　be　done　to　clear　the　active　list　and　make　it　really　a　list　of　officers　fit　for　active　service。　Up　to　this　time　there　had　been　no　system　of　retiring　men　for　inefficiency　or　age。　An　officer　who　did　not　retire　of　his　own　accord　simply　went　on　rising　automatically　till　he　died。　The　president　of　this　board　had　himself　turned　sixty。　But　he　was　the　thoroughly　efficient　David　Glasgow　Farragut；　a　man　who　was　to　do　greater　things　afloat　than　even　Fox　could　do　ashore。　How　badly　active　officers　were　wanted　may　be　inferred　from　the　fact　that　before　the　appointment　of　Farragut's　promotion　board　the　total　number　of　regular　officers　remaining　in　the　navy　was　only　1457。　Intensive　training　was　tried　at　the　Naval　Academy。　Yet　7500　volunteer　officers　had　to　be　used　before　the　war　was　over。　These　came　mostly　from　the　merchant　service　and　were　generally　brave；　capable；　first…rate　men。　But　a　nautical　is　not　the　same　as　a　naval　training；　and　the　dearth　of　good　professional　naval　officers　was　felt　to　the　end。　The　number　of　enlisted　seamen　authorized　by　Congress　rose　from　7600　to　51；500。　But　the　very　greatest　difficulty　was　found　in　〃keeping　up　to　strength；〃　even　with　the　most　lavish　use　of　bounties。

The　number　of　vessels　in　the　navy　kept　on　growing　all　through。　Of　course　not　nearly　all　of　them　were　regular　men…of…war　or　even　fighting　craft　〃fit　to　go　foreign。〃　At　the　end　of　the　first　year　there　were　264　in　commission；　at　the　end　of　the　second；　427；　at　the　end　of　the　third；　588；　and　at　the　end　of　the　fourth；　671。

Bearing　this　in　mind；　and　remembering　the　many　other　Northern　odds；　one　might　easily　imagine　that　the　Southern　armies　fought　only　with　the　courage　of　despair。　Yet　such　was　not　the　case。　This　was　no　ordinary　war；　to　be　ended　by　a　treaty　in　which　compromise　would　play　its　part。　There　could　be　only　two　alternatives：　either　the　South　would　win　her　independence　or　the　North　would　have　to　beat　her　into　complete　submission。　Under　the　circumstances　the　united　South　would　win　whenever　the　divided　North　thought　that　complete　subjugation　would　cost　more　than　it　was　worth。　The　great　aim　of　the　South　was；　therefore；　not　to　conquer　the　North　but　simply　to　sicken　the　North　of　trying　to　conquer　her。　〃Let　us　alone　and　we'll　let　you　alone〃　was　her　insinuating　argument；　and　this；　as　she　knew　very　well；　was　echoed　by　many　people　in　the　North。　Thus；　as　regards　her　own　objective；　she　began　with　hopes　that　the　Northern　peace　party　never　quite　let　die。

Then；　so　far　as　her　patriotic　feelings　were　concerned；　the　South　was　not　fighting　for　any　one　point　at　issuenot　even　for　slavery；　because　only　a　small　minority　held　slavesbut　for　her　whole　way　of　life；　which；　rightly　or　wrongly；　she　wanted　to　live　in　her　own　Southern　way；　and　she　passionately　resented　the　invasion　of　her　soil。　This　gave　her　army　a　very　high　morale；　which；　in　its　turn；　inclined　her　soldiers　the　better　to　appreciate　their　real　or　imagined　advantages　over　the　Northern　hosts。　First；　they　and　their　enemies　both　knew　that　they　enjoyed　the　three　real　advantages　of　fighting　at　home　under　magnificent　leaders　and　with　interior　lines。　Robert　Lee　and　Stonewall　Jackson　stood　head　and　shoulders　above　any　Northern　leaders　till　Grant　and　Sherman　rose　to　greatness　during　the　latter　half　of　the　war。　Lee　himself