representative government-第24节
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proportion of petty tradesmen。 In a state of society thus composed; if the representative system could be made ideally perfect; and if it were possible to maintain it in that state; its organisation must be such that these two classes; manual labourers and their affinities on one side; employers of labour and their affinities on the other; should be; in the arrangement of the representative system; equally balanced; each influencing about an equal number of votes in Parliament: since; assuming that the majority of each class; in any difference between them; would be mainly governed by their class interests; there would be a minority of each in whom that consideration would be subordinate to reason; justice; and the good of the whole; and this minority of either; joining with the whole of the other; would turn the scale against any demands of their own majority which were not such as ought to prevail。 The reason why; in any tolerable constituted society; justice and the general interest mostly in the end carry their point; is that the separate and selfish interests of mankind are almost always divided; some are interested in what is wrong; but some; also; have their private interest on the side of what is right: and those who are governed by higher considerations; though too few and weak to prevail against the whole of the others; usually after sufficient discussion and agitation become strong enough to turn the balance in favour of the body of private interests which is on the same side with them。 The representative system ought to be so constituted as to maintain this state of things: it ought not to allow any of the various sectional interests to be so powerful as to be capable of prevailing against truth and justice and the other sectional interests combined。 There ought always to be such a balance preserved among personal interests as may render any one of them dependent for its successes on carrying with it at least a large proportion of those who act on higher motives and more comprehensive and distant views。 Chapter 7 Of True and False Democracy; Representation of All; and Representation of the Majority only。
IT HAS been seen that the dangers incident to a representative democracy are of two kinds: danger of a low grade of intelligence in the representative body; and in the popular opinion which controls it; and danger of class legislation on the part of the numerical majority; these being all composed of the same class。 We have next to consider how far it is possible so to organise the democracy as; without interfering materially with the characteristic benefits of democratic government; to do away with these two great evils; or at least to abate them; in the utmost degree attainable by human contrivance。 The common mode of attempting this is by limiting the democratic character of the representation; through a more or less restricted suffrage。 But there is a previous consideration which; duly kept in view; considerably modifies the circumstances which are supposed to render such a restriction necessary。 A completely equal democracy; in a nation in which a single class composes the numerical majority; cannot be divested of certain evils; but those evils are greatly aggravated by the fact that the democracies which at present exist are not equal; but systematically unequal in favour of the predominant class。 Two very different ideas are usually confounded under the name democracy。 The pure idea of democracy; according to its definition; is the government of the whole people by the whole people; equally represented。 Democracy as commonly conceived and hitherto practised is the government of the whole people by a mere majority of the people; exclusively represented。 The former is synonymous with the equality of all citizens; the latter; strangely confounded with it; is a government of privilege; in favour of the numerical majority; who alone possess practically any voice in the State。 This is the inevitable consequence of the manner in which the votes are now taken; to the complete disfranchisement of minorities。 The confusion of ideas here is great; but it is so easily cleared up that one would suppose the slightest indication would be sufficient to place the matter in its true light before any mind of average intelligence。 It would be so; but for the power of habit; owing to which the simplest idea; if unfamiliar; has as great difficulty in making its way to the mind as a far more complicated one。 That the minority must yield to the majority; the smaller number to the greater; is a familiar idea; and accordingly men think there is no necessity for using their minds any further; and it does not occur to them that there is any medium between allowing the smaller number to be equally powerful with the greater; and blotting out the smaller number altogether。 In a representative body actually deliberating; the minority must of course be overruled; and in an equal democracy (since the opinions of the constituents; when they insist on them; determine those of the representative body) the majority of the people; through their representatives; will outvote and prevail over the minority and their representatives。 But does it follow that the minority should have no representatives at all? Because the majority ought to prevail over the minority; must the majority have all the votes; the minority none? Is it necessary that the minority should not even be heard? Nothing but habit and old association can reconcile any reasonable being to the needless injustice。 In a really equal democracy; every or any section would be represented; not disproportionately; but proportionately。 A majority of the electors would always have a majority of the representatives; but a minority of the electors would always have a minority of the representatives。 Man for man they would be as fully represented as the majority。 Unless they are; there is not equal government; but a government of inequality and privilege: one part of the people rule over the rest: there is a part whose fair and equal share of influence in the representation is withheld from them; contrary to all just government; but; above all; contrary to the principle of democracy; which professes equality as its very root and foundation。 The injustice and violation of principle are not less flagrant because those who suffer by them are a minority; for there is not equal suffrage where every single individual does not count for as much as any other single individual in the community。 But it is not only a minority who suffer。 Democracy; thus constituted; does not even attain its ostensible object; that of giving the powers of government in all cases to the numerical majority。 It does something very different: it gives them to a majority of the majority; who may be; and often are; but a minority of the whole。 All principles are most effectually tested by extreme cases。 Suppose then; that; in a country governed by equal and universal suffrage; there is a contested election in every constituency; and every election is carried by a small majority。 The Parliament thus brought together represents little more than a bare majority of the people。 This Parliament proceeds to legislate; and adopts important measures by a bare majority of itself。 What guarantee is there that these measures accord with the wishes of a majority of the people? Nearly half the electors; having been outvoted at the hustings; have had no influence at all in the decision; and the whole of these may be; a majority of them probably are; hostile to the measures; having voted against those by whom they have been carried。 Of the remaining electors; nearly half have chosen representatives who; by supposition; have voted against the measures。 It is possible; therefore; and not at all improbable; that the opinion which has prevailed was agreeable only to a minority of the nation; though a majority of that portion of it whom the institutions of the country have erected into a ruling class。 If democracy means the certain ascendancy of the majority; there are no means of insuring that but by allowing every individual figure to tell equally in the summing up。 Any minority left out; either purposely or by the play of the machinery; gives the power not to the majority; but to a minority in some other part of the scale。 The only answer which can possibly be made to this reasoning is; that as different opinions predominate in different localities; the opinion which is in a minority in some places has a majority in others; and on the whole every opinion which exists in the constituencies obtains its fair share of voices in the representation。 And this is roughly true in the present state of the constituency; if it were not; the discordance of the House with the general sentiment of the country would soon become evident。 But it would be no longer true if the present constituency were much enlarged; still less; if made co…extensive with the whole population; for in that case the majority in every locality would consist of manual labourers; and when there was any question pending; on which these classes were at issue with the rest of the community; no other class could succeed in getting represented anywhere。 Even n