on the soul-第3节
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
inciples。 That is why （with one exception） all those who define the soul by its power of knowing make it either an element or constructed out of the elements。 The language they all use is similar； like； they say； is known by like； as the soul knows everything； they construct it out of all the principles。 Hence all those who admit but one cause or element； make the soul also one （e。g。 fire or air）； while those who admit a multiplicity of principles make the soul also multiple。 The exception is Anaxagoras； he alone says that mind is impassible and has nothing in common with anything else。 But； if this is so； how or in virtue of what cause can it know？ That Anaxagoras has not explained； nor can any answer be inferred from his words。 All who acknowledge pairs of opposites among their principles； construct the soul also out of these contraries； while those who admit as principles only one contrary of each pair； e。g。 either hot or cold； likewise make the soul some one of these。 That is why； also； they allow themselves to be guided by the names； those who identify soul with the hot argue that sen （to live） is derived from sein （to boil）； while those who identify it with the cold say that soul （psuche） is so called from the process of respiration and （katapsuxis）。 Such are the traditional opinions concerning soul； together with the grounds on which they are maintained。
3
We must begin our examination with movement； for doubtless； not only is it false that the essence of soul is correctly described by those who say that it is what moves （or is capable of moving） itself； but it is an impossibility that movement should be even an attribute of it。 We have already pointed out that there is no necessity that what originates movement should itself be moved。 There are two senses in which anything may be moved…either （a） indirectly； owing to something other than itself； or （b） directly； owing to itself。 Things are 'indirectly moved' which are moved as being contained in something which is moved； e。g。 sailors in a ship； for they are moved in a different sense from that in which the ship is moved； the ship is 'directly moved'； they are 'indirectly moved'； because they are in a moving vessel。 This is clear if we consider their limbs； the movement proper to the legs （and so to man） is walking； and in this case the sailors tare not walking。 Recognizing the double sense of 'being moved'； what we have to consider now is whether the soul is 'directly moved' and participates in such direct movement。 There are four species of movement…locomotion； alteration； diminution； growth； consequently if the soul is moved； it must be moved with one or several or all of these species of movement。 Now if its movement is not incidental； there must be a movement natural to it； and； if so； as all the species enumerated involve place； place must be natural to it。 But if the essence of soul be to move itself； its being moved cannot be incidental to…as it is to what is white or three cubits long； they too can be moved； but only incidentally…what is moved is that of which 'white' and 'three cubits long' are the attributes； the body in which they inhere； hence they have no place： but if the soul naturally partakes in movement； it follows that it must have a place。 Further； if there be a movement natural to the soul； there must be a counter…movement unnatural to it； and conversely。 The same applies to rest as well as to movement； for the terminus ad quem of a thing's natural movement is the place of its natural rest； and similarly the terminus ad quem of its enforced movement is the place of its enforced rest。 But what meaning can be attached to enforced movements or rests of the soul； it is difficult even to imagine。 Further； if the natural movement of the soul be upward； the soul must be fire； if downward； it must be earth； for upward and downward movements are the definitory characteristics of these bodies。 The same reasoning applies to the intermediate movements； termini； and bodies。 Further； since the soul is observed to originate movement in the body； it is reasonable to suppose that it transmits to the body the movements by which it itself is moved； and so； reversing the order； we may infer from the movements of the body back to similar movements of the soul。 Now the body is moved from place to place with movements of locomotion。 Hence it would follow that the soul too must in accordance with the body change either its place as a whole or the relative places of its parts。 This carries with it the possibility that the soul might even quit its body and re…enter it； and with this would be involved the possibility of a resurrection of animals from the dead。 But； it may be contended； the soul can be moved indirectly by something else； for an animal can be pushed out of its course。 Yes； but that to whose essence belongs the power of being moved by itself； cannot be moved by something else except incidentally； just as what is good by or in itself cannot owe its goodness to something external to it or to some end to which it is a means。 If the soul is moved； the most probable view is that what moves it is sensible things。 We must note also that； if the soul moves itself； it must be the mover itself that is moved； so that it follows that if movement is in every case a displacement of that which is in movement； in that respect in which it is said to be moved； the movement of the soul must be a departure from its essential nature； at least if its self…movement is essential to it； not incidental。 Some go so far as to hold that the movements which the soul imparts to the body in which it is are the same in kind as those with which it itself is moved。 An example of this is Democritus； who uses language like that of the comic dramatist Philippus； who accounts for the movements that Daedalus imparted to his wooden Aphrodite by saying that he poured quicksilver into it； similarly Democritus says that the spherical atoms which according to him constitute soul； owing to their own ceaseless movements draw the whole body after them and so produce its movements。 We must urge the question whether it is these very same atoms which produce rest also…how they could do so； it is difficult and even impossible to say。 And； in general； we may object that it is not in this way that the soul appears to originate movement in animals…it is through intention or process of thinking。 It is in the same fashion that the Timaeus also tries to give a physical account of how the soul moves its body； the soul； it is there said； is in movement； and so owing to their mutual implication moves the body also。 After compounding the soul…substance out of the elements and dividing it in accordance with the harmonic numbers； in order that it may possess a connate sensibility for 'harmony' and that the whole may move in movements well attuned； the Demiurge bent the straight line into a circle； this single circle he divided into two circles united at two common points； one of these he subdivided into seven circles。 All this implies that the movements of the soul are identified with the local movements of the heavens。 Now； in the first place； it is a mistake to say that the soul is a spatial magnitude。 It is evident that Plato means the soul of the whole to be like the sort of soul which is called mind not like the sensitive or the desiderative soul； for the movements of neither of these are circular。 Now mind is one and continuous in the sense in which the process of thinking is so； and thinking is identical with the thoughts which are its parts； these have a serial unity like that of number； not a unity like that of a spatial magnitude。 Hence mind cannot have that kind of unity either； mind is either without parts or is continuous in some other way than that which characterizes a spatial magnitude。 How； indeed； if it were a spatial magnitude； could mind possibly think？ Will it think with any one indifferently of its parts？ In this case； the 'part' must be understood either in the sense of a spatial magnitude or in the sense of a point （if a point can be called a part of a spatial magnitude）。 If we accept the latter alternative； the points being infinite in number； obviously the mind can never exhaustively traverse them； if the former； the mind must think the same thing over and over again； indeed an infinite number of times （whereas it is manifestly possible to think a thing once only）。 If contact of any part whatsoever of itself with the object is all that is required； why need mind move in a circle； or indeed possess magnitude at all？ On the other hand； if contact with the whole circle is necessary； what meaning can be given to the contact of the parts？ Further； how could what has no parts think what has parts； or what has parts think what has none？ We must identify the circle referred to with mind； for it is mind whose movement is thinking； and it is the circle whose movement is revolution； so that if thinking is a movement of revolution； the circle which has this characteristic movement must be mind。 If the circular movement is eternal； there must be something which mind is always thinking…what can this be？ For all practical processes of thinking have limits…they al
