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st universally the contrary characteristic。 They are very jealous of any attempt to exercise power over them not sanctioned by long usage and by their own opinion of right; but they in general care very little for the exercise of power over others。 Not having the smallest sympathy with the passion for governing; while they are but too well acquainted with the motives of private interest from which that office is sought; they prefer that it should be performed by those to whom it comes without seeking; as a consequence of social position。 If foreigners understood this; it would account to them for some of the apparent contradictions in the political feelings of Englishmen; their unhesitating readiness to let themselves be governed by the higher classes; coupled with so little personal subservience to them; that no people are so fond of resisting authority when it oversteps certain prescribed limits; or so determined to make their rulers always remember that they will only be governed in the way they themselves like best。 Place…hunting; accordingly; is a form of ambition to which the English; considered nationally; are almost strangers。 If we except the few families or connections of whom official employment lies directly in the way; Englishmen's views of advancement in life take an altogether different direction… that of success in business; or in a profession。 They have the strongest distaste for any mere struggle for office by political parties or individuals: and there are few things to which they have a greater aversion than to the multiplication of public employments: a thing; on the contrary; always popular with the bureaucracy…ridden nations of the Continent; who would rather pay higher taxes than diminish by the smallest fraction their individual chances of a place for themselves or their relatives; and among whom a cry for retrenchment never means abolition of offices; but the reduction of the salaries of those which are too considerable for the ordinary citizen to have any chance of being appointed to them。                                Chapter 5              Of the Proper Functions of Representative Bodies。

  IN TREATING of representative government; it is above all necessary to keep in view the distinction between its idea or essence; and the particular forms in which the idea has been clothed by accidental historical developments; or by the notions current at some particular period。   The meaning of representative government is; that the whole people; or some numerous portion of them; exercise through deputies periodically elected by themselves the ultimate controlling power; which; in every constitution; must reside somewhere。 This ultimate power they must possess in all its completeness。 They must be masters; whenever they please; of all the operations of government。 There is no need that the constitutional law should itself give them this mastery。 It does not in the British Constitution。 But what it does give practically amounts to this。 The power of final control is as essentially single; in a mixed and balanced government; as in a pure monarchy or democracy。 This is the portion of truth in the opinion of the ancients; revived by great authorities in our own time; that a balanced constitution is impossible。 There is almost always a balance; but the scales never hang exactly even。 Which of them preponderates is not always apparent on the face of the political institutions。 In the British Constitution; each of the three co…ordinate members of the sovereignty is invested with powers which; if fully exercised; would enable it to stop all the machinery of government。 Nominally; therefore; each is invested with equal power of thwarting and obstructing the others: and if; by exerting that power; any of the three could hope to better its position; the ordinary course of human affairs forbids us to doubt that the power would be exercised。 There can be no question that the full powers of each would be employed defensively if it found itself assailed by one or both of the others。 What then prevents the same powers from being exerted aggressively? The unwritten maxims of the Constitution… in other words; the positive political morality of the country: and this positive political morality is what we must look to; if we would know in whom the really supreme power in the Constitution resides。   By constitutional law; the Crown can refuse its assent to any Act of Parliament; and can appoint to office and maintain in it any Minister; in opposition to the remonstrances of Parliament。 But the constitutional morality of the country nullifies these powers; preventing them from being ever used; and; by requiring that the head of the Administration should always be virtually appointed by the House of Commons; makes that body the real sovereign of the State。 These unwritten rules; which limit the use of lawful powers; are; however; only effectual; and maintain themselves in existence; on condition of harmonising with the actual distribution of real political strength。 There is in every constitution a strongest power… one which would gain the victory if the compromises by which the Constitution habitually works were suspended and there came a trial of strength。 Constitutional maxims are adhered to; and are practically operative; so long as they give the predominance in the Constitution to that one of the powers which has the preponderance of active power out of doors。 This; in England; is the popular power。 If; therefore; the legal provisions of the British Constitution; together with the unwritten maxims by which the conduct of the different political authorities is in fact regulated; did not give to the popular element in the Constitution that substantial supremacy over every department of the government which corresponds to its real power in the country; the Constitution would not possess the stability which characterises it; either the laws or the unwritten maxims would soon have to be changed。 The British government is thus a representative government in the correct sense of the term: and the powers which it leaves in hands not directly accountable to the people can only be considered as precautions which the ruling power is willing should be taken against its own errors。 Such precautions have existed in all well…constructed democracies。 The Athenian Constitution had many such provisions; and so has that of the United States。   But while it is essential to representative government that the practical supremacy in the state should reside in the representatives of the people; it is an open question what actual functions; what precise part in the machinery of government; shall be directly and personally discharged by the representative body。 Great varieties in this respect are compatible with the essence of representative government; provided the functions are such as secure to the representative body the control of everything in the last resort。   There is a radical distinction between controlling the business of government and actually doing it。 The same person or body may be able to control everything; but cannot possibly do everything; and in many cases its control over everything will be more perfect the less it personally attempts to do。 The commander of an army could not direct its movements effectually if he himself fought in the ranks; or led an assault。 It is the same with bodies of men。 Some things cannot be done except by bodies; other things cannot be well done by them。 It is one question; therefore; what a popular assembly should control; another what it should itself do。 It should; as we have already seen; control all the operations of government。 But in order to determine through what channel this general control may most expediently be exercised; and what portion of the business of government the representative assembly should hold in its own hands; it is necessary to consider what kinds of business a numerous body is competent to perform properly。 That alone which it can do well it ought to take personally upon itself。 With regard to the rest; its proper province is not to do it; but to take means for having it well done by others。   For example; the duty which is considered as belonging more peculiarly than any other to an assembly representative of the people; is that of voting the taxes。 Nevertheless; in no country does the representative body undertake; by itself or its delegated officers; to prepare the estimates。 Though the supplies can only be voted by the House of Commons; and though the sanction of the House is also required for the appropriation of the revenues to the different items of the public expenditure; it is the maxim and the uniform practice of the Constitution that money can be granted only on the proposition of the Crown。 It has; no doubt; been felt; that moderation as to the amount; and care and judgment in the detail of its application; can only be expected when the executive government; through whose hands it is to pass; is made responsible for the plans and calculations on which the disbursements are grounded。 Parliament; accordingly; is not expected; nor even permitted; to originate directly either taxation or expenditure。 All it is asked for is its consent; and the sole power it possesses is that 

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