representative government-第44节

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to　me　false；　and　its　practical　operation　hurtful；　though　the　mischief　would　in　that　case　be　confined　within　certain　bounds。　But　if　the　securities　by　which　I　have　endeavoured　to　guard　the　representative　principle　are　not　recognised　by　the　Constitution；　if　provision　is　not　made　for　the　representation　of　minorities；　nor　any　difference　admitted　in　the　numerical　value　of　votes；　according　to　some　criterion　of　the　amount　of　education　possessed　by　the　voters；　in　that　case　no　words　can　exaggerate　the　importance　in　principle　of　leaving　an　unfettered　discretion　to　the　representative；　for　it　would　then　be　the　only　chance；　under　universal　suffrage；　for　any　other　opinions　than　those　of　the　majority　to　be　heard　in　Parliament。　In　that　falsely　called　democracy　which　is　really　the　exclusive　rule　of　the　operative　classes；　all　others　being　unrepresented　and　unheard；　the　only　escape　from　class　legislation　in　its　narrowest；　and　political　ignorance　in　its　most　dangerous；　form；　would　lie　in　such　disposition　as　the　uneducated　might　have　to　choose　educated　representatives；　and　to　defer　to　their　opinions。　Some　willingness　to　do　this　might　reasonably　be　expected；　and　everything　would　depend　upon　cultivating　it　to　the　highest　point。　But；　once　invested　with　political　omnipotence；　if　the　operative　classes　voluntarily　concurred　in　imposing　in　this　or　any　other　manner　any　considerable　limitation　upon　their　self…opinion　and　self…will；　they　would　prove　themselves　wiser　than　any　class；　possessed　of　absolute　power；　has　shown　itself；　or；　we　may　venture　to　say；　is　ever　likely　to　show　itself；　under　that　corrupting　influence。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　13　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　a　Second　Chamber。

　　OF　ALL　topics　relating　to　the　theory　of　representative　government；　none　has　been　the　subject　of　more　discussion；　especially　on　the　Continent；　than　what　is　known　as　the　question　of　the　Two　Chambers。　It　has　occupied　a　greater　amount　of　the　attention　of　thinkers　than　many　questions　of　ten　times　its　importance；　and　has　been　regarded　as　a　sort　of　touchstone　which　distinguishes　the　partisans　of　limited　from　those　of　uncontrolled　democracy。　For　my　own　part；　I　set　little　value　on　any　check　which　a　Second　Chamber　can　apply　to　a　democracy　otherwise　unchecked；　and　I　am　inclined　to　think　that　if　all　other　constitutional　questions　are　rightly　decided；　it　is　but　of　secondary　importance　whether　the　Parliament　consists　of　two　Chambers；　or　only　of　one。　　　If　there　are　two　Chambers；　they　may　either　be　of　similar；　or　of　dissimilar　composition。　If　of　similar；　both　will　obey　the　same　influences；　and　whatever　has　a　majority　in　one　of　the　Houses　will　be　likely　to　have　it　in　the　other。　It　is　true　that　the　necessity　of　obtaining　the　consent　of　both　to　the　passing　of　any　measure　may　at　times　be　a　material　obstacle　to　improvement；　since；　assuming　both　the　Houses　to　be　representative；　and　equal　in　their　numbers；　a　number　slightly　exceeding　a　fourth　of　the　entire　representation　may　prevent　the　passing　of　a　Bill；　while；　if　there　is　but　one　House；　a　Bill　is　secure　of　passing　if　it　has　a　bare　majority。　But　the　case　supposed　is　rather　abstractedly　possible　than　likely　to　occur　in　practice。　It　will　not　often　happen　that　of　two　Houses　similarly　composed；　one　will　be　almost　unanimous；　and　the　other　nearly　equally　divided：　if　a　majority　in　one　rejects　a　measure；　there　will　generally　have　been　a　large　minority　unfavourable　to　it　in　the　other；　any　improvement；　therefore；　which　could　be　thus　impeded；　would　in　almost　all　cases　be　one　which　had　not　much　more　than　a　simple　majority　in　the　entire　body；　and　the　worst　consequence　that　could　ensue　would　be　to　delay　for　a　short　time　the　passing　of　the　measure；　or　give　rise　to　a　fresh　appeal　to　the　electors　to　ascertain　if　the　small　majority　in　Parliament　corresponded　to　an　effective　one　in　the　country。　The　inconvenience　of　delay；　and　the　advantages　of　the　appeal　to　the　nation；　might　be　regarded　in　this　case　as　about　equally　balanced。　　　I　attach　little　weight　to　the　argument　oftenest　urged　for　having　two　Chambers…　to　prevent　precipitancy；　and　compel　a　second　deliberation；　for　it　must　be　a　very　ill…constituted　representative　assembly　in　which　the　established　forms　of　business　do　not　require　many　more　than　two　deliberations。　The　consideration　which　tells　most；　in　my　judgment；　in　favour　of　two　Chambers　（and　this　I　do　regard　as　of　some　moment）　is　the　evil　effect　produced　upon　the　mind　of　any　holder　of　power；　whether　an　individual　or　an　assembly；　by　the　consciousness　of　having　only　themselves　to　consult。　