representative government-第2节

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　civilised　government。　The　same　might　have　been　said；　though　somewhat　less　absolutely；　of　the　barbarians　who　overran　the　Roman　Empire。　It　required　centuries　of　time；　and　an　entire　change　of　circumstances；　to　discipline　them　into　regular　obedience　even　to　their　own　leaders；　when　not　actually　serving　under　their　banner。　There　are　nations　who　will　not　voluntarily　submit　to　any　government　but　that　of　certain　families；　which　have　from　time　immemorial　had　the　privilege　of　supplying　them　with　chiefs。　Some　nations　could　not；　except　by　foreign　conquest；　be　made　to　endure　a　monarchy；　others　are　equally　averse　to　a　republic。　The　hindrance　often　amounts；　for　the　time　being；　to　impracticability。　　　But　there　are　also　cases　in　which；　though　not　averse　to　a　form　of　government…　possibly　even　desiring　it…　a　people　may　be　unwilling　or　unable　to　fulfil　its　conditions。　They　may　be　incapable　of　fulfilling　such　of　them　as　are　necessary　to　keep　the　government　even　in　nominal　existence。　Thus　a　people　may　prefer　a　free　government；　but　if；　from　indolence；　or　carelessness；　or　cowardice；　or　want　of　public　spirit；　they　are　unequal　to　the　exertions　necessary　for　preserving　it；　if　they　will　not　fight　for　it　when　it　is　directly　attacked；　if　they　can　be　deluded　by　the　artifices　used　to　cheat　them　out　of　it；　if　by　momentary　discouragement；　or　temporary　panic；　or　a　fit　of　enthusiasm　for　an　individual；　they　can　be　induced　to　lay　their　liberties　at　the　feet　even　of　a　great　man；　or　trust　him　with　powers　which　enable　him　to　subvert　their　institutions；　in　all　these　cases　they　are　more　or　less　unfit　for　liberty：　and　though　it　may　be　for　their　good　to　have　had　it　even　for　a　short　time；　they　are　unlikely　long　to　enjoy　it。　Again；　a　people　may　be　unwilling　or　unable　to　fulfil　the　duties　which　a　particular　form　of　government　requires　of　them。　A　rude　people；　though　in　some　degree　alive　to　the　benefits　of　civilised　society；　may　be　unable　to　practise　the　forbearance　which　it　demands：　their　passions　may　be　too　violent；　or　their　personal　pride　too　exacting；　to　forego　private　conflict；　and　leave　to　the　laws　the　avenging　of　their　real　or　supposed　wrongs。　In　such　a　case；　a　civilised　government；　to　be　really　advantageous　to　them；　will　require　to　be　in　a　considerable　degree　despotic：　to　be　one　over　which　they　do　not　themselves　exercise　control；　and　which　imposes　a　great　amount　of　forcible　restraint　upon　their　actions。　　　Again；　a　people　must　be　considered　unfit　for　more　than　a　limited　and　qualified　freedom；　who　will　not　co…operate　actively　with　the　law　and　the　public　authorities　in　the　repression　of　evil…doers。　A　people　who　are　more　disposed　to　shelter　a　criminal　than　to　apprehend　him；　who；　like　the　Hindoos；　will　perjure　themselves　to　screen　the　man　who　has　robbed　them；　rather　than　take　trouble　or　expose　themselves　to　vindictiveness　by　giving　evidence　against　him；　who；　like　some　nations　of　Europe　down　to　a　recent　date；　if　a　man　poniards　another　in　the　public　street；　pass　by　on　the　other　side；　because　it　is　the　business　of　the　police　to　look　to　the　matter；　and　it　is　safer　not　to　interfere　in　what　does　not　concern　them；　a　people　who　are　revolted　by　an　execution；　but　not　shocked　at　an　assassination…　require　that　the　public　authorities　should　be　armed　with　much　sterner　powers　of　repression　than　elsewhere；　since　the　first　indispensable　requisites　of　civilised　life　have　nothing　else　to　rest　on。　These　deplorable　states　of　feeling；　in　any　people　who　have　emerged　from　savage　life；　are；　no　doubt；　usually　the　consequence　of　previous　bad　government；　which　has　taught　them　to　regard　the　law　as　made　for　other　ends　than　their　good；　and　its　administrators　as　worse　enemies　than　those　who　openly　violate　it。　But　however　little　blame　may　be　due　to　those　in　whom　these　mental　habits　have　grown　up；　and　however　the　habits　may　be　ultimately　conquerable　by　better　government；　yet　while　they　exist　a　people　so　disposed　cannot　be　governed　with　as　little　power　exercised　over　them　as　a　people　whose　sympathies　are　on　the　side　of　the　law；　and　who　are　willing　to　give　active　assistance　in　its　enforcement。　Again；　representative　institutions　are　of　little　value；　and　may　be　a　mere　instrument　of　tyranny　or　intrigue；　when　the　generality　of　electors　are　not　sufficiently　interested　in　their　own　government　to　give　their　vote；　or；　if　they　vote　at　all；　do　not　bestow　their　suffrages　on　public　grounds；　but　sell　them　for　money；　or　vote　at　the　beck　of　some　one　who　has　control　over　them；　or　whom　for　private　reasons　they　desire　to　propitiate。　Popular　election　thus　practised；　instead　of　a　security　against　misgovernment；　is　but　an　additional　wheel　in　its　machinery。　　　