representative government-第16节

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st　universally　the　contrary　characteristic。　They　are　very　jealous　of　any　attempt　to　exercise　power　over　them　not　sanctioned　by　long　usage　and　by　their　own　opinion　of　right；　but　they　in　general　care　very　little　for　the　exercise　of　power　over　others。　Not　having　the　smallest　sympathy　with　the　passion　for　governing；　while　they　are　but　too　well　acquainted　with　the　motives　of　private　interest　from　which　that　office　is　sought；　they　prefer　that　it　should　be　performed　by　those　to　whom　it　comes　without　seeking；　as　a　consequence　of　social　position。　If　foreigners　understood　this；　it　would　account　to　them　for　some　of　the　apparent　contradictions　in　the　political　feelings　of　Englishmen；　their　unhesitating　readiness　to　let　themselves　be　governed　by　the　higher　classes；　coupled　with　so　little　personal　subservience　to　them；　that　no　people　are　so　fond　of　resisting　authority　when　it　oversteps　certain　prescribed　limits；　or　so　determined　to　make　their　rulers　always　remember　that　they　will　only　be　governed　in　the　way　they　themselves　like　best。　Place…hunting；　accordingly；　is　a　form　of　ambition　to　which　the　English；　considered　nationally；　are　almost　strangers。　If　we　except　the　few　families　or　connections　of　whom　official　employment　lies　directly　in　the　way；　Englishmen's　views　of　advancement　in　life　take　an　altogether　different　direction…　that　of　success　in　business；　or　in　a　profession。　They　have　the　strongest　distaste　for　any　mere　struggle　for　office　by　political　parties　or　individuals：　and　there　are　few　things　to　which　they　have　a　greater　aversion　than　to　the　multiplication　of　public　employments：　a　thing；　on　the　contrary；　always　popular　with　the　bureaucracy…ridden　nations　of　the　Continent；　who　would　rather　pay　higher　taxes　than　diminish　by　the　smallest　fraction　their　individual　chances　of　a　place　for　themselves　or　their　relatives；　and　among　whom　a　cry　for　retrenchment　never　means　abolition　of　offices；　but　the　reduction　of　the　salaries　of　those　which　are　too　considerable　for　the　ordinary　citizen　to　have　any　chance　of　being　appointed　to　them。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　5　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Proper　Functions　of　Representative　Bodies。

　　IN　TREATING　of　representative　government；　it　is　above　all　necessary　to　keep　in　view　the　distinction　between　its　idea　or　essence；　and　the　particular　forms　in　which　the　idea　has　been　clothed　by　accidental　historical　developments；　or　by　the　notions　current　at　some　particular　period。　　　The　meaning　of　representative　government　is；　that　the　whole　people；　or　some　numerous　portion　of　them；　exercise　through　deputies　periodically　elected　by　themselves　the　ultimate　controlling　power；　which；　in　every　constitution；　must　reside　somewhere。　This　ultimate　power　they　must　possess　in　all　its　completeness。　They　must　be　masters；　whenever　they　please；　of　all　the　operations　of　government。　There　is　no　need　that　the　constitutional　law　should　itself　give　them　this　mastery。　It　does　not　in　the　British　Constitution。　But　what　it　does　give　practically　amounts　to　this。　The　power　of　final　control　is　as　essentially　single；　in　a　mixed　and　balanced　government；　as　in　a　pure　monarchy　or　democracy。　This　is　the　portion　of　truth　in　the　opinion　of　the　ancients；　revived　by　great　authorities　in　our　own　time；　that　a　balanced　constitution　is　impossible。　There　is　almost　always　a　balance；　but　the　scales　never　hang　exactly　even。　Which　of　them　preponderates　is　not　always　apparent　on　the　face　of　the　political　institutions。　In　the　British　Constitution；　each　of　the　three　co…ordinate　members　of　the　sovereignty　is　invested　with　powers　which；　if　fully　exercised；　would　enable　it　to　stop　all　the　machinery　of　government。　Nominally；　therefore；　each　is　invested　with　equal　power　of　thwarting　and　obstructing　the　others：　and　if；　by　exerting　that　power；　any　of　the　three　could　hope　to　better　its　position；　the　ordinary　course　of　human　affairs　forbids　us　to　doubt　that　the　power　would　be　exercised。　There　can　be　no　question　that　the　full　powers　of　each　would　be　employed　defensively　if　it　found　itself　assailed　by　one　or　both　of　the　others。　What　then　prevents　the　same　powers　from　being　exerted　aggressively？　The　unwritten　maxims　of　the　Constitution…　in　other　words；　the　positive　political　morality　of　the　country：　and　this　positive　political　morality　is　what　we　must　look　to；　if　we　would　know　in　whom　the　really　supreme　power　in　the　Constitution　resides。　　　By　constitutional　law；　the　Crown　can　refuse　its　assent　to　any　Act　of　Parliament；　and　can　appoint　to　office　and　maintain　in　it　any　Minister；　in　opposition　to　the　remonstrances　of　Parliament。　