It　is　important　that　no　set　of　persons　should；　in　great　affairs；　be　able；　even　temporarily；　to　make　their　sic　volo　prevail　without　asking　any　one　else　for　his　consent。　A　majority　in　a　single　assembly；　when　it　has　assumed　a　permanent　character…　when　composed　of　the　same　persons　habitually　acting　together；　and　always　assured　of　victory　in　their　own　House…　easily　becomes　despotic　and　overweening；　if　released　from　the　necessity　of　considering　whether　its　acts　will　be　concurred　in　by　another　constituted　authority。　The　same　reason　which　induced　the　Romans　to　have　two　consuls　makes　it　desirable　there　should　be　two　Chambers：　that　neither　of　them　may　be　exposed　to　the　corrupting　influence　of　undivided　power；　even　for　the　space　of　a　single　year。　One　of　the　most　indispensable　requisites　in　the　practical　conduct　of　politics；　especially　in　the　management　of　free　institutions；　is　conciliation：　a　readiness　to　compromise；　a　willingness　to　concede　something　to　opponents；　and　to　shape　good　measures　so　as　to　be　as　little　offensive　as　possible　to　persons　of　opposite　views；　and　of　this　salutary　habit；　the　mutual　give　and　take　（as　it　has　been　called）　between　two　Houses　is　a　perpetual　school；　useful　as　such　even　now；　and　its　utility　would　probably　be　even　more　felt　in　a　more　democratic　constitution　of　the　Legislature。　　　But　the　Houses　need　not　both　be　of　the　same　composition；　they　may　be　intended　as　a　check　on　one　another。　One　being　supposed　democratic；　the　other　will　naturally　be　constituted　with　a　view　to　its　being　some　restraint　upon　the　democracy。　But　its　efficacy　in　this　respect　wholly　depends　on　the　social　support　which　it　can　command　outside　the　House。　An　assembly　which　does　not　rest　on　the　basis　of　some　great　power　in　the　country　is　ineffectual　against　one　which　does。　An　aristocratic　House　is　only　powerful　in　an　aristocratic　state　of　society。　The　House　of　Lords　was　once　the　strongest　power　in　our　Constitution；　and　the　Commons　only　a　checking　body：　but　this　was　when　the　Barons　were　almost　the　only　power　out　of　doors。　I　cannot　believe　that；　in　a　really　democratic　state　of　society；　the　House　of　Lords　would　be　of　any　practical　value　as　a　moderator　of　democracy。　When　the　force　on　one　side　is　feeble　in　comparison　with　that　on　the　other；　the　way　to　give　it　effect　is　not　to　draw　both　out　in　line；　and　muster　their　strength　in　open　field　over　against　one　another。　Such　tactics　would　ensure　the　utter　defeat　of　the　less　powerful。　It　can　only　act　to　advantage　by　not　holding　itself　apart；　and　compelling　every　one　to　declare　himself　either　with　or　against　it；　but　taking　a　position　among；　rather　than　in　opposition　to；　the　crowd；　and　drawing　to　itself　the　elements　most　capable　of　allying　themselves　with　it　on　any　given　point；　not　appearing　at　all　as　an　antagonist　body；　to　provoke　a　general　rally　against　it；　but　working　as　one　of　the　elements　in　a　mixed　mass；　infusing　its　leaven；　and　often　making　what　would　be　the　weaker　part　the　stronger；　by　the　addition　of　its　influence。　The　really　moderating　power　in　a　democratic　constitution　must　act　in　and　through　the　democratic　House。　　　That　there　should　be；　in　every　polity；　a　centre　of　resistance　to　the　predominant　power　in　the　Constitution…　and　in　a　democratic　constitution；　therefore；　a　nucleus　of　resistance　to　the　democracy…　I　have　already　maintained；　and　I　regard　it　as　a　fundamental　maxim　of　government。　If　any　people；　who　possess　a　democratic　representation；　are；　from　their　historical　antecedents；　more　willing　to　tolerate　such　a　centre　of　resistance　in　the　form　of　a　Second　Chamber　or　House　of　Lords　than　in　any　other　shape；　this　constitutes　a　stronger　reason　for　having　it　in　that　shape。　But　it　does　not　appear　to　me　the　best　shape　in　itself；　nor　by　any　means　the　most　efficacious　for　its　object。　If　there　are　two　Houses；　one　considered　to　represent　the　people；　the　other　to　represent　only　a　class；　or　not　to　be　representative　at　all；　I　cannot　think　that　where　democracy　is　the　ruling　power　in　society　the　Second　House　would　have　any　real　ability　to　resist　even　the　aberrations　of　the　first。　It　might　be　suffered　to　exist　in　deference　to　habit　and　association；　but　not　as　an　effective　check。　If　it　exercised　an　independent　will；　it　would　be　required　to　do　so　in　the　same　general　spirit　as　the　other　House；　to　be　equally　democratic　with　it；　and　to　content　itself　with　correcting　the　accidental　oversights　of　the　more　popular　branch　of　the　legislature；　or　competing　with　it　in　popular　measures。　　　The　practicability　of　any　real　check　to　the　ascendancy　of　the　majority　depends　henceforth　on　the　distribution　of　strength　in　the　most　popular　branch　of　the　governing　body；　and　I　have　indicated　the　mode　in　which；　to　the　best　of　my　judgment；　a　balance　of　forces　might　most　advantageously　be　estab