the science of right-第28节

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Now　a　hereditary　nobility　is　a　rank　which　takes　precedence　of　merit

and　is　hoped　for　without　any　good　reason…　a　thing　of　the　imagination

without　genuine　reality。　For　if　an　ancestor　had　merit；　he　could　not

transmit　it　to　his　posterity；　but　they　must　always　acquire　it　for

themselves。　Nature　has　in　fact　not　so　arranged　that　the　talent　and

will　which　give　rise　to　merit　in　the　state；　are　hereditary。　And

because　it　cannot　be　supposed　of　any　individual　that　he　will　throw

away　his　freedom；　it　is　impossible　that　the　common　will　of　all　the

people　should　agree　to　such　a　groundless　prerogative；　and　hence　the

sovereign　cannot　make　it　valid。　It　may　happen；　however；　that　such　an

anomaly　as　that　of　subjects　who　would　be　more　than　citizens；　in　the

manner　of　born　officials；　or　hereditary　professors；　has　slipped　into

the　mechanism　of　government　in　olden　times；　as　in　the　case　of　the

feudal　system；　which　was　almost　entirely　organized　with　reference　to

war。　Under　such　circumstances；　the　state　cannot　deal　otherwise　with

this　error　of　a　wrongly　instituted　rank　in　its　midst；　than　by　the

remedy　of　a　gradual　extinction　through　hereditary　positions　being　left

unfilled　as　they　fall　vacant。　The　state　has　therefore　the　right

provisorily　to　let　a　dignity　in　title　continue；　until　the　public

opinion　matures　on　the　subject。　And　this　will　thus　pass　from　the

threefold　division　into　sovereign；　nobles；　and　people；　to　the

twofold　and　only　natural　division　into　sovereign　and　people。

　　No　individual　in　the　state　can　indeed　be　entirely　without　dignity；

for　he　has　at　least　that　of　being　a　citizen；　except　when　he　has　lost

his　civil　status　by　a　crime。　As　a　criminal　he　is　still　maintained　in

life；　but　he　is　made　the　mere　instrument　of　the　will　of　another；

whether　it　be　the　state　or　a　particular　citizen。　In　the　latter

position；　in　which　he　could　only　be　placed　by　a　juridical　judgement；

he　would　practically　become　a　slave；　and　would　belong　as　property

（dominium）　to　another；　who　would　be　not　merely　his　master　（herus）

but　his　owner　（dominus）。　Such　an　owner　would　be　entitled　to　exchange

or　alienate　him　as　a　thing；　to　use　him　at　will　except　for　shameful

purposes；　and　to　dispose　of　his　powers；　but　not　of　his　life　and

members。　No　one　can　bind　himself　to　such　a　condition　of　dependence；　as

he　would　thereby　cease　to　be　a　person；　and　it　is　only　as　a　person　that

he　can　make　a　contract。　It　may；　however；　appear　that　one　man　may

bind　himself　to　another　by　a　contract　of　hire；　to　discharge　a

certain　service　that　is　permissible　in　its　kind；　but　is　left

entirely　undetermined　as　regards　its　measure　or　amount；　and　that　as

receiving　wages　or　board　or　protection　in　return；　he　thus　becomes　only

a　servant　subject　to　the　will　of　a　master　（subditus）　and　not　a　slave

（servus）。　But　this　is　an　illusion。　For　if　masters　are　entitled　to

use　the　powers　of　such　subjects　at　will；　they　may　exhaust　these

powers…　as　has　been　done　in　the　case　of　Negroes　in　the　Sugar　Island…

and　they　may　thus　reduce　their　servants　to　despair　and　death。　But　this

would　imply　that　they　had　actually　given　themselves　away　to　their

masters　as　property；　which；　in　the　case　of　persons；　is　impossible。　A

person　can；　therefore；　only　contract　to　perform　work　that　is　defined

both　in　quality　and　quantity；　either　as　a　day…labourer　or　as　a

domiciled　subject。　In　the　latter　case　he　may　enter　into　a　contract

of　lease　for　the　use　of　the　land　of　a　superior；　giving　a　definite　rent

or　annual　return　for　its　utilization　by　himself；　or　he　may　contract

for　his　service　as　a　labourer　upon　the　land。　But　he　does　not　thereby

make　himself　a　slave；　or　a　bondsman；　or　a　serf　attached　to　the　soil

（glebae　adscriptus）；　as　he　would　thus　divest　himself　of　his

personality；　he　can　only　enter　into　a　temporary　or　at　most　a　heritable

lease。　And　even　if　by　committing　a　crime　he　has　personally　become

subjected　to　another；　this　subject…condition　does　not　become

hereditary；　for　he　has　only　brought　it　upon　himself　by　his　own

wrongdoing。　Neither　can　one　who　has　been　begotten　by　a　slave　be

claimed　as　property　on　the　ground　of　the　cost　of　his　rearing；

because　such　rearing　is　an　absolute　duty　naturally　incumbent　upon

parents；　and　in　case　the　parents　be　slaves；　it　devolves　upon　their

masters　or　owners；　who；　in　undertaking　the　possession　of　such

subjects；　have　also　made　themselves　responsible　for　the　performance　of

their　duties。



　　　　　　　　　　　　E。　The　Right　of　Punishing　and　of　Pardoning。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I。　The　Right　of　Punishing。



