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c　business。　Their　abilities　would　probably　draw　to　them　more　than　their　numerical　share　of　the　actual　administration　of　government；　as　the　Athenians　did　not　confide　responsible　public　functions　to　Cleon　or　Hyperbolus　（the　employment　of　Cleon　at　Pylos　and　Amphipolis　was　purely　exceptional）；　but　Nicias；　and　Theramenes；　and　Alcibiades；　were　in　constant　employment　both　at　home　and　abroad；　though　known　to　sympathise　more　with　oligarchy　than　with　democracy。　The　instructed　minority　would；　in　the　actual　voting；　count　only　for　their　numbers；　but　as　a　moral　power　they　would　count　for　much　more；　in　virtue　of　their　knowledge；　and　of　the　influence　it　would　give　them　over　the　rest。　An　arrangement　better　adapted　to　keep　popular　opinion　within　reason　and　justice；　and　to　guard　it　from　the　various　deteriorating　influences　which　assail　the　weak　side　of　democracy；　could　scarcely　by　human　ingenuity　be　devised。　A　democratic　people　would　in　this　way　be　provided　with　what　in　any　other　way　it　would　almost　certainly　miss…leaders　of　a　higher　grade　of　intellect　and　character　than　itself。　Modern　democracy　would　have　its　occasional　Pericles；　and　its　habitual　group　of　superior　and　guiding　minds。　　　With　all　this　array　of　reasons；　of　the　most　fundamental　character；　on　the　affirmative　side　of　the　question；　what　is　there　on　the　negative？　Nothing　that　will　sustain　examination；　when　people　can　once　be　induced　to　bestow　any　real　examination　upon　a　new　thing。　Those　indeed；　if　any　such　there　be；　who；　under　pretence　of　equal　justice；　aim　only　at　substituting　the　class　ascendancy　of　the　poor　for　that　of　the　rich；　will　of　course　be　unfavourable　to　a　scheme　which　places　both　on　a　level。　But　I　do　not　believe　that　any　such　wish　exists　at　present　among　the　working　classes　of　this　country；　though　I　would　not　answer　for　the　effect　which　opportunity　and　demagogic　artifices　may　hereafter　have　in　exciting　it。　In　the　United　States；　where　the　numerical　majority　have　long　been　in　full　possession　of　collective　despotism；　they　would　probably　be　as　unwilling　to　part　with　it　as　a　single　despot　or　an　aristocracy。　But　I　believe　that　the　English　democracy　would　as　yet　be　content　with　protection　against　the　class　legislation　of　others；　without　claiming　the　power　to　exercise　it　in　their　turn。　　　Among　the　ostensible　objectors　to　Mr。　Hare's　scheme；　some　profess　to　think　the　plan　unworkable；　but　these；　it　will　be　found；　are　generally　people　who　have　barely　heard　of　it；　or　have　given　it　a　very　slight　and　cursory　examination。　Others　are　unable　to　reconcile　themselves　to　the　loss　of　what　they　term　the　local　character　of　the　representation。　A　nation　does　not　seem　to　them　to　consist　of　persons；　but　of　artificial　units；　the　creation　of　geography　and　statistics。　Parliament　must　represent　towns　and　counties；　not　human　beings。　But　no　one　seeks　to　annihilate　towns　and　counties。　Towns　and　counties；　it　may　be　presumed；　are　represented　when　the　human　beings　who　inhabit　them　are　represented。　Local　feelings　cannot　exist　without　somebody　who　feels　them；　nor　local　interests　without　somebody　interested　in　them。　If　the　human　beings　whose　feelings　and　interests　these　are　have　their　proper　share　of　representation；　these　feelings　and　interests　are　represented　in　common　with　all　other　feelings　and　interests　of　those　persons。　But　I　cannot　see　why　the　feelings　and　interests　which　arrange　mankind　according　to　localities　should　be　the　only　one　thought　worthy　of　being　represented；　or　why　people　who　have　other　feelings　and　interests；　which　they　value　more　than　they　do　their　geographical　ones；　should　be　restricted　to　these　as　the　sole　principle　of　their　political　classification。　The　notion　that　Yorkshire　and　Middlesex　have　rights　apart　from　those　of　their　inhabitants；　or　that　Liverpool　and　Exeter　are　the　proper　objects　of　the　legislator's　care；　in　contradistinction　the　population　of　those　places；　is　a　curious　specimen　of　delusion　produced　by　words。　　　In　general；　however；　objectors　cut　the　matter　short　by　affirming　that　the　people　of　England　will　never　consent　to　such　a　system。　What　the　people　of　England　are　likely　to　think　of　those　who　pass　such　a　summary　sentence　on　their　capacity　of　understanding　and　judgment；　deeming　it　superfluous　to　consider　whether　a　thing　is　right　or　wrong　before　affirming　that　they　are　certain　to　reject　it；　I　will　not　undertake　to　say。　For　my　own　part；　I　do　not　think　that　the　people　of　England　have　deserved　to　be；　without　trial；　stigmatised　as　insurmountably　prejudiced　against　anything　which　can　be　proved　to　be　good　either　for　themselves　or　for　others。　