representative government-第18节
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osition in the representative body： what might we expect if they were made by the body itself？ Numerous bodies never regard special qualifications at all。 Unless a man is fit for the gallows； he is thought to be about as fit as other people for almost anything for which he can offer himself as a candidate。 When appointments made by a public body are not decided； as they almost always are； by party connection or private jobbing； a man is appointed either because he has a reputation； often quite undeserved； for general ability； or frequently for no better reason than that he is personally popular。 It has never been thought desirable that Parliament should itself nominate even the members of a Cabinet。 It is enough that it virtually decides who shall be prime minister； or who shall be the two or three individuals from whom the prime minister shall be chosen。 In doing this it merely recognises the fact that a certain person is the candidate of the party whose general policy commands its support。 In reality； the only thing which Parliament decides is； which of two； or at most three； parties or bodies of men； shall furnish the executive government： the opinion of the party itself decides which of its members is fittest to be placed at the head。 According to the existing practice of the British Constitution； these things seem to be on as good a footing as they can be。 Parliament does not nominate any minister； but the Crown appoints the head of the administration in conformity to the general wishes and inclinations manifested by Parliament； and the other ministers on the recommendation of the chief； while every minister has the undivided moral responsibility of appointing fit persons to the other offices of administration which are not permanent。 In a republic； some other arrangement would be necessary： but the nearer it approached in practice to that which has long existed in England； the more likely it would be to work well。 Either； as in the American republic； the head of the Executive must be elected by some agency entirely independent of the representative body； or the body must content itself with naming the prime minister； and making him responsible for the choice
of his associates and subordinates。 To all these considerations； at least theoretically； I fully anticipate a general assent： though； practically； the tendency is strong in representative bodies to interfere more and more in the details of administration； by virtue of the general law； that whoever has the strongest power is more and more tempted to make an excessive use of it； and this is one of the practical dangers to which the futurity of representative governments will be exposed。 But it is equally true； though only of late and slowly beginning to be acknowledged； that a numerous assembly is as little fitted for the direct business of legislation as for that of administration。 There is hardly any kind of intellectual work which so much needs to be done； not only by experienced and exercised minds； but by minds trained to the task through long and laborious study； as the business of making laws。 This is a sufficient reason； were there no other； why they can never be well made but by a committee of very few persons。 A reason no less conclusive is； that every provision of a law requires to be framed with the most accurate and long…sighted perception of its effect on all the other provisions； and the law when made should be capable of fitting into a consistent whole with the previously existing laws。 It is impossible that these conditions should be in any degree fulfilled when laws are voted clause by clause in a miscellaneous assembly。 The incongruity of such a mode of legislating would strike all minds； were it not that our laws are already； as to form and construction； such a chaos； that the confusion and contradiction seem incapable of being made greater by any addition to the mass。 Yet even now； the utter unfitness of our legislative machinery for its purpose is making itself practically felt every year more and more。 The mere time necessarily occupied in getting through Bills renders Parliament more and more incapable of passing any； except on detached and narrow points。 If a Bill is prepared which even attempts to deal with the whole of any subject （and it is impossible to legislate properly on any part without having the whole present to the mind）； it hangs over from session to session through sheer impossibility of finding time to dispose of it。 It matters not though the Bill may have been deliberately drawn up by the authority deemed the best qualified； with all appliances and means to boot； or by a select commission； chosen for their conversancy with the subject； and having employed years in considering and digesting the particular measure； it cannot be passed； because the House of Commons will not forego the precious privilege of tinkering it with their clumsy hands。 The custom has of late been to some extent introduced； when the principle of a Bill has been affirmed on the second reading； of referring it for consideration in detail to a Select Committee： but it has not been found that this practice causes much less time to be lost afterwards in carrying it through the Committee of the whole House： the opinions or private crotchets which have been overruled by knowledge always insist on giving themselves a second chance before the tribunal of ignorance。 Indeed； the practice itself has been adopted principally by the House of Lords； the members of which are less busy and fond of meddling； and less jealous of the importance of their individual voices； than those of the elective House。 And when a Bill of many clauses does succeed in getting itself discussed in detail； what can depict the state in which it comes out of Committee！ Clauses omitted which are essential to the working of the rest； incongruous ones inserted to conciliate some private interest； or some crotchety member who threatens to delay the Bill； articles foisted in on the motion of some sciolist with a mere smattering of the subject； leading to consequences which the member who introduced or those who supported the Bill did not at the moment foresee； and which need an amending Act in the next session to correct their mischiefs。 It is one of the evils of the present mode of managing these things that the explaining and defending of a Bill； and of its various provisions； is scarcely ever performed by the person from whose mind they emanated； who probably has not a seat in the House。 Their defence rests upon some minister or member of Parliament who did not frame them； who is dependent on cramming for all his arguments but those which are perfectly obvious； who does not know the full strength of his case； nor the best reasons by which to support it； and is wholly incapable of meeting unforeseen objections。 This evil； as far as Government bills are concerned； admits of remedy； and has been remedied in some representative constitutions； by allowing the Government to be represented in either House by persons in its confidence； having a right to speak； though not to vote。 If that； as yet considerable； majority of the House of Commons who never desire to move an amendment or make a speech would no longer leave the whole regulation of business to those who do； if they would bethink themselves that better qualifications for legislation exist； and may be found if sought for； than a fluent tongue and the faculty of getting elected by a constituency； it would soon be recognised that； in legislation as well as administration； the only task to which a representative assembly can possibly be competent is not that of doing the work； but of causing it to be done； of determining to whom or to what sort of people it shall be confided； and giving or withholding the national sanction to it when performed。 Any government fit for a high state of civilisation would have as one of its fundamental elements a small body； not exceeding in number the members of a Cabinet； who should act as a Commission of legislation； having for its appointed office to make the laws。 If the laws of this country were； as surely they will soon be； revised and put into a connected form； the Commission of Codification by which this is effected should remain as a permanent institution； to watch over the work； protect it from deterioration； and make further improvements as often as required。 No one would wish that this body should of itself have any power of enacting laws： the Commission would only embody the element of intelligence in their construction； Parliament would represent that of will。 No measure would become a law until expressly sanctioned by Parliament： and Parliament； or either House； would have the power not only of rejecting but of sending back a Bill to the Commission for reconsideration or improvement。 Either House might also exercise its initiative； by referring any subject to the Commission； with directions to prepare a law。 The Commission； of course； would have no power of refusing its instrumentality to any legislation which the country desired。 Instructions； concurred in by both Houses； to draw up a Bill which should effect a particular purpose； would be imperative on the Commissioners； unless they preferred to resign the
