representative government-第14节
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en； however； the evil stops here； the price may be worth paying； for the publicity and discussion which； though not an invariable； are a natural accompaniment of any； even nominal； representation。 In the modern Kingdom of Greece； for example；* it can hardly be doubted； that the placehunters who chiefly compose the representative assembly； though they contribute little or nothing directly to good government； nor even much temper the arbitrary power of the executive； yet keep up the idea of popular rights； and conduce greatly to the real liberty of the press which exists in that country。 This benefit； however； is entirely dependent on the co…existence with the popular body of an hereditary king。 If； instead of struggling for the favours of the chief ruler； these selfish and sordid factions struggled for the chief place itself； they would certainly； as in Spanish America； keep the country in a state of chronic revolution and civil war。 A despotism； not even legal； but of illegal violence； would be alternately exercised by a succession of political adventurers； and the name and forms of representation would have no effect but to prevent despotism from attaining the stability and security by which alone its evils can be mitigated； or its few advantages realised。
* Written before the salutary revolution of 1862； which； provoked by popular disgust at the system of governing by corruption； and the general demoralisation of political men； has opened to that rapidly improving people a new and hopeful chance of real constitutional government。
The preceding are the cases in which representative government cannot permanently exist。 There are others in which it possibly might exist； but in which some other form of government would be preferable。 These are principally when the people； in order to advance in civilisation； have some lesson to learn； some habit not yet acquired； to the acquisition of which representative government is likely to be an impediment。 The most obvious of these cases is the one already considered； in which the people have still to learn the first lesson of civilisation； that of obedience。 A race who have been trained in energy and courage by struggles with Nature and their neighbours； but who have not yet settled down into permanent obedience to any common superior； would be little likely to acquire this habit under the collective government of their own body。 A representative assembly drawn from among themselves would simply reflect their own turbulent insubordination。 It would refuse its authority to all proceedings which would impose； on their savage independence； any improving restraint。 The mode in which such tribes are usually brought to submit to the primary conditions of civilised society is through the necessities of warfare； and the despotic authority indispensable to military command。 A military leader is the only superior to whom they will submit； except occasionally some prophet supposed to be inspired from above； or conjurer regarded as possessing miraculous power。 These may exercise a temporary ascendancy； but as it is merely personal； it rarely effects any change in the general habits of the people； unless the prophet； like Mahomet； is also a military chief； and goes forth the armed apostle of a new religion； or unless the military chiefs ally themselves with his influence； and turn it into a prop for their own government。 A people are no less unfitted for representative government by the contrary fault to that last specified； by extreme passiveness； and ready submission to tyranny。 If a people thus prostrated by character and circumstances could obtain representative institutions； they would inevitably choose their tyrants as their representatives； and the yoke would be made heavier on them by the contrivance which prima facie might be expected to lighten it。 On the contrary； many a people has gradually emerged from this condition by the aid of a central authority； whose position has made it the rival； and has ended by making it the master； of the local despots； and which； above all； has been single。 French history； from Hugh Capet to Richelieu and Louis XIV。； is a continued example of this course of things。 Even when the King was scarcely so powerful as many of his chief feudatories； the great advantage which he derived from being but one has been recognised by French historians。 To him the eyes of all the locally oppressed were turned； he was the object of hope and reliance throughout the kingdom； while each local potentate was only powerful within a more or less confined space。 At his hands； refuge and protection were sought from every part of the country； against first one； then another； of the immediate oppressors。 His progress to ascendancy was slow； but it resulted from successively taking advantage of opportunities which offered themselves only to him。 It was； therefore； sure； and； in proportion as it was accomplished； it abated； in the oppressed portion of the community； the habit of submitting to oppression。 The king's interest lay in encouraging all partial attempts on the part of the serfs to emancipate themselves from their masters； and place themselves in immediate subordination to himself。 Under his protection numerous communities were formed which knew no one above them but the King。 Obedience to a distant monarch is liberty itself compared with the dominion of the lord of the neighbouring castle： and the monarch was long compelled by necessities of position to exert his authority as the ally； rather than the master； of the classes whom he had aided in affecting their liberation。 In this manner a central power； despotic in principle though generally much restricted in practice； was mainly instrumental in carrying the people through a necessary stage of improvement； which representative government； if real； would most likely have prevented them from entering upon。 Nothing short of despotic rule； or a general massacre； could have effected the emancipation of the serfs in the Russian Empire。 The same passages of history forcibly illustrate another mode in which unlimited monarchy overcomes obstacles to the progress of civilisation which representative government would have had a decided tendency to aggravate。 One of the strongest hindrances to improvement； up to a rather advanced stage； is an inveterate spirit of locality。 Portions of mankind； in many other respects capable of； and prepared for； freedom； may be unqualified for amalgamating into even the smallest nation。 Not only may jealousies and antipathies repel them from one another； and bar all possibility of voluntary union； but they may not yet have acquired any of the feelings or habits which would make the union real； supposing it to be nominally accomplished。 They may； like the citizens of an ancient community； or those of an Asiatic village； have had considerable practice in exercising their faculties on village or town interests； and have even realised a tolerably effective popular government on that restricted scale； and may yet have but slender sympathies with anything beyond； and no habit or capacity of dealing with interests common to many such communities。 I am not aware that history furnishes any example in which a number of these political atoms or corpuscles have coalesced into a body； and learnt to feel themselves one people； except through previous subjection to a central authority common to all。* It is through the habit of deferring to that authority； entering into its plans and subserving its purposes； that a people such as we have supposed receive into their minds the conception of large interests； common to a considerable geographical extent。 Such interests； on the contrary； are necessarily the predominant consideration in the mind of the central ruler； and through the relations； more or less intimate； which he progressively establishes with the localities； they become familiar to the general mind。 The most favourable concurrence of circumstances under which this step in improvement could be made； would be one which should raise up representative institutions without representative government； a representative body； or bodies； drawn from the localities； making itself the auxiliary and instrument of the central power； but seldom attempting to thwart or control it。 The people being thus taken； as it were； into council； though not sharing the supreme power； the political education given by the central authority is carried home； much more effectually than it could otherwise be； to the local chiefs and to the population generally； while； at the same time； a tradition is kept up of government by general consent； or at least； the sanction of tradition is not given to government without it； which； when consecrated by custom； has so often put a bad end to a good beginning； and is one of the most frequent causes of the sad fatality which in most countries has stopped improvement in so early a stage； because the work of some one period has been so done as to bar the needful work of the ages following。 Meanwhile； it may be laid down as a political truth； that by irresponsible monarchy rather than by representative government can a multitude of insignificant political units be welded into a people； with common feelings o
