the ethics(part v)-第4节
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modifications or images of things may be referred to the
idea of God。
Proof。… There is no modification of the body; whereof the mind may not form
some clear and distinct conception (V:iv。); wherefore it can bring it about;
that they should all be referred to the idea of God (I:xv。)。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XV。 He who clearly and distinctly understands himself
and his emotions loves God; and so much the more in proportion
as he more understands himself and his emotions。
Proof。… He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions
feels pleasure (III:liii。); and this pleasure is (by the last Prop。)
accompanied by the idea of God; therefore (Def。 of the Emotions:vi。) such an
one loves God; and (for the same reason) so much the more in proportion as
he more understands himself and his emotions。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XVI。 This love towards God must
hold the chief place in the mind。
Proof。… For this love is associated with all the modifications of the body
(V:xiv。) and is fostered by them all (V:v。); therefore (V:xi。); it must hold
the chief place in the mind。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XVII。 God is without passions;
neither is he affected by
any emotion of pleasure or pain。
Proof。… All ideas; in so far as they are referred to God; are true
(II:xxxii。); that is (II:Def。iv。) adequate; and therefore (by the general
Def。 of the Emotions) God is without passions。 Again; God cannot pass either
to a greater or to a lesser perfection (I:xx。Coroll。ii。); therefore
(by Def。 of the Emotions:ii。; &iii。) he is not affected by any emotion of
pleasure or pain。
Corollary。 Strictly speaking; God does not love or hate anyone。 For God (by
the foregoing Prop。) is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain;
consequently (Def。 of the Emotions:vi。; &vii。) he does not love or hate
anyone。
Prop。XVIII。 No one can hate God。
Proof。… The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (II:xlvi。;
II:xlvii。); wherefore; in so far as we contemplate God; we are active
(III:iii。) ; consequently (III:lix。) there can be no pain accompanied by the
idea of God; in other words (Def。 of the Emotions:vii。); no one can hate
God。 Q。E。D。
Corollary。… Love towards God cannot be turned into hate。
Note。… It may be objected that; as we understand God as the cause of all
things; we by that very fact regard God as the cause of pain。 But I make
answer; that; in so far as we understand the causes of pain; it to that
extent (V:iii。) ceases to be a passion; that is; it ceases to be pain
(III:lix。); therefore; in so far as we understand God to be the cause of
pain; we to that extent feel pleasure。
Prop。 XIX。 He; who loves God;
cannot endeavour that God
should love him in return。
Proof。… For; if a man should so endeavour; he would desire (V:xvii。Coroll。)
that God; whom he loves; should not be God; and consequently he would desire
to feel pain (III:xix。); which is absurd (III:xxviii。)。 Therefore; he who
loves God; &c。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XX。 This love towards God cannot be stained by the
emotion of envy or jealousy: contrariwise; it is the more fostered;
in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be
joined to God by the same bond of love。
Proof。… This love towards God is the highest good which we can seek for
under the guidance of reason (IV:xxviii。); it is common to all men
(IV:xxxvi);and we desire that all should rejoice therein (IV:xxxvii。);
therefore (Def。 of the Emotions:xxiii); it cannot be stained by the
emotion envy nor by; the emotion of jealousy; (V:xviii。 see definition of
Jealousy; (III:xxxv。 Note); but; contrariwise; it must needs be the more
fostered; in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice
therein。 Q。E。D。
Note。… We can in the same way; show; that there is no emotion directly
contrary to this love; whereby this love can be destroyed; therefore we may
conclude; that this love towards God is the most constant of all the
emotions; and that; in so far as it is referred to the body; it cannot be
destroyed; unless the body be destroyed also。 As to its nature; in so far as
it is referred to the mind only; we shall presently inquire。
I have now gone through all the remedies against the emotions; or all
that the mind; considered in itself alone; can do against them。 Whence it
appears that the mind's power over the emotions consists:…
I。 In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V:iv。Note)。
II。 In the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an
external cause; which we conceive confusedly (V:ii。 and V:iv。Note)。
III。 In the fact; that; in respect to time; the emotions referred to
things; which we distinctly understand; surpass those referred to what we
conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner (V:vii。)。
IV。 In the number of causes whereby those modifications (Affectiones。
Camerer reads affectus … emotions); are fostered; which have regard to the
common properties of things or to God (V:ix。; V:xi。)。
V。 Lastly; in the order wherein the mind can arrange and associate; one
with another; its own emotions (V:x。Note and V:xii。; V:xiii。; V:xiv。)。
But; in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better
understood; it should be specially observed that the emotions are called by
us strong; when we compare the emotion of one man with the emotion of
another; and see that one man is more troubled than another by the same
emotion; or when we are comparing the various emotions of the same man one
with another; and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion
than by another。 For the strength of every emotion is defined by a
comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause。 Now the
power of the mind is defined by knowledge only; and its infirmity or passion
is defined by the privation of knowledge only: it therefore follows; that
that mind is most passive; whose greatest part is made up of inadequate
ideas; so that it may be characterized more readily by its passive states
than by its activities: on the other hand; that mind is most active; whose
greatest part is made up of adequate ideas; so that; although it may contain
as many inadequate ideas as the former mind; it may yet be more easily
characterized by ideas attributable to human virtue; than by ideas which
tell of human infirmity。 Again; it must be observed; that spiritual
unhealthiness; and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love for
something which is subject to many variations; and which we can never become
masters of。 For no one is solicitous or anxious about anything; unless he
loves it; neither do wrongs; suspicions; enmities; &c。 arise; except in
regard to things whereof no one can be really master。
We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct knowledge;
and especially that third kind of knowledge (II:xlvii。Note); founded on the
actual knowledge of God; possesses over the emotions: if it does not
absolutely destroy them; in so far as they are passions (V:iii。 and
V:iv。Note); at any rate; it causes them to occupy a very small part of the
mind (V:xiv。)。 Further; it begets a love towards a thing immutable and
eternal (V:xv。); whereof we may really enter into possession (II:xlv。);
neither can it be defiled with those faults which are inherent in ordinary
love; but it may grow from strength to strength; and may engross the greater
part of the mind; and deeply penetrate it。 And now I have finished with all
that concerns this present life: for; as I said in the beginning of this
note; I have briefly described all the remedies against the emotions。 And
this everyone may readily have seen for himself; if he has attended to
what is advanced in the present note; and also to the definitions of the
mind and its emotions; and; lastly; to Propositions III:i。 and III:iii。 It
is now; therefore; time to pass on to those matters; which appertain to the
duration of the mind; without relation to the body。
Prop。 XXI。 The mind can only imagine anything;
or remember what is past; while the body endures。
Proof。… The mind does not express the actual existence of its body; nor does
it imagine the modifications of the body as actual; except while the body
endures (II:viii。Coroll。); and; consequently (II:xxvi。); it does not imagine
any body as actually existing; except while its own body endures。 Thus it
cannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination; see II:xvii。Note);
or remember things past; except while the body endures (see definition of
Memory; II:xviii。Note)。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXII。 Neverthele