But　the　constitutional　morality　of　the　country　nullifies　these　powers；　preventing　them　from　being　ever　used；　and；　by　requiring　that　the　head　of　the　Administration　should　always　be　virtually　appointed　by　the　House　of　Commons；　makes　that　body　the　real　sovereign　of　the　State。　These　unwritten　rules；　which　limit　the　use　of　lawful　powers；　are；　however；　only　effectual；　and　maintain　themselves　in　existence；　on　condition　of　harmonising　with　the　actual　distribution　of　real　political　strength。　There　is　in　every　constitution　a　strongest　power…　one　which　would　gain　the　victory　if　the　compromises　by　which　the　Constitution　habitually　works　were　suspended　and　there　came　a　trial　of　strength。　Constitutional　maxims　are　adhered　to；　and　are　practically　operative；　so　long　as　they　give　the　predominance　in　the　Constitution　to　that　one　of　the　powers　which　has　the　preponderance　of　active　power　out　of　doors。　This；　in　England；　is　the　popular　power。　If；　therefore；　the　legal　provisions　of　the　British　Constitution；　together　with　the　unwritten　maxims　by　which　the　conduct　of　the　different　political　authorities　is　in　fact　regulated；　did　not　give　to　the　popular　element　in　the　Constitution　that　substantial　supremacy　over　every　department　of　the　government　which　corresponds　to　its　real　power　in　the　country；　the　Constitution　would　not　possess　the　stability　which　characterises　it；　either　the　laws　or　the　unwritten　maxims　would　soon　have　to　be　changed。　The　British　government　is　thus　a　representative　government　in　the　correct　sense　of　the　term：　and　the　powers　which　it　leaves　in　hands　not　directly　accountable　to　the　people　can　only　be　considered　as　precautions　which　the　ruling　power　is　willing　should　be　taken　against　its　own　errors。　Such　precautions　have　existed　in　all　well…constructed　democracies。　The　Athenian　Constitution　had　many　such　provisions；　and　so　has　that　of　the　United　States。　　　But　while　it　is　essential　to　representative　government　that　the　practical　supremacy　in　the　state　should　reside　in　the　representatives　of　the　people；　it　is　an　open　question　what　actual　functions；　what　precise　part　in　the　machinery　of　government；　shall　be　directly　and　personally　discharged　by　the　representative　body。　Great　varieties　in　this　respect　are　compatible　with　the　essence　of　representative　government；　provided　the　functions　are　such　as　secure　to　the　representative　body　the　control　of　everything　in　the　last　resort。　　　There　is　a　radical　distinction　between　controlling　the　business　of　government　and　actually　doing　it。　The　same　person　or　body　may　be　able　to　control　everything；　but　cannot　possibly　do　everything；　and　in　many　cases　its　control　over　everything　will　be　more　perfect　the　less　it　personally　attempts　to　do。　The　commander　of　an　army　could　not　direct　its　movements　effectually　if　he　himself　fought　in　the　ranks；　or　led　an　assault。　It　is　the　same　with　bodies　of　men。　Some　things　cannot　be　done　except　by　bodies；　other　things　cannot　be　well　done　by　them。　It　is　one　question；　therefore；　what　a　popular　assembly　should　control；　another　what　it　should　itself　do。　It　should；　as　we　have　already　seen；　control　all　the　operations　of　government。　But　in　order　to　determine　through　what　channel　this　general　control　may　most　expediently　be　exercised；　and　what　portion　of　the　business　of　government　the　representative　assembly　should　hold　in　its　own　hands；　it　is　necessary　to　consider　what　kinds　of　business　a　numerous　body　is　competent　to　perform　properly。　That　alone　which　it　can　do　well　it　ought　to　take　personally　upon　itself。　With　regard　to　the　rest；　its　proper　province　is　not　to　do　it；　but　to　take　means　for　having　it　well　done　by　others。　　　For　example；　the　duty　which　is　considered　as　belonging　more　peculiarly　than　any　other　to　an　assembly　representative　of　the　people；　is　that　of　voting　the　taxes。　Nevertheless；　in　no　country　does　the　representative　body　undertake；　by　itself　or　its　delegated　officers；　to　prepare　the　estimates。　Though　the　supplies　can　only　be　voted　by　the　House　of　Commons；　and　though　the　sanction　of　the　House　is　also　required　for　the　appropriation　of　the　revenues　to　the　different　items　of　the　public　expenditure；　it　is　the　maxim　and　the　uniform　practice　of　the　Constitution　that　money　can　be　granted　only　on　the　proposition　of　the　Crown。　It　has；　no　doubt；　been　felt；　that　moderation　as　to　the　amount；　and　care　and　judgment　in　the　detail　of　its　application；　can　only　be　expected　when　the　executive　government；　through　whose　hands　it　is　to　pass；　is　made　responsible　for　the　plans　and　calculations　on　which　the　disbursements　are　grounded。　Parliament；　accordingly；　is　not　expected；　nor　even　permitted；　to　originate　directly　either　taxation　or　expenditure。　All　it　is　asked　for　is　its　consent；　and　the　sole　power　it　possesses　is　that