representative government-第56节
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eigners to those who are not only their nearest neighbours； but the wealthiest； and one of the freest； as well as most civilised and powerful； nations of the earth。 The cases in which the greatest practical obstacles exist to the blending of nationalities are when the nationalities which have been bound together are nearly equal in numbers and in the other elements of power。 In such cases； each； confiding in its strength； and feeling itself capable of maintaining an equal struggle with any of the others； is unwilling to be merged in it： each cultivates with party obstinacy its distinctive peculiarities； obsolete customs； and even declining languages； are revived to deepen the separation； each deems itself tyrannised over if any authority is exercised within itself by functionaries of a rival race； and whatever is given to one of the conflicting nationalities is considered to be taken from all the rest。 When nations； thus divided； are under a despotic government which is a stranger to all of them； or which； though sprung from one； yet feeling greater interest in its own power than in any sympathies of nationality； assigns no privilege to either nation； and chooses its instruments indifferently from all； in the course of a few generations； identity of situation often produces harmony of feeling； and the different races come to feel towards each other as fellow…countrymen； particularly if they are dispersed over the same tract of country。 But if the era of aspiration to free government arrives before this fusion has been effected； the opportunity has gone by for effecting it。 From that time； if the unreconciled nationalities are geographically separate； and especially if their local position is such that there is no natural fitness or convenience in their being under the same government （as in the case of an Italian province under a French or German yoke）； there is not only an obvious propriety； but； if either freedom or concord is cared for； a necessity； for breaking the connection altogether。 There may be cases in which the provinces； after separation； might usefully remain united by a federal tie： but it generally happens that if they are willing to forego complete independence； and become members of a federation； each of them has other neighbours with whom it would prefer to connect itself； having more sympathies in common； if not also greater community of interest。 Chapter 17 Of Federal Representative Governments。
PORTIONS OF mankind who are not fitted； or not disposed； to live under the same internal government； may often with advantage be federally united as to their relations with foreigners： both to prevent wars among themselves； and for the sake of more effectual protection against the aggression of powerful States。 To render a federation advisable； several conditions are necessary。 The first is； that there should be a sufficient amount of mutual sympathy among the populations。 The federation binds them always to fight on the same side； and if they have such feelings towards one another； or such diversity of feeling towards their neighbours； that they would generally prefer to fight on opposite sides； the federal tie is neither likely to be of long duration； not to be well observed while it subsists。 The sympathies available for the purpose are those of race； language； religion； and； above all； of political institutions； as conducing most to a feeling of identity of political interest。 When a few free states； separately insufficient for their own defence； are hemmed in on all sides by military or feudal monarchs； who hate and despise freedom even in a neighbour； those states have no chance for preserving liberty and its blessings but by a federal union。 The common interest arising from this cause has in Switzerland； for several centuries； been found adequate to maintain efficiently the federal bond； in spite not only of difference of religion when religion was the grand source of irreconcilable political enmity throughout Europe； but also in spite of great weakness in the constitution of the federation itself。 In America； where all the conditions for the maintenance of union existed at the highest point； with the sole drawback of difference of institutions in the single but most important article of Slavery； this one difference has gone so far in alienating from each other's sympathies the two divisions of the Union； that the maintenance or disruption of a tie of so much value to them both depends on the issue of an obstinate civil war。 A second condition of the stability of a federal government is that the separate states be not so powerful as to be able to rely； for protection against foreign encroachment； on their individual strength。 If they are； they will be apt to think that they do not gain； by union with others； the equivalent of what they sacrifice in their own liberty of action； and consequently； whenever the policy of the Confederation； in things reserved to its cognisance； is different from that which any one of its members would separately pursue； the internal and sectional breach will； through absence of sufficient anxiety to preserve the union； be in danger of going so far as to dissolve it。 A third condition； not less important than the two others； is that there be not a very marked inequality of strength among the several contracting states。 They cannot； indeed； be exactly equal in resources： in all federations there will be a gradation of power among the members； some will be more populous； rich； and civilised than others。 There is a wide difference in wealth and population between New York and Rhode Island； between Bern and Zug or Glaris。 The essential is； that there should not be any one State so much more powerful than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with many of them combined。 If there be such a one； and only one； it will insist on being master of the joint deliberations： if there be two； they will be irresistible when they agree； and whenever they differ everything will be decided by a struggle for ascendancy between the rivals。 This cause is alone enough to reduce the German Bund to almost a nullity； independently of its wretched internal constitution。 It effects none of the real purposes of a confederation。 It has never bestowed on Germany a uniform system of customs； nor so much as a uniform coinage； and has served only to give Austria and Prussia a legal right of pouring in their troops to assist the local sovereigns in keeping their subjects obedient to despotism： while in regard to external concerns； the Bund would make all Germany a dependency of Prussia if there were no Austria； and of Austria if there were no Prussia： and in the meantime each petty prince has little choice but to be a partisan of one or the other； or to intrigue with foreign governments against both。 There are two different modes of organising a Federal Union。 The federal authorities may represent the Governments solely； and their acts may be obligatory only on the Governments as such； or they may have the power of enacting laws and issuing orders which are binding directly on individual citizens。 The former is the plan of the German so…called Confederation； and of the Swiss Constitution previous to 1847。 It was tried in America for a few years immediately following the War of Independence。 The other principle is that of the existing Constitution of the United States； and has been adopted within the last dozen years by the Swiss Confederacy。 The Federal Congress of the American Union is a substantive part of the government of every individual State。 Within the limits of its attributions； it makes laws which are obeyed by every citizen individually； executes them through its own officers； and enforces them by its own tribunals。 This is the only principle which has been found； or which is ever likely； to produce an effective federal government。 A union between the governments only is a mere alliance； and subject to all the contingencies which render alliances precarious。 If the acts of the President and of Congress were binding solely on the Governments of New York； Virginia； or Pennsylvania； and could only be carried into effect through orders issued by those Governments to officers appointed by them； under responsibility to their own courts of justice no mandates of the Federal Government which were disagreeable to a local majority would ever be executed。 Requisitions issued to a government have no other sanction； or means of enforcement； than war： and a federal army would have to be always in readiness to enforce the decrees of the Federation against any recalcitrant State； subject to the probability that other States； sympathising with the recusant； and perhaps sharing its sentiments on the particular point in dispute； would withhold their contingents； if not send them to fight in the ranks of the disobedient State。 Such a federation is more likely to be a cause than a preventive of internal wars： and if such was not its effect in Switzerland until the events of the years immediately preceding 1847； it was only because the Federal Government felt its weakness so strongly that it hardly ever attempted to exercise any real authority。 In America； the experiment of
