representative government-第51节
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case of local bodies； besides the function of electing； many citizens in turn have the chance of being elected； and many； either by selection or by rotation； fill one or other of the numerous local executive offices。 In these positions they have to act for public interests； as well as to think and to speak； and the thinking cannot all be done by proxy。 It may be added； that these local functions； not being in general sought by the higher ranks； carry down the important political education which they are the means of conferring to a much lower grade in society。 The mental discipline being thus a more important feature in local concerns than in the general affairs of the State； while there are not such vital interests dependent on the quality of the administration； a greater weight may be given to the former consideration； and the latter admits much more frequently of being postponed to it than in matters of general legislation and the conduct of imperial affairs。 The proper constitution of local representative bodies does not present much difficulty。 The principles which apply to it do not differ in any respect from those applicable to the national representation。 The same obligation exists； as in the case of the more important function； for making the bodies elective； and the same reasons operate as in that case； but with still greater force； for giving them a widely democratic basis： the dangers being less； and the advantages； in point of popular education and cultivation； in some respects even greater。 As the principal duty of the local bodies consists of the imposition and expenditure of local taxation； the electoral franchise should vest in all who contribute to the local rates； to the exclusion of all who do not。 I assume that there is no indirect taxation； no octroi duties； or that if there are； they are supplementary only； those on whom their burden falls being also rated to a direct assessment。 The representation of minorities should be provided for in the same manner as in the national Parliament； and there are the same strong reasons for plurality of votes。 Only； there is not so decisive an objection； in the inferior as in the higher body； to making the plural voting depend （as in some of the local elections of our own country） on a mere money qualification： for the honest and frugal dispensation of money forms so much larger a part of the business of the local than of the national body； that there is more justice as well as policy in allowing a greater proportional influence to those who have a larger money interest at stake。 In the most recently established of our local representative institutions； the Boards of Guardians； the justices of peace of the district sit ex officio along with the elected members； in number limited by law to a third of the whole。 In the peculiar constitution of English society I have no doubt of the beneficial effect of this provision。 It secures the presence； in these bodies； of a more educated class than it would perhaps be practicable to attract thither on any other terms； and while the limitation in number of the ex officio members precludes them from acquiring predominance by mere numerical strength； they； as a virtual representation of another class； having sometimes a different interest from the rest； are a check upon the class interests of the farmers or petty shopkeepers who form the bulk of the elected Guardians。 A similar commendation cannot be given to the constitution of the only provincial boards we possess； the Quarter Sessions； consisting of the justices of peace alone； on whom； over and above their judicial duties； some of the most important parts of the administrative business of the country depend for their performance。 The mode of formation of these bodies is most anomalous； they being neither elected； nor； in any proper sense of the term； nominated； but holding their important functions； like the feudal lords to whom they succeeded； virtually by right of their acres： the appointment vested in the Crown （or； speaking practically； in one of themselves； the Lord Lieutenant） being made use of only as a means of excluding any one who it is thought would do discredit to the body； or； now and then； one who is on the wrong side in politics。 The institution is the most aristocratic in principle which now remains in England； far more so than the House of Lords； for it grants public money and disposes of important public interests； not in conjunction with a popular assembly； but alone。 It is clung to with proportionate tenacity by our aristocratic classes； but is obviously at variance with all the principles which are the foundation of representative government。 In a County Board there is not the same justification as in Boards of Guardians； for even an admixture of ex officio with elected members： since the business of a county being on a sufficiently large scale to be an object of interest and attraction to country gentlemen； they would have no more difficulty in getting themselves elected to the Board than they have in being returned to Parliament as county members。 In regard to the proper circumscription of the constituencies which elect the local representative bodies； the principle which； when applied as an exclusive and unbending rule to parliamentary representation； is inappropriate； namely community of local interests； is here the only just and applicable one。 The very object of having a local representation is in order that those who have any interest in common； which they do not share with the general body of their countrymen； may manage that joint interest by themselves： and the purpose is contradicted if the distribution of the local representation follows any other rule than the grouping of those joint interests。 There are local interests peculiar to every town； whether great or small； and common to all its inhabitants： every town； therefore； without distinction of size； ought to have its municipal council。 It is equally obvious that every town ought to have but one。 The different quarters of the same town have seldom or never any material diversities of local interest； they all require to have the same things done； the same expenses incurred； and； except as to their churches； which it is probably desirable to leave under simply parochial management； the same arrangements may be made to serve for all。 Paving； lighting； water supply； drainage； port and market regulations； cannot without great waste and inconvenience be different for different quarters of the same town。 The subdivision of London into six or seven independent districts； each with its separate arrangements for local business （several of them without unity of administration even within themselves）； prevents the possibility of consecutive or well regulated cooperation for common objects； precludes any uniform principle for the discharge of local duties； compels the general government to take things upon itself which would be best left to local authorities if there were any whose authority extended to the entire metropolis； and answers no purpose but to keep up the fantastical trappings of that union of modern jobbing and antiquated foppery； the Corporation of the City of London。 Another equally important principle is； that in each local circumscription there should be but one elected body for all local business； not different bodies for different parts of it。 Division of labour does not mean cutting up every business into minute fractions； it means the union of such operations as are fit to be performed by the same persons； and the separation of such as can be better performed by different persons。 The executive duties of the locality do indeed require to be divided into departments； for the same reason as those of the State； because they are of diverse kinds； each requiring knowledge peculiar to itself； and needing； for its due performance； the undivided attention of a specially qualified functionary。 But the reasons for subdivision which apply to the execution do not apply to the control。 The business of the elective body is not to do the work； but to see that it is properly done； and that nothing necessary is left undone。 This function can be fulfilled for all departments by the same superintending body； and by a collective and comprehensive far better than by a minute and microscopic view。 It is as absurd in public affairs as it would be in private that every workman should be looked after by a superintendent to himself。 The Government of the Crown consists of many departments； and there are many ministers to conduct them； but those ministers have not a Parliament apiece to keep them to their duty。 The local； like the national Parliament； has for its proper business to consider the interest of the locality as a whole； composed of parts all of which must be adapted to one another； and attended to in the order and ratio of their importance。 There is another very weighty reason for uniting the control of all the business of a locality under one body。 The greatest imperfection of popular local institutions； and the chief cause of the failure which so often attends them； is the low calibre of the men by whom they are almost always carried on。 That these should be of a very miscellaneous character is； indeed； p
