on the soul-第7节
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ation of an actuality to that of which it is the actuality。 We have now given an answer to the question; What is soul?…an answer which applies to it in its full extent。 It is substance in the sense which corresponds to the definitive formula of a thing's essence。 That means that it is 'the essential whatness' of a body of the character just assigned。 Suppose that what is literally an 'organ'; like an axe; were a natural body; its 'essential whatness'; would have been its essence; and so its soul; if this disappeared from it; it would have ceased to be an axe; except in name。 As it is; it is just an axe; it wants the character which is required to make its whatness or formulable essence a soul; for that; it would have had to be a natural body of a particular kind; viz。 one having in itself the power of setting itself in movement and arresting itself。 Next; apply this doctrine in the case of the 'parts' of the living body。 Suppose that the eye were an animal…sight would have been its soul; for sight is the substance or essence of the eye which corresponds to the formula; the eye being merely the matter of seeing; when seeing is removed the eye is no longer an eye; except in name…it is no more a real eye than the eye of a statue or of a painted figure。 We must now extend our consideration from the 'parts' to the whole living body; for what the departmental sense is to the bodily part which is its organ; that the whole faculty of sense is to the whole sensitive body as such。 We must not understand by that which is 'potentially capable of living' what has lost the soul it had; but only what still retains it; but seeds and fruits are bodies which possess the qualification。 Consequently; while waking is actuality in a sense corresponding to the cutting and the seeing; the soul is actuality in the sense corresponding to the power of sight and the power in the tool; the body corresponds to what exists in potentiality; as the pupil plus the power of sight constitutes the eye; so the soul plus the body constitutes the animal。 From this it indubitably follows that the soul is inseparable from its body; or at any rate that certain parts of it are (if it has parts) for the actuality of some of them is nothing but the actualities of their bodily parts。 Yet some may be separable because they are not the actualities of any body at all。 Further; we have no light on the problem whether the soul may not be the actuality of its body in the sense in which the sailor is the actuality of the ship。 This must suffice as our sketch or outline determination of the nature of soul。
2
Since what is clear or logically more evident emerges from what in itself is confused but more observable by us; we must reconsider our results from this point of view。 For it is not enough for a definitive formula to express as most now do the mere fact; it must include and exhibit the ground also。 At present definitions are given in a form analogous to the conclusion of a syllogism; e。g。 What is squaring? The construction of an equilateral rectangle equal to a given oblong rectangle。 Such a definition is in form equivalent to a conclusion。 One that tells us that squaring is the discovery of a line which is a mean proportional between the two unequal sides of the given rectangle discloses the ground of what is defined。 We resume our inquiry from a fresh starting…point by calling attention to the fact that what has soul in it differs from what has not; in that the former displays life。 Now this word has more than one sense; and provided any one alone of these is found in a thing we say that thing is living。 Living; that is; may mean thinking or perception or local movement and rest; or movement in the sense of nutrition; decay and growth。 Hence we think of plants also as living; for they are observed to possess in themselves an originative power through which they increase or decrease in all spatial directions; they grow up and down; and everything that grows increases its bulk alike in both directions or indeed in all; and continues to live so long as it can absorb nutriment。 This power of self…nutrition can be isolated from the other powers mentioned; but not they from it…in mortal beings at least。 The fact is obvious in plants; for it is the only psychic power they possess。 This is the originative power the possession of which leads us to speak of things as living at all; but it is the possession of sensation that leads us for the first time to speak of living things as animals; for even those beings which possess no power of local movement but do possess the power of sensation we call animals and not merely living things。 The primary form of sense is touch; which belongs to all animals。 just as the power of self…nutrition can be isolated from touch and sensation generally; so touch can be isolated from all other forms of sense。 (By the power of self…nutrition we mean that departmental power of the soul which is common to plants and animals: all animals whatsoever are observed to have the sense of touch。) What the explanation of these two facts is; we must discuss later。 At present we must confine ourselves to saying that soul is the source of these phenomena and is characterized by them; viz。 by the powers of self…nutrition; sensation; thinking; and motivity。 Is each of these a soul or a part of a soul? And if a part; a part in what sense? A part merely distinguishable by definition or a part distinct in local situation as well? In the case of certain of these powers; the answers to these questions are easy; in the case of others we are puzzled what to say。 just as in the case of plants which when divided are observed to continue to live though removed to a distance from one another (thus showing that in their case the soul of each individual plant before division was actually one; potentially many); so we notice a similar result in other varieties of soul; i。e。 in insects which have been cut in two; each of the segments possesses both sensation and local movement; and if sensation; necessarily also imagination and appetition; for; where there is sensation; there is also pleasure and pain; and; where these; necessarily also desire。 We have no evidence as yet about mind or the power to think; it seems to be a widely different kind of soul; differing as what is eternal from what is perishable; it alone is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic powers。 All the other parts of soul; it is evident from what we have said; are; in spite of certain statements to the contrary; incapable of separate existence though; of course; distinguishable by definition。 If opining is distinct from perceiving; to be capable of opining and to be capable of perceiving must be distinct; and so with all the other forms of living above enumerated。 Further; some animals possess all these parts of soul; some certain of them only; others one only (this is what enables us to classify animals); the cause must be considered later。' A similar arrangement is found also within the field of the senses; some classes of animals have all the senses; some only certain of them; others only one; the most indispensable; touch。 Since the expression 'that whereby we live and perceive' has two meanings; just like the expression 'that whereby we know'…that may mean either (a) knowledge or (b) the soul; for we can speak of knowing by or with either; and similarly that whereby we are in health may be either (a) health or (b) the body or some part of the body; and since of the two terms thus contrasted knowledge or health is the name of a form; essence; or ratio; or if we so express it an actuality of a recipient matter…knowledge of what is capable of knowing; health of what is capable of being made healthy (for the operation of that which is capable of originating change terminates and has its seat in what is changed or altered); further; since it is the soul by or with which primarily we live; perceive; and think:…it follows that the soul must be a ratio or formulable essence; not a matter or subject。 For; as we said; word substance has three meanings form; matter; and the complex of both and of these three what is called matter is potentiality; what is called form actuality。 Since then the complex here is the living thing; the body cannot be the actuality of the soul; it is the soul which is the actuality of a certain kind of body。 Hence the rightness of the view that the soul cannot be without a body; while it csnnot he a body; it is not a body but something relative to a body。 That is why it is in a body; and a body of a definite kind。 It was a mistake; therefore; to do as former thinkers did; merely to fit it into a body without adding a definite specification of the kind or character of that body。 Reflection confirms the observed fact; the actuality of any given thing can only be realized in what is already potentially that thing; i。e。 in a matter of its own appropriate to it。 From all this it follows that soul is an actuality or formulable essence of something that possesses a potentiality of being besouled。
3
Of the psychic powers above enumerated some kinds of living things; as we have said; possess all; some