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he mode in which; to the best of my judgment; a balance of forces might most advantageously be established there。 I have also pointed out; that even if the numerical majority were allowed to exercise complete predominance by means of a corresponding majority in Parliament; yet if minorities also are permitted to enjoy the equal right due to them on strictly democratic principles; of being represented proportionally to their numbers; this provision will ensure the perpetual presence in the House by the same popular title as its other members; of so many of the first intellects in the country; that without being in any way banded apart; or invested with any invidious prerogative; this portion of the national representation will have a personal weight much more than in proportion to its numerical strength; and will afford; in a most effective form; the moral centre of resistance which is needed。 A Second Chamber; therefore; is not required for this purpose; and would not contribute to it; but might even; in some conceivable modes impede its attainment。 If; however; for the other reasons already mentioned; the decision were taken that there should be such a Chamber; it is desirable that it should be composed of elements which; without being open to the imputation of class interests adverse to the majority; would incline it to oppose itself to the class interests of the majority; and qualify it to raise its voice with authority against their errors and weaknesses。 These conditions evidently are not found in a body constituted in the manner of our House of Lords。 So soon as conventional rank and individual riches no longer overawe the democracy; a House of Lords becomes insignificant。   Of all principles on which a wisely conservative body; destined to moderate and regulate democratic ascendancy; could possibly be constructed; the best seems to be that exemplified in the Roman Senate; itself the most consistently prudent and sagacious body that ever administered public affairs。 The deficiencies of a democratic assembly; which represents the general public; are the deficiencies of the public itself; want of special training and knowledge。 The appropriate corrective is to associate with it a body of which special training and knowledge should be the characteristics。 If one House represents popular feeling; the other should represent personal merit; tested and guaranteed by actual public service; and fortified by practical experience。 If one is the People's Chamber; the other should be the Chamber of Statesmen; a council composed of all living public men who have passed through important political offices or employments。 Such a Chamber would be fitted for much more than to be a merely moderating body。 It would not be exclusively a check; but also an impelling force。 In its hands the power of holding the people back would be vested in those most competent; and who would generally be most inclined; to lead them forward in any right course。 The council to whom the task would be entrusted of rectifying the people's mistakes would not represent a class believed to be opposed to their interest; but would consist of their own natural leaders in the path of progress。 No mode of composition could approach to this in giving weight and efficacy to their function of moderators。 It would be impossible to cry down a body always foremost in promoting improvements as a mere obstructive body; whatever amount of mischief it might obstruct。   Were the place vacant in England for such a Senate (I need scarcely say that this is a mere hypothesis); it might be composed of some such elements as the following。 All who were or had been members of the Legislative Commission described in a former chapter; and which I regard as an indispensable ingredient in a well…constituted popular government。 All who were or had been Chief justices; or heads of any of the superior courts of law or equity。 All who had for five years filled the office of puisne judge。 All who had held for two years any Cabinet office: but these should also be eligible to the House of Commons; and if elected members of it; their peerage or senatorial office should be held in suspense。 The condition of time is needed to prevent persons from being named Cabinet Ministers merely to give them a seat in the Senate; and the period of two years is suggested; that the same term which qualifies them for a pension might entitle them to a senatorship。 All who had filled the office of Commander…in…Chief; and all who; having commanded an army or a fleet; had been thanked by Parliament for military or naval successes。 All who had held; during ten years; first…class diplomatic appointments。 All who had been Governors…General of India or British America; and all who had held for ten years any Colonial Governorships。 The permanent civil service should also be represented; all should be senators who had filled; during ten years; the important offices of Under…Secretary to the Treasury; permanent Under…Secretary of State; or any others equally high and responsible。 If; along with the persons thus qualified by practical experience in the administration of public affairs; any representation of the speculative class were to be included… a thing in itself desirable… it would be worth consideration whether certain professorships; in certain national institutions; after a tenure of a few years; might confer a seat in the Senate。 Mere scientific and literary eminence are too indefinite and disputable: they imply a power of selection; whereas the other qualifications speak for themselves; if the writings by which reputation has been gained are unconnected with politics; they are no evidence of the special qualities required; while if political; they would enable successive Ministries to deluge the House with party tools。   The historical antecedents of England render it all but certain that; unless in the improbable case of a violent subversion of the existing Constitution; any Second Chamber which could possibly exist would have to be built on the foundation of the House of Lords。 It is out of the question to think practically of abolishing that assembly; to replace it by such a Senate as I have sketched; or by any other; but there might not be the same insuperable difficulty in aggregating the classes or categories just spoken of to the existing body; in the character of Peers for life。 An ulterior; and perhaps; on this supposition; a necessary step; might be; that the hereditary Peerage should be present in the House by their representatives instead of personally: a practice already established in the case of the Scotch and Irish Peers; and which the mere multiplication of the order will probably at some time or other render inevitable。 An easy adaptation of Mr。 Hare's plan would prevent the representative Peers from representing exclusively the party which has the majority in the Peerage。 If; for example; one representative were allowed for every ten Peers; any ten might be admitted to choose a representative; and the Peers might be free to group themselves for that purpose as they pleased。 The election might be thus conducted: All Peers who were candidates for the representation of their order should be required to declare themselves such; and enter their names in a list。 A day and place should be appointed at which Peers desirous of voting should be present; either in person; or; in the usual parliamentary manner; by their proxies。 The votes should be taken; each Peer voting for only one。 Every candidate who had as many as ten votes should be declared elected。 If any one had more; all but ten should be allowed to withdraw their votes; or ten of the number should be selected by lot。 These ten would form his constituency; and the remainder of his voters would be set free to give their votes over again for some one else。 This process should be repeated until (so far as possible) every Peer present either personally or by proxy was represented。 When a number less than ten remained over; if amounting to five they might still be allowed to agree on a representative; if fewer than five; their votes must be lost; or they might be permitted to record them in favour of somebody already elected。 With this inconsiderable exception; every representative Peer would represent ten members of the Peerage; all of whom had not only voted for him; but selected him as the one; among all open to their choice; by whom they were most desirous to be represented。 As a compensation to the Peers who were not chosen representatives of their order; they should be eligible to the House of Commons; a justice now refused to Scotch Peers; and to Irish Peers in their own part of the kingdom; while the representation in the House of Lords of any but the most numerous party in the Peerage is denied equally to both。   The mode of composing a Senate; which has been here advocated; not only seems the best in itself; but is that for which historical precedent; and actual brilliant success; can to the greatest extent be pleaded。 It is not; however; the only feasible plan that might be proposed。 Another possible mode of forming a Second Chamber would be to have it elected by the First; subject to the restriction that they should not nominate any of their own members。 Su

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