the science of right-第7节

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juridical　act　on　my　part。　But　the　assumption　of　this　act　at　the　same

time　involves　the　admission　that　I　am　obliged　reciprocally　to

observe　a　similar　abstention　towards　every　other　in　respect　of　what　is

externally　theirs；　for　the　obligation　in　question　arises　from　a

universal　rule　regulating　the　external　juridical　relations。　Hence　I　am

not　obliged　to　let　alone　what　another　person　declares　to　be　externally

his；　unless　every　other　person　likewise　secures　me　by　a　guarantee　that

he　will　act　in　relation　to　what　is　mine；　upon　the　same　principle。　This

guarantee　of　reciprocal　and　mutual　abstention　from　what　belongs　to

others　does　not　require　a　special　juridical　act　for　its　establishment；

but　is　already　involved　in　the　conception　of　an　external　obligation　of

right；　on　account　of　the　universality　and　consequently　the　reciprocity

of　the　obligatoriness　arising　from　a　universal　Rule。　Now　a　single

will；　in　relation　to　an　external　and　consequently　contingent

possession；　cannot　serve　as　a　compulsory　law　for　all；　because　that

would　be　to　do　violence　to　the　freedom　which　is　in　accordance　with

universal　laws。　Therefore　it　is　only　a　will　that　binds　every　one；

and　as　such　a　common；　collective；　and　authoritative　will；　that　can

furnish　a　guarantee　of　security　to　all。　But　the　state　of　men　under　a

universal；　external；　and　public　legislation；　conjoined　with

authority　and　power；　is　called　the　civil　state。　There　can　therefore　be

an　external　mine　and　thine　only　in　the　civil　state　of　society。

　　Consequence。…　It　follows；　as　a　corollary；　that；　if　it　is　juridically

possible　to　have　an　external　object　as　one's　own；　the　individual

subject　of　possession　must　be　allowed　to　compel　or　constrain　every

person　with　whom　a　dispute　as　to　the　mine　or　thine　of　such　a

possession　may　arise；　to　enter　along　with　himself　into　the　relations

of　a　civil　constitution。



　　　　9。　There　May；　However；　Be　an　External　Mine　and　Thine　Found　as

　　　　　　a　Fact　in　the　State　of　Nature；　but　it　is　only　Provisory。



　　Natural　right　in　the　state　of　a　civil　constitution　means　the　forms

of　right　which　may　be　deduced　from　principles　a　priori　as　the

conditions　of　such　a　constitution。　It　is　therefore　not　to　be　infringed

by　the　statutory　laws　of　such　a　constitution；　and　accordingly　the

juridical　principle　remains　in　force；　that；　〃Whoever　proceeds　upon　a

maxim　by　which　it　becomes　impossible　for　me　to　have　an　object　of　the

exercise　of　my　will　as　mine；　does　me　a　lesion　or　injury。〃　For　a

civil　constitution　is　only　the　juridical　condition　under　which　every

one　has　what　is　his　own　merely　secured　to　him；　as　distinguished　from

its　being　specially　assigned　and　determined　to　him。　All　guarantee；

therefore；　assumes　that　everyone　to　whom　a　thing　is　secured　is　already

in　possession　of　it　as　his　own。　Hence；　prior　to　the　civil

constitution…　or　apart　from　it…　an　external　mine　and　thine　must　be

assumed　as　possible；　and　along　with　it　a　right　to　compel　everyone　with

whom　we　could　come　into　any　kind　of　intercourse　to　enter　with　us

into　a　constitution　in　which　what　is　mine　or　thine　can　be　secured。

There　may　thus　be　a　possession　in　expectation　or　in　preparation　for

such　a　state　of　security；　as　can　only　be　established　on　the　law　of　the

common　will；　and　as　it　is　therefore　in　accordance　with　the　possibility

of　such　a　state；　it　constitutes　a　provisory　or　temporary　juridical

possession；　whereas　that　possession　which　is　found　in　reality　in　the

civil　state　of　society　will　be　a　peremptory　or　guaranteed

possession。　Prior　to　entering　into　this　state；　for　which　he　is

naturally　prepared；　the　individual　rightfully　resists　those　who　will

not　adapt　themselves　to　it；　and　who　would　disturb　him　in　his　provisory

possession；　because；　if　the　will　of　all　except　himself　were　imposing

upon　him　an　obligation　to　withdraw　from　a　certain　possession；　it　would

still　be　only　a　one…sided　or　unilateral　will；　and　consequently　it

would　have　just　as　little　legal　title…　which　can　be　properly　based

only　on　the　universalized　will…　to　contest　a　claim　of　right　as　he

would　have　to　assert　it。　Yet　be　has　the　advantage　on　his　side；　of

being　in　accord　with　the　conditions　requisite　to　the　introduction

and　institution　of　a　civil　form　of　society。　In　a　word；　the　mode　in

which　anything　external　may　be　held　as　one's　own　in　the　state　of

nature；　is　just　physical　possession　with　a　presumption　of　right　thus

far　in　its　favour；　that　by　union　of　the　wills　of　all　in　a　public

