representative government-第58节
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power of the Federal Government ought to extend； and whether by the Constitution it did extend； to making roads and canals at the cost of the Union。 It is only in transactions with foreign powers that the authority of the Federal Government is of necessity complete。 On every other subject； the question depends on how closely the people in general wish to draw the federal tie； what portion of their local freedom of action they are willing to surrender； in order to enjoy more fully the benefit of being one nation。
* Mr。 Calhoun。
Respecting the fitting constitution of a federal government within itself much need not be said。 It of course consists of a legislative branch and an executive； and the constitution of each is amenable to the same principles as that of representative governments generally。 As regards the mode of adapting these general principles to a federal government； the provision of the American Constitution seems exceedingly judicious； that Congress should consist of two Houses； and that while one of them is constituted according to population； each State being entitled to representatives in the ratio of the number of its inhabitants； the other should represent not the citizens； but the State Governments； and every State； whether large or small； should be represented in it by the same number of members。 This provision precludes any undue power from being exercised by the more powerful States over the rest； and guarantees the reserved rights of the State Governments； by making it impossible； as far as the mode of representation can prevent； that any measure should pass Congress unless approved not only by a majority of the citizens； but by a majority of the States。 I have before adverted to the further incidental advantage obtained of raising the standard of qualifications in one of the Houses。 Being nominated by select bodies； the Legislatures of the various States； whose choice； for reasons already indicated； is more likely to fall on eminent men than any popular election… who have not only the power of electing such； but a strong motive to do so； because the influence of their State in the general deliberations must be materially affected by the personal weight and abilities of its representatives； the Senate of the United States； thus chosen； has always contained nearly all the political men of established and high reputation in the Union： while the Lower House of Congress has； in the opinion of competent observers； been generally as remarkable for the absence of conspicuous personal merit as the Upper House for its presence。 When the conditions exist for the formation of efficient and durable Federal Unions； the multiplication of them is always a benefit to the world。 It has the same salutary effect as any other extension of the practice of co…operation； through which the weak； by uniting； can meet on equal terms with the strong。 By diminishing the number of those petty states which are not equal to their own defence； it weakens the temptations to an aggressive policy； whether working directly by arms； or through the prestige of superior power。 It of course puts an end to war and diplomatic quarrels； and usually also to restrictions on commerce； between the States composing the Union； while； in reference to neighbouring nations； the increased military strength conferred by it is of a kind to be almost exclusively available for defensive； scarcely at all for aggressive； purposes。 A federal government has not a sufficiently concentrated authority to conduct with much efficiency any war but one of self…defence； in which it can rely on the voluntary co…operation of every citizen： nor is there anything very flattering to national vanity or ambition in acquiring； by a successful war； not subjects； nor even fellow…citizens； but only new； and perhaps troublesome； independent members of the confederation。 The warlike proceedings of the Americans in Mexico were purely exceptional； having been carried on principally by volunteers； under the influence of the migratory propensity which prompts individual Americans to possess themselves of unoccupied land； and stimulated； if by any public motive； not by that of national aggrandisement； but by the purely sectional purpose of extending slavery。 There are few signs in the proceedings of Americans； nationally or individually； that the desire of territorial acquisition for their country as such has any considerable power over them。 Their hankering after Cuba is； in the same manner； merely sectional； and the northern States； those opposed to slavery； have never in any way favoured it。 The question may present itself （as in Italy at its present uprising） whether a country； which is determined to be united； should form a complete or a merely federal union。 The point is sometimes necessarily decided by the mere territorial magnitude of the united whole。 There is a limit to the extent of country which can advantageously be governed； or even whose government can be conveniently superintended； from a single centre。 There are vast countries so governed； but they； or at least their distant provinces； are in general deplorably ill administered； and it is only when the inhabitants are almost savages that they could not manage their affairs better separately。 This obstacle does not exist in the case of Italy； the size of which does not come up to that of several very efficiently governed single states in past and present times。 The question then is whether the different parts of the nation require to be governed in a way so essentially different that it is not probable the same Legislature； and the same ministry or administrative body； will give satisfaction to them all。 Unless this be the case； which is a question of fact； it is better for them to be completely united。 That a totally different system of laws； and very different administrative institutions； may exist in two portions of a country without being any obstacle to legislative unity is proved by the case of England and Scotland。 Perhaps； however； this undisturbed co…existence of two legal systems； under one united legislature； making different laws for the two sections of the country in adaptation to the previous differences； might not be so well preserved； or the same confidence might not be felt in its preservation； in a country whose legislators were more possessed （as is apt to be the case on the Continent） with the mania for uniformity。 A people having that unbounded toleration which is characteristic of this country for every description of anomaly； so long as those whose interests it concerns do not feel aggrieved by it； afforded an exceptionally advantageous field for trying this difficult experiment。 In most countries； if it was an object to retain different systems of law； it might probably be necessary to retain distinct legislatures as guardians of them； which is perfectly compatible with a national Parliament and King； or a national Parliament without a King； supreme over the external relations of all the members of the body。 Whenever it is not deemed necessary to maintain permanently； in the different provinces； different systems of jurisprudence； and fundamental institutions grounded on different principles； it is always practicable to reconcile minor diversities with the maintenance of unity of government。 All that is needful is to give a sufficiently large sphere of action to the local authorities。 Under one and the same central government there may be local governors； and provincial assemblies for local purposes。 It may happen； for instance； that the people of different provinces may have preferences in favour of different modes of taxation。 If the general legislature could not be depended on for being guided by the members for each province in modifying the general system of taxation to suit that province； the Constitution might provide that as many of the expenses of the government as could by any possibility be made local should be defrayed by local rates imposed by the provincial assemblies； and that those which must of necessity be general； such as the support of an army and navy； should； in the estimates for the year； be apportioned among the different provinces according to some general estimate of their resources； the amount assigned to each being levied by the local assembly on the principles most acceptable to the locality； and paid en bloc into the national treasury。 A practice approaching to this existed even in the old French monarchy； so far as regarded the pays d'etats； each of which； having consented or been required to furnish a fixed sum； was left to assess it upon the inhabitants by its own officers； thus escaping the grinding despotism of the royal intendants and subdelegues； and this privilege is always mentioned as one of the advantages which mainly contributed to render them； as some of them were； the most flourishing provinces of France。 Identity of central government is compatible with many different degrees of centralisation； not only administrative； but even legislative。 A people may have the desire； and the capacity； for a closer union than one merely federal； while yet their local peculiarities and antecedents render considerable diversities desirable in the details of their gover