Besides　these　moral　hindrances；　mechanical　difficulties　are　often　an　insuperable　impediment　to　forms　of　government。　In　the　ancient　world；　though　there　might　be；　and　often　was；　great　individual　or　local　independence；　there　could　be　nothing　like　a　regulated　popular　government　beyond　the　bounds　of　a　single　city…community；　because　there　did　not　exist　the　physical　conditions　for　the　formation　and　propagation　of　a　public　opinion；　except　among　those　who　could　be　brought　together　to　discuss　public　matters　in　the　same　agora。　This　obstacle　is　generally　thought　to　have　ceased　by　the　adoption　of　the　representative　system。　But　to　surmount　it　completely；　required　the　press；　and　even　the　newspaper　press；　the　real　equivalent；　though　not　in　all　respects　an　adequate　one；　of　the　Pnyx　and　the　Forum。　There　have　been　states　of　society　in　which　even　a　monarchy　of　any　great　territorial　extent　could　not　subsist；　but　unavoidably　broke　up　into　petty　principalities；　either　mutually　independent；　or　held　together　by　a　loose　tie　like　the　feudal：　because　the　machinery　of　authority　was　not　perfect　enough　to　carry　orders　into　effect　at　a　great　distance　from　the　person　of　the　ruler。　He　depended　mainly　upon　voluntary　fidelity　for　the　obedience　even　of　his　army；　nor　did　there　exist　the　means　of　making　the　people　pay　an　amount　of　taxes　sufficient　for　keeping　up　the　force　necessary　to　compel　obedience　throughout　a　large　territory。　In　these　and　all　similar　cases；　it　must　be　understood　that　the　amount　of　the　hindrance　may　be　either　greater　or　less。　It　may　be　so　great　as　to　make　the　form　of　government　work　very　ill；　without　absolutely　precluding　its　existence；　or　hindering　it　from　being　practically　preferable　to　any　other　which　can　be　had。　This　last　question　mainly　depends　upon　a　consideration　which　we　have　not　yet　arrived　at…　the　tendencies　of　different　forms　of　government　to　promote　Progress。　　　We　have　now　examined　the　three　fundamental　conditions　of　the　adaptation　of　forms　of　government　to　the　people　who　are　to　be　governed　by　them。　If　the　supporters　of　what　may　be　termed　the　naturalistic　theory　of　politics；　mean　but　to　insist　on　the　necessity　of　these　three　conditions；　if　they　only　mean　that　no　government　can　permanently　exist　which　does　not　fulfil　the　first　and　second　conditions；　and；　in　some　considerable　measure；　the　third；　their　doctrine；　thus　limited；　is　incontestable。　Whatever　they　mean　more　than　this　appears　to　me　untenable。　All　that　we　are　told　about　the　necessity　of　an　historical　basis　for　institutions；　of　their　being　in　harmony　with　the　national　usages　and　character；　and　the　like；　means　either　this；　or　nothing　to　the　purpose。　There　is　a　great　quantity　of　mere　sentimentality　connected　with　these　and　similar　phrases；　over　and　above　the　amount　of　rational　meaning　contained　in　them。　But；　considered　practically；　these　alleged　requisites　of　political　institutions　are　merely　so　many　facilities　for　realising　the　three　conditions。　When　an　institution；　or　a　set　of　institutions；　has　the　way　prepared　for　it　by　the　opinions；　tastes；　and　habits　of　the　people；　they　are　not　only　more　easily　induced　to　accept　it；　but　will　more　easily　learn；　and　will　be；　from　the　beginning；　better　disposed；　to　do　what　is　required　of　them　both　for　the　preservation　of　the　institutions；　and　for　bringing　them　into　such　action　as　enables　them　to　produce　their　best　results。　It　would　be　a　great　mistake　in　any　legislator　not　to　shape　his　measures　so　as　to　take　advantage　of　such　pre…existing　habits　and　feelings　when　available。　On　the　other　hand；　it　is　an　exaggeration　to　elevate　these　mere　aids　and　facilities　into　necessary　conditions。　People　are　more　easily　induced　to　do；　and　do　more　easily；　what　they　are　already　used　to；　but　people　also　learn　to　do　things　new　to　them。　Familiarity　is　a　great　help；　but　much　dwelling　on　an　idea　will　make　it　familiar；　even　when　strange　at　first。　There　are　abundant　instances　in　which　a　whole　people　have　been　eager　for　untried　things。　The　amount　of　capacity　which　a　people　possess　for　doing　new　things；　and　adapting　themselves　to　new　circumstances；　is　itself　one　of　the　elements　of　the　question。　It　is　a　quality　in　which　different　nations；　and　different　stages　of　civilisation；　differ　much　from　one　another。　The　capability　of　any　given　people　for　fulfilling　the　conditions　of　a　given　form　of　government　cannot　be　pronounced　on　by　any　sweeping　rule。　Knowledge　of　the　particular　people；　and　general　practical　judgment　and　sagacity；　must　be　the　guides。　　　There　is　also　another　consideration　not　to　be　lost　sight　of。　A　people　may　be　unprepared　for　good　institutions；　but　to　kindle　a　desire　for　them　is　a　necessary　part　of　the　preparation。　To　recomm