representative government-第17节
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axation or expenditure。 All it is asked for is its consent； and the sole power it possesses is that of refusal。 The principles which are involved and recognised in this constitutional doctrine； if followed as far as they will go； are a guide to the limitation and definition of the general functions of representative assemblies。 In the first place； it is admitted in all countries in which the representative system is practically understood； that numerous representative bodies ought not to administer。 The maxim is grounded not only on the most essential principles of good government； but on those of the successful conduct of business of any description。 No body of men； unless organised and under command； is fit for action； in the proper sense。 Even a select board； composed of few members； and these specially conversant with the business to be done； is always an inferior instrument to some one individual who could be found among them； and would be improved in character if that one person were made the chief； and all the others reduced to subordinates。 What can be done better by a body than by any individual is deliberation。 When it is necessary or important to secure hearing and consideration to many conflicting opinions； a deliberative body is indispensable。 Those bodies； therefore； are frequently useful； even for administrative business； but in general only as advisers； such business being； as a rule； better conducted under the responsibility of one。 Even a joint…stock company has always in practice； if not in theory； a managing director； its good or bad management depends essentially on some one person's qualifications； and the remaining directors； when of any use； are so by their suggestions to him； or by the power they possess of watching him； and restraining or removing him in case of misconduct。 That they are ostensibly equal shares with him in the management is no advantage； but a considerable set…off against any good which they are capable of doing： it weakens greatly the sense in his own mind； and in those of other people； of that individual responsibility in which he should stand forth personally and undividedly。 But a popular assembly is still less fitted to administer； or to dictate in detail to those who have the charge of administration。 Even when honestly meant； the interference is almost always injurious。 Every branch of public administration is a skilled business； which has its own peculiar principles and traditional rules； many of them not even known； in any effectual way； except to those who have at some time had a hand in carrying on the business； and none of them likely to be duly appreciated by persons not practically acquainted with the department。 I do not mean that the transaction of public business has esoteric mysteries； only to be understood by the initiated。 Its principles are all intelligible to any person of good sense； who has in his mind a true picture of the circumstances and conditions to be dealt with： but to have this he must know those circumstances and conditions； and the knowledge does not come by intuition。 There are many rules of the greatest importance in every branch of public business （as there are in every private occupation）； of which a person fresh to the subject neither knows the reason or even suspects the existence； because they are intended to meet dangers or provide against inconveniences which never entered into his thoughts。 I have known public men； ministers； of more than ordinary natural capacity； who on their first introduction to a department of business new to them； have excited the mirth of their inferiors by the air with which they announced as a truth hitherto set at nought； and brought to light by themselves； something which was probably the first thought of everybody who ever looked at the subject； given up as soon as he had got on to a second。 It is true that a great statesman is he who knows when to depart from traditions； as well as when to adhere to them。 But it is a great mistake to suppose that he will do this better for being ignorant of the traditions。 No one who does not thoroughly know the modes of action which common experience has sanctioned is capable of judging of the circumstances which require a departure from those ordinary modes of action。 The interests dependent on the acts done by a public department； the consequences liable to follow from any particular mode of conducting it； require for weighing and estimating them a kind of knowledge； and of specially exercised judgment； almost as rarely found in those not bred to it； as the capacity to reform the law in those who have not professionally studied it。 All these difficulties are sure to be ignored by a representative assembly which attempts to decide on special acts of administration。 At its best； it is inexperience sitting in judgment on experience； ignorance on knowledge： ignorance which never suspecting the existence of what it does not know； is equally careless and supercilious； making light of； if not resenting； all pretensions to have a judgment better worth attending to than its own。 Thus it is when no interested motives intervene： but when they do； the result is jobbery more unblushing and audacious than the worst corruption which can well take place in a public office under a government of publicity。 It is not necessary that the interested bias should extend to the majority of the assembly。 In any particular case it is of ten enough that it affects two or three of their number。 Those two or three will have a greater interest in misleading the body； than any other of its members are likely to have in putting it right。 The bulk of the assembly may keep their hands clean； but they cannot keep their minds vigilant or their judgments discerning in matters they know nothing about； and an indolent majority； like an indolent individual； belongs to the person who takes most pains with it。 The bad measures or bad appointments of a minister may be checked by Parliament； and the interest of ministers in defending； and of rival partisans in attacking； secures a tolerably equal discussion： but quis custodiet custodes？ who shall check the Parliament？ A minister； a head of an office； feels himself under some responsibility。 An assembly in such cases feels under no responsibility at all： for when did any member of Parliament lose his seat for the vote he gave on any detail of administration？ To a minister； or the head of an office； it is of more importance what will be thought of his proceedings some time hence than what is thought of them at the instant： but an assembly； if the cry of the moment goes with it； however hastily raised or artificially stirred up； thinks itself and is thought by everybody to be completely exculpated however disastrous may be the consequences。 Besides； an assembly never personally experiences the inconveniences of its bad measures until they have reached the dimensions of national evils。 Ministers and administrators see them approaching； and have to bear all the annoyance and trouble of attempting to ward them off。 The proper duty of a representative assembly in regard to matters of administration is not to decide them by its own vote； but to take care that the persons who have to decide them shall be the proper persons。 Even this they cannot advantageously do by nominating the individuals。 There is no act which more imperatively requires to be performed under a strong sense of individual responsibility than the nomination to employments。 The experience of every person conversant with public affairs bears out the assertion； that there is scarcely any act respecting which the conscience of an average man is less sensitive； scarcely any case in which less consideration is paid to qualifications； partly because men do not know； and partly because they do not care for； the difference in qualifications between one person and another。 When a minister makes what is meant to be an honest appointment； that is when he does not actually job it for his personal connections or his party； an ignorant person might suppose that he would try to give it to the person best qualified。 No such thing。 An ordinary minister thinks himself a miracle of virtue if he gives it to a person of merit； or who has a claim on the public on any account； though the claim or the merit may be of the most opposite description to that required。 Il fallait un calculateur； ce fut un danseur qui l'obtint； is hardly more of a caricature than in the days of Figaro； and the minister doubtless thinks himself not only blameless but meritorious if the man dances well。 Besides； the qualifications which fit special individuals for special duties can only be recognised by those who know the individuals； or who make it their business to examine and judge of persons from what they have done； or from the evidence of those who are in a position to judge。 When these conscientious obligations are so little regarded by great public officers who can be made responsible for their appointments； how must it be with assemblies who cannot？ Even now； the worst appointments are those which are made for the sake of gaining support or disarming opposition in the representative body： what might we expect if they were made by the body itself？ Numer
