representative government-第29节
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hardly ever be outvoted； except occasionally； by the sectarian groups； or knots of men bound together by a common crotchet who have been already spoken of。 The answer to this appears to be conclusive。 No one pretends that under Mr。 Hare's or any other plan organisation would cease to be an advantage。 Scattered elements are always at a disadvantage compared with organised bodies。 As Mr。 Hare's plan cannot alter the nature of things； we must expect that all parties or sections； great or small； which possess organisation； would avail themselves of it to the utmost to strengthen their influence。 But under the existing system those influences are everything。 The scattered elements are absolutely nothing。 The voters who are neither bound to the great political nor to any of the little sectarian divisions have no means of making their votes available。 Mr。 Hare's plan gives them the means。 They might be more； or less； dexterous in using it。 They might obtain their share of influence； or much less than their share。 But whatever they did acquire would be clear gain。 And when it is assumed that every petty interest； or combination for a petty object； would give itself an organisation； why should we suppose that the great interest of national intellect and character would alone remain unorganised？ If there would be Temperance tickets； and Ragged School tickets； and the like； would not one public…spirited person in a constituency be sufficient to put forth a 〃personal merit〃 ticket； and circulate it through a whole neighbourhood？ And might not a few such persons； meeting in London； select from the list of candidates the most distinguished names； without regard to technical divisions of opinion； and publish them at a trifling expense through all the constituencies？ It must be remembered that the influence of the two great parties； under the present mode of election； is unlimited： in Mr。 Hare's scheme it would be great； but confined within bounds。 Neither they； nor any of the smaller knots； would be able to elect more members than in proportion to the relative number of their adherents。 The ticket system in America operates under conditions the reverse of this。 In America electors vote for the party ticket； because the election goes by a mere majority； and a vote for any one who is certain not to obtain the majority is thrown away。 But； on Mr。 Hare's system； a vote given to a person of known worth has almost as much chance of obtaining its object as one given to a party candidate。 It might be hoped； therefore； that every Liberal or Conservative； who was anything besides a Liberal or a Conservative… who had any preferences of his own in addition to those of his party… would scratch through the names of the more obscure and insignificant party candidates； and inscribe in their stead some of the men who are an honour to the nation。 And the probability of this fact would operate as a strong inducement with those who drew up the party lists not to confine themselves to pledged party men； but to include along with these； in their respective tickets； such of the national notabilities as were more in sympathy with their side than with the opposite。 The real difficulty； for it is not to be dissembled that there is a difficulty； is that the independent voters； those who are desirous of voting for unpatronised persons of merit； would be apt to put down the names of a few such persons； and to fill up the remainder of their list with mere party candidates； thus helping to swell the numbers against those by whom they would prefer to be represented。 There would be an easy remedy for this； should it be necessary to resort to it； namely； to impose a limit to the number of secondary or contingent votes。 No voter is likely to have an independent preference； grounded on knowledge； for 658； or even for 100 candidates。 There would be little objection to his being limited to twenty； fifty； or whatever might be the number in the selection of whom there was some probability that his own choice would be exercised…that he would vote as an individual； and not as one of the mere rank and file of a party。 But even without this restriction； the evil would be likely to cure itself as soon as the system came to be well understood。 To counteract it would become a paramount object with all the knots and cliques whose influence is so much deprecated。 From these； each in itself a small minority； the word would go forth； 〃Vote for your special candidates only； or at least put their names foremost； so as to give them the full chance which your numerical strength warrants； of obtaining the quota by means of first votes； or without descending low in the scale。〃 And those voters who did not belong to any clique would profit by the lesson。 The minor groups would have precisely the amount of power which they ought to have。 The influence they could exercise would be exactly that which their number of voters entitled them to； not a particle more； while to ensure even that； they would have a motive to put up； as representatives of their special objects； candidates whose other recommendations would enable them to obtain the suffrages of voters not of the sect or clique。 It is curious to observe how the popular line of argument in defence of existing systems veers round； according to the nature of the attack made upon them。 Not many years ago it was the favourite argument in support of the then existing system of representation； that under it all 〃interests〃 or 〃classes〃 were represented。 And certainly； all interests or classes of any importance ought to be represented； that is； ought to have spokesmen； or advocates； in Parliament。 But from thence it was argued that a system ought to be supported which gave to the partial interests not advocates merely； but the tribunal itself。 Now behold the change。 Mr。 Hare's system makes it impossible for partial interests to have the command of the tribunal； but it ensures them advocates； and for doing even this it is reproached。 Because it unites the good points of class representation and the good points of numerical representation； it is attacked from both sides at once。 But it is not such objections as these that are the real difficulty in getting the system accepted； it is the exaggerated notion entertained of its complexity； and the consequent doubt whether it is capable of being carried into effect。 The only complete answer to this objection would be actual trial。 When the merits of the plan shall have become more generally known； and shall have gained for it a wider support among impartial thinkers； an effort should be made to obtain its introduction experimentally in some limited field； such as the municipal election of some great town。 An opportunity was lost when the decision was taken to divide the West Riding of Yorkshire for the purpose of giving it four members； instead of trying the new principle； by leaving the constituency undivided； and allowing a candidate to be returned on obtaining either in first or secondary votes a fourth part of the whole number of votes given。 Such experiments； would be a very imperfect test of the worth of the plan： but they would be an exemplification of its mode of working； they would enable people to convince themselves that it is not impracticable； would familiarise them with its machinery； and afford some materials for judging whether the difficulties which are thought to be so formidable are real or imaginary。 The day when such a partial trial shall be sanctioned by Parliament will； I believe； inaugurate a new era of Parliamentary Reform； destined to give to Representative Government a shape fitted to its mature and triumphant period； when it shall have passed through the militant stage in which alone the world has yet seen it。*
* In the interval between the last and present editions of this treatise； it has become known that the experiment here suggested has actually been made on a larger than any municipal or provincial scale； and has been in course of trial for several years。 In the Danish Constitution （not that of Denmark proper； but the Constitution framed for the entire Danish kingdom） the equal representation of minorities was provided for on a plan so nearly identical with Mr。 Hare's； as to add another to the examples how the ideas which resolve difficulties arising out of a general situation of the human mind or of society； present themselves； without communication； to several superior minds at once。 This feature of the Danish electoral law has been brought fully and clearly before the British public in an able paper by Mr。 Robert Lytton； forming one of the valuable reports by Secretaries of Legation； printed by order of the House of Commons in 1864； Mr。 Hare's plan； which may now be also called M。 Andrae's； has thus advanced from the position of a simple project to that of a realised political fact。 Though Denmark is as yet the only country in which Personal Representation has become an institution； the progress of the idea among thinking minds has been very rapid。 In almost all the countries in which universal suffrage is now regarded as a necessity； the scheme is rapidly making its way： with the friends of democracy； as a logical consequence of their principle； with those who rather acce
