representative government-第26节
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is would； so far； give reality to the electoral rights of the otherwise virtually disfranchised minority。 But it is important that not those alone who refuse to vote for any of the local candidates； but those also who vote for one of them and are defeated； should be enabled to find elsewhere the representation which they have not succeeded in obtaining in their own district。 It is therefore provided that an elector may deliver a voting paper； containing other names in addition to the one which stands foremost in his preference。 His vote would only be counted for one candidate； but if the object of his first choice failed to be returned； from not having obtained the quota； his second perhaps might be more fortunate。 He may extend his list to a greater number； in the order of his preference； so that if the names which stand near the top of the list either cannot make up the quota； or are able to make it up without his vote； the vote may still be used for some one whom it may assist in returning。 To obtain the full number of members required to complete the House； as well as to prevent very popular candidates from engrossing nearly all the suffrages； it is necessary； however many votes a candidate may obtain； that no more of them than the quota should be counted for his return： the remainder of those who voted for him would have their votes counted for the next person on their respective lists who needed them； and could by their aid complete the quota。 To determine which of a candidate's votes should be used for his return； and which set free for others； several methods are proposed； into which we shall not here enter。 He would of course retain the votes of all those who would not otherwise be represented； and for the remainder； drawing lots； in default of better； would be an unobjectionable expedient。 The voting papers would be conveyed to a central office； where the votes would be counted； the number of first； second； third； and other votes given for each candidate ascertained； and the quota would be allotted to every one who could make it up； until the number of the House was complete： first votes being preferred to second； second to third； and so forth。 The voting papers； and all the elements of the calculation； would be placed in public repositories； accessible to all whom they concerned； and if any one who had obtained the quota was not duly returned it would be in his power easily to prove it。 These are the main provisions of the scheme。 For a more minute knowledge of its very simple machinery； I must refer to Mr。 Hare's Treatise on the Election of Representatives （a small volume Published in 1859）；* and to a pamphlet by Mr。 Henry Fawcett （now Professor of Political Economy in the University； of Cambridge）； published in 1860； and entitled Mr。 Hare's Reform Bill simplified and explained。 This last is a very clear and concise exposition of the plan； reduced to its simplest elements； by the omission of some of Mr。 Hare's original provisions； which； though in themselves beneficial； we're thought to take more from the simplicity of the scheme than they added to its practical usefulness。 The more these works are studied the stronger； I venture to predict； will be the impression of the perfect feasibility of the scheme； and its transcendant advantages。 Such and so numerous are these； that； in my conviction； they place Mr。 Hare's plan among the very greatest improvements yet made in the theory and practice of government。
* In a second edition； published recently； Mr。 Hare has made important improvements in some of the detailed provisions。
In the first place； it secures a representation； in proportion to numbers； of every division of the electoral body： not two great parties alone； with perhaps a few large sectional minorities in particular places； but every minority in the whole nation； consisting of a sufficiently large number to be； on principles of equal justice； entitled to a representative。 Secondly； no elector
would； as at present； be nominally represented by some one whom he had not chosen。 Every member of the House would be the representative of a unanimous constituency。 He would represent a thousand electors； or two thousand； or five thousand； or ten thousand； as the quota might be； every one of whom would have not only voted for him； but selected him from the whole country； not merely from the assortment of two or three perhaps rotten oranges； which may be the only choice offered to him in his local market。 Under this relation the tie between the elector and the representative would be of a strength； and a value； of which at present we have no experience。 Every one of the electors would be personally identified with his representative； and the representative with his constituents。 Every elector who voted for him would have done so either because； among all the candidates for Parliament who are favourably known to a certain number of electors； he is the one who best expresses the voter's own opinions； because he is one of those whose abilities and character the voter most respects； and whom he most willingly trusts to think for him。 The member would represent persons； not the mere bricks and mortar of the town… the voters themselves； not a few vestrymen or parish notabilities merely。 All however； that is worth preserving in the representation of places would be preserved。 Though the Parliament of the nation ought to have as little as possible to do with purely local affairs； yet； while it has to do with them； there ought to be members specially commissioned to look after the interests of every important locality： and these there would still be。 In every locality which could make up the quota within itself； the majority would generally prefer to be represented by one of themselves； by a person of local knowledge； and residing in the locality； if there is any such person to be found among the candidates； who is otherwise well qualified to be their representative。 It would be the minorities chiefly； who being unable to return the local member； would look out elsewhere for a candidate likely to obtain other votes in addition to their own。 Of all modes in which a national representation can possibly be constituted； this one affords the best； security for the intellectual qualifications desirable in the representatives。 At present； by universal admission； it is becoming more and more difficult for any one who has only talents and character to gain admission into the House of Commons。 The only persons who can get elected are those who possess local influence； or make their way by lavish expenditure； or who； on the invitation of three or four tradesmen or attorneys； are sent down by one of the two great parties from their London clubs； as men whose votes the party can depend on under all circumstances。 On Mr。 Hare's system； those who did not like the local candidates； or who could not succeed in carrying the local candidate they preferred； would have the power to fill up their voting papers by a selection from all the persons of national reputation； on the list of candidates； with whose general political principles they were in sympathy。 Almost every person； therefore； who had made himself in any way honourably distinguished； though devoid of local influence； and having sworn allegiance to no political party； would have a fair chance of making up the quota； and with this encouragement such persons might be expected to offer themselves； in numbers hitherto undreamt of。 Hundreds of able men of independent thought； who would have no chance whatever of being chosen by the majority of any existing constituency； have by their writings； or their exertions in some field of public usefulness； made themselves known and approved by a few persons in almost every district of the kingdom； and if every vote that would be given for them in every place could be counted for their election； they might be able to complete the number of the quota。 In no other way which it seems possible to suggest would Parliament be so certain of containing the very elite of the country。 And it is not solely through the votes of minorities that this system of election would raise the intellectual standard of the House of Commons。 Majorities would be compelled to look out for members of a much higher calibre。 When the individuals composing the majority would no longer be reduced to Hobson's choice； of either voting for the person brought forward by their local leaders or not voting at all； when the nominee of the leaders would have to encounter the competition not solely of the candidate of the minority； but of all the men of established reputation in the country who were willing to serve； it would be impossible any longer to foist upon the electors the first person who presents himself with the catchwords of the party in his mouth and three or four thousand pounds in his pocket。 The majority would insist on having a candidate worthy of their choice； or they would carry their votes somewhere else； and the minority would prevail。 The slavery of the majority to the least estimable portion of their number would be at an end： the very best and most capable of the local notabilities would be put forward by preference； if possible； such as were known in some advanta