legislation　it　will　be　made　juridical；　and　in　this　expectation　it

holds　comparatively；　as　a　kind　of　potential　juridical　possession。

　　This　prerogative　of　right；　as　arising　from　the　fact　of　empirical

possession；　is　in　accordance　with　the　formula：　〃It　is　well　for　those

who　are　in　possession〃　（Beati　possidentes）。　It　does　not　consist　in　the

fact　that；　because　the　possessor　has　the　presumption　of　being　a

rightful　man；　it　is　unnecessary　for　him　to　bring　forward　proof　that　he

possesses　a　certain　thing　rightfully；　for　this　position　applies　only

to　a　case　of　disputed　right。　But　it　is　because　it　accords　with　the

postulate　of　the　practical　reason；　that　everyone　is　invested　with

the　faculty　of　having　as　his　own　any　external　object　upon　which　he　has

exerted　his　will；　and；　consequently；　all　actual　possession　is　a

state　whose　rightfulness　is　established　upon　that　postulate　by　an

anterior　act　of　will。　And　such　an　act；　if　there　be　no　prior　possession

of　the　same　object　by　another　opposed　to　it；　does；　therefore；

provisionally　justify　and　entitle　me；　according　to　the　law　of　external

freedom；　to　restrain　anyone　who　refuses　to　enter　with　me　into　a

state　of　public　legal　freedom　from　all　pretension　to　the　use　of　such

an　object。　For　such　a　procedure　is　requisite；　in　conformity　with　the

postulate　of　reason；　in　order　to　subject　to　my　proper　use　a　thing

which　would　otherwise　be　practically　annihilated；　as　regards　all

proper　use　of　it。

CH2

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　PART。　PRIVATE　RIGHT。

　　The　System　of　those　Laws　Which　Require　No　External　Promulgation。

　　　　　　CHAPTER　II。　The　Mode　of　Acquiring　Anything　External。



　　　　　　　10。　The　General　Principle　of　External　Acquisition。



　　I　acquire　a　thing　when　I　act　（efficio）　so　that　it　becomes　mine。　An

external　thing　is　originally　mine　when　it　is　mine　even　without　the

intervention　of　a　juridical　act。　An　acquisition　is　original　and

primary　when　it　is　not　derived　from　what　another　had　already　made

his　own。

　　There　is　nothing　external　that　is　as　such　originally　mine；　but

anything　external　may　be　originally　acquired　when　it　is　an　object　that

no　other　person　has　yet　made　his。　A　state　in　which　the　mine　and

thine　are　in　common　cannot　be　conceived　as　having　been　at　any　time

original。　Such　a　state　of　things　would　have　to　be　acquired　by　an

external　juridical　act；　although　there　may　be　an　original　and　common

possession　of　an　external　object。　Even　if　we　think　hypothetically　of　a

state　in　which　the　mine　and　thine　would　be　originally　in　common　as　a

communio　mei　et　tui　originaria；　it　would　still　have　to　be

distinguished　from　a　primeval　communion　（communio　primaeva）　with

things　in　common；　sometimes　supposed　to　be　founded　in　the　first　period

of　the　relations　of　right　among　men；　and　which　could　not　be　regarded

as　based　upon　principles　like　the　former；　but　only　upon　history。

Even　under　that　condition　the　historic　communio；　as　a　supposed

primeval　community；　would　always　have　to　be　viewed　as　acquired　and

derivative　（communio　derivativa）。

　　The　principle　of　external　acquisition；　then；　may　be　expressed

thus：　〃Whatever　I　bring　under　my　power　according　to　the　law　of

external　freedom；　of　which　as　an　object　of　my　free　activity　of　will

I　have　the　capability　of　making　use　according　to　the　postulate　of

the　practical　reason；　and　which　I　will　to　become　mine　in　conformity

with　the　idea　of　a　possible　united　common　will；　is　mine。〃

　　The　practical　elements　（momenta　attendenda）　constitutive　of　the

process　of　original　acquisition　are：

　　1。　Prehension　or　seizure　of　an　object　which　belongs　to　no　one；

for；　if　it　belonged　already　to　some　one；　the　act　would　conflict　with

the　freedom　of　others；　that　is；　according　to　universal　laws。　This　is

the　taking　possession　of　an　object　of　my　free　activity　of　will　in

space　and　time；　the　possession；　therefore；　into　which　I　thus　put

myself　is　sensible　or　physical　possession　（possessio　phenomenon）；

　　2。　Declaration　of　the　possession　of　this　object　by　formal

designation　and　the　act　of　my　freewill　in　interdicting　every　other

person　from　using　it　as　his；

　　3。　Appropriation；　as　the　act；　in　idea；　of　an　externally

legislative　common　will；　by　which　all　and　each　are　obliged　to

respect　and　act　in　conformity　with　my　act　of　will。

　　The　validity　of　the　last　element　in　the　process　of　acquisition；　as

that　on　which　the　conclusion　that　〃the　external　object　is　mine〃　rests；

is　what　makes　the　possession　valid　as　a　purely　rational　and

juridical　possession　（possessio　noumenon）。　It　is　founded　upon　the　fact

that；　as　all　these　acts　are　jur