　　The　right　of　administering　punishment　is　the　right　of　the

sovereign　as　the　supreme　power　to　inflict　pain　upon　a　subject　on

account　of　a　crime　committed　by　him。　The　head　of　the　state　cannot

therefore　be　punished；　but　his　supremacy　may　be　withdrawn　from　him。

Any　transgression　of　the　public　law　which　makes　him　who　commits　it

incapable　of　being　a　citizen；　constitutes　a　crime；　either　simply　as

a　private　crime　（crimen）；　or　also　as　a　public　crime　（crimen　publicum）。

Private　crimes　are　dealt　with　by　a　civil　court；　public　crimes　by　a

criminal　court。　Embezzlement　or　speculation　of　money　or　goods

entrusted　in　trade；　fraud　in　purchase　or　sale；　if　done　before　the　eyes

of　the　party　who　suffers；　are　private　crimes。　On　the　other　hand；

coining　false　money　or　forging　bills　of　exchange；　theft；　robbery；

etc。；　are　public　crimes；　because　the　commonwealth；　and　not　merely　some

particular　individual；　is　endangered　thereby。　Such　crimes　may　be

divided　into　those　of　a　base　character　（indolis　abjectae）　and　those　of

a　violent　character　（indolis　violentiae）。

　　Judicial　or　juridical　punishment　（poena　forensis）　is　to　be

distinguished　from　natural　punishment　（poena　naturalis）；　in　which

crime　as　vice　punishes　itself；　and　does　not　as　such　come　within　the

cognizance　of　the　legislator。　juridical　punishment　can　never　be

administered　merely　as　a　means　for　promoting　another　good　either

with　regard　to　the　criminal　himself　or　to　civil　society；　but　must　in

all　cases　be　imposed　only　because　the　individual　on　whom　it　is

inflicted　has　committed　a　crime。　For　one　man　ought　never　to　be　dealt

with　merely　as　a　means　subservient　to　the　purpose　of　another；　nor　be

mixed　up　with　the　subjects　of　real　right。　Against　such　treatment　his

inborn　personality　has　a　right　to　protect　him；　even　although　he　may　be

condemned　to　lose　his　civil　personality。　He　must　first　be　found　guilty

and　punishable；　before　there　can　be　any　thought　of　drawing　from　his

punishment　any　benefit　for　himself　or　his　fellow…citizens。　The　penal

law　is　a　categorical　imperative；　and　woe　to　him　who　creeps　through　the

serpent…windings　of　utilitarianism　to　discover　some　advantage　that　may

discharge　him　from　the　justice　of　punishment；　or　even　from　the　due

measure　of　it；　according　to　the　Pharisaic　maxim：　〃It　is　better　that

one　man　should　die　than　that　the　whole　people　should　perish。〃　For　if

justice　and　righteousness　perish；　human　life　would　no　longer　have

any　value　in　the　world。　What；　then；　is　to　be　said　of　such　a　proposal

as　to　keep　a　criminal　alive　who　has　been　condemned　to　death；　on　his

being　given　to　understand　that；　if　he　agreed　to　certain　dangerous

experiments　being　performed　upon　him；　he　would　be　allowed　to　survive

if　he　came　happily　through　them？　It　is　argued　that　physicians　might

thus　obtain　new　information　that　would　be　of　value　to　the

commonweal。　But　a　court　of　justice　would　repudiate　with　scorn　any

proposal　of　this　kind　if　made　to　it　by　the　medical　faculty；　for

justice　would　cease　to　be　justice；　if　it　were　bartered　away　for　any

consideration　whatever。

　　But　what　is　the　mode　and　measure　of　punishment　which　public

justice　takes　as　its　principle　and　standard？　It　is　just　the

principle　of　equality；　by　which　the　pointer　of　the　scale　of　justice　is

made　to　incline　no　more　to　the　one　side　than　the　other。　It　may　be

rendered　by　saying　that　the　undeserved　evil　which　any　one　commits　on

another　is　to　be　regarded　as　perpetrated　on　himself。　Hence　it　may　be

said：　〃If　you　slander　another；　you　slander　yourself；　if　you　steal　from

another；　you　steal　from　yourself；　if　you　strike　another；　you　strike

yourself；　if　you　kill　another；　you　kill　yourself。〃　This　is　the　right

of　retaliation　（jus　talionis）；　and；　properly　understood；　it　is　the

only　principle　which　in　regulating　a　public　court；　as　distinguished

from　mere　private　judgement；　can　definitely　assign　both　the　quality

and　the　quantity　of　a　just　penalty。　All　other　standards　are　wavering

and　uncertain；　and　on　account　of　other　considerations　involved　in

them；　they　contain　no　principle　conformable　to　the　sentence　of　pure

and　strict　justice。　It　may　appear；　however；　that　difference　of

social　status　would　not　admit　the　application　of　the　principle　of

retaliation；　which　is　that　of　〃like　with　like。〃　But　although　the

application　may　not　in　all　cases　be　possible　according　to　the

letter；　yet　as　regards　the　effect　it　may　always　be　attained　in

practice；　by　due　regard　being　given　to　the　disposition　and　sentiment

of　the　parties　in　the　higher　soci