It　also　appears　to　me　that　when　prejudices　persist　obstinately；　it　is　the　fault　of　nobody　so　much　as　of　those　who　make　a　point　of　proclaiming　them　insuperable；　as　an　excuse　to　themselves　for　never　joining　in　an　attempt　to　remove　them。　Any　prejudice　whatever　will　be　insurmountable　if　those　who　do　not　share　it　themselves　truckle　to　it；　and　flatter　it；　and　accept　it　as　a　law　of　nature。　I　believe；　however；　that　in　this　case　there　is　in　general；　among　those　who　have　yet　heard　of　the　proposition；　no　other　hostility　to　it　than　the　natural　and　healthy　distrust　attaching　to　all　novelties　which　have　not　been　sufficiently　canvassed　to　make　generally　manifest　all　the　pros　and　cons　of　the　question。　The　only　serious　obstacle　is　the　unfamiliarity：　this　indeed　is　a　formidable　one；　for　the　imagination　much　more　easily　reconciles　itself　to　a　great　alteration　in　substance；　than　to　a　very　small　one　in　names　and　forms。　But　unfamiliarity　is　a　disadvantage　which；　when　there　is　any　real　value　in　an　idea；　it　only　requires　time　to　remove。　And　in　these　days　of　discussion；　and　generally　awakened　interest　in　improvement；　what　formerly　was　the　work　of　centuries；　often　requires　only　years。

　　Since　the　first　publication　of　this　Treatise；　several　adverse　criticisms　have　been　made　on　Mr。　Hare's　plan；　which　indicate　at　least　a　careful　examination　of　it；　and　a　more　intelligent　consideration　than　had　previously　been　given　to　its　pretensions。　This　is　the　natural　progress　of　the　discussion　of　great　improvements。　They　are　at　first　met　by　a　blind　prejudice；　and　by　arguments　to　which　only　blind　prejudice　could　attach　any　value。　As　the　prejudice　weakens；　the　arguments　it　employs　for　some　time　increase　in　strength；　since；　the　plan　being　better　understood；　its　inevitable　inconveniences；　and　the　circumstances　which　militate　against　its　at　once　producing　all　the　benefits　it　is　intrinsically　capable　of；　come　to　light　along　with　its　merits。　But　of　all　the　objections；　having　any　semblance　of　reason；　which　have　come　under　my　notice；　there　is　not　one　which　had　not　been　foreseen；　considered；　and　canvassed　by　the　supporters　of　the　plan；　and　found　either　unreal　or　easily　surmountable。　　　The　most　serious；　in　appearance；　of　the　objections　may　be　the　most　briefly　answered；　the　assumed　impossibility　of　guarding　against　fraud；　or　suspicion　of　fraud；　in　the　operations　of　the　Central　Office。　Publicity；　and　complete　liberty　of　inspecting　the　voting　papers　after　the　election；　were　the　securities　provided；　but　these；　it　is　maintained；　would　be　unavailing；　because；　to　check　the　returns；　a　voter　would　have　to　go　over　all　the　work　that　had　been　done　by　the　staff　of　clerks。　This　would　be　a　very　weighty　objection；　if　there　were　any　necessity　that　the　returns　should　be　verified　individually　by　every　voter。　All　that　a　simple　voter　could　be　expected　to　do　in　the　way　of　verification　would　be　to　check　the　use　made　of　his　own　voting　paper；　for　which　purpose　every　paper　would　be　returned；　after　a　proper　interval；　to　the　place　from　whence　it　came。　But　what　he　could　not　do　would　be　done　for　him　by　the　unsuccessful　candidates　and　their　agents。　Those　among　the　defeated　who　thought　that　they　ought　to　have　been　returned　would；　singly　or　a　number　together；　employ　an　agency　for　verifying　the　process　of　the　election；　and　if　they　detected　material　error；　the　documents　would　be　referred　to　a　Committee　of　the　House　of　Commons；　by　whom　the　entire　electoral　operations　of　the　nation　would　be　examined　and　verified；　at　a　tenth　part　the　expense　of　time　and　money　necessary　for　the　scrutiny　of　a　single　return　before　an　Election　Committee　under　the　system　now　in　force。　　　Assuming　the　plan　to　be　workable；　two　modes　have　been　alleged　in　which　its　benefits　might　be　frustrated；　and　injurious　consequences　produced　in　lieu　of　them。　First；　it　is　said　that　undue　power　would　be　given　to　knots　or　cliques；　sectarian　combinations；　associations　for　special　objects；　such　as　the　Maine　Law　League；　the　Ballot　or　Liberation　Society；　or　bodies　united　by　class　interests　or　community　of　religious　persuasion。　It　is　in　the　second　place　objected　that　the　system　would　admit　of　being　worked　for　party　purposes。　A　central　organ　of　each　political　party　would　send　its　list　of　658　candidates　all　through　the　country；　to　be　voted　for　by　the　whole　of　its　supporters　in　every　constituency。　Their　votes　would　far　outnumber　those　which　could　ever　be　obtained　by　any　independent　candidate。　The　〃ticket〃　system；　it　is　contended；　would；　as　it　does　in　America；　operate　solely　in　favour　of　the　great　organised　parties；　whose　tickets　would　be　accepted　blindly；　and　voted　for　in　their　integrity；　and　would　hardly　ever　be　outvoted；　except　occasionally；　by　the　sectarian　groups；　or　knots　of　men　bound　togethe