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The Ethics 'Part 5'







(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)







by Benedict de Spinoza







Translated by R。 H。 M。 Elwes





















PART V:  Of the Power of the Understanding; or of Human Freedom















PREFACE



At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics; which is concerned



with the way leading to freedom。 I shall therefore treat therein of the



power of the reason; showing how far the reason can control the emotions;



and what is the nature of Mental Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be



able to see; how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant。



It is no part of my design to point out the method and means whereby the



understanding may be perfected; nor to show the skill whereby the body may



be so tended; as to be capable of the due performance of its functions。 The



latter question lies in the province of Medicine; the former in the province



of Logic。 Here; therefore; I repeat; I shall treat only of the power of the



mind; or of reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its



dominion over the emotions; for their control and moderation。 That we do



not possess absolute dominion over them; I have already shown。 Yet the



Stoics have thought; that the emotions depended absolutely on our will; and



that we could absolutely govern them。 But these philosophers were compelled;



by the protest of experience; not from their own principles; to confess;



that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them:



and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the example (if I remember



rightly) of two dogs; the one a house…dog and the other a hunting…dog。 For



by long training it could be brought about; that the house…dog should become



accustomed to hunt; and the hunting…dog to cease from running after hares。



To this opinion Descartes not a little inclines。 For he maintained; that the



soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain; namely;



to that part called the pineal gland; by the aid of which the mind is



enabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body; and also



external objects; and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in



motion in various ways。 He asserted; that this gland is so suspended in the



midst of the brain; that it could be moved by the slightest motion of the



animal spirits: further; that this gland is suspended in the midst of the



brain in as many different manners; as the animal spirits can impinge



thereon; and; again; that as many different marks are impressed on the said



gland; as there are different external objects which impel the animal



spirits towards it; whence it follows; that if the will of the soul suspends



the gland in a position; wherein it has already been suspended once before



by the animal spirits driven in one way or another; the gland in its turn



reacts on the said spirits; driving and determining them to the condition



wherein they were; when repulsed before by a similar position of the gland。



He further asserted; that every act of mental volition is united in nature



to a certain given motion of the gland。 For instance; whenever anyone



desires to look at a remote object; the act of volition causes the pupil of



the eye to dilate; whereas; if the person in question had only thought of



the dilatation of the pupil; the mere wish to dilate it would not have



brought about the result; inasmuch as the motion of the gland; which serves



to impel the animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would



dilate or contract the pupil; is not associated in nature with the wish to



dilate or contract the pupil; but with the wish to look at remote or very



near objects。 Lastly; he maintained that; although every motion of the



aforesaid gland seems to have been united by nature to one particular



thought out of the whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning of



our life; yet it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with



other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de l'ame; I。 50。



He thence concludes; that there is no soul so weak; that it cannot; under



proper direction; acquire absolute power over its passions。 For passions as



defined by him are 〃perceptions; or feelings; or disturbances of the soul;



which are referred to the soul as species; and which (mark the expression)



are produced; preserved; and strengthened through some movement of the



spirits。〃 (Passion del l'ame;I。27。) But; seeing that we can join any motion



of the gland; or consequently of the spirits; to any volition; the



determination of the will depends entirely on our own powers; if; therefore;



we determine our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to which



we wish our actions to tend; and associate the motions of the passions which



we wish to acquire with the said decisions; we shall acquire an absolute



dominion over our passions。 Such is the doctrine of this illustrious



philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his own words); it is one



which; had it been less ingenious; I could hardly believe to have proceeded



from so great a man。 Indeed; I am lost in wonder; that a philosopher; who



had stoutly asserted; that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow



from self…evident premisses; and would affirm nothing which he did not



clearly and distinctly perceive; and who had so often taken to task the



scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities;



could maintain a hypothesis; beside which occult qualities are commonplace。



What does he understand; I ask; by the union of the mind and the body? What



clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union



with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like him to



explain this union through its proximate cause。 What clear and distinct



conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain



particle of extended matter? What clear and distinct conception has he got



of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended



matter? But he had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from



body; that he could not assign any particular cause of the union between the



two; or of the mind itself; but was obliged to have recourse to the cause of



the whole universe; that is to God。 Further; I should much like to know;



what degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland; and with



what force can it hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance; whether this



gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the



animal spirits; and whether the motions of the passions; which we have



closely united with firm decisions; cannot be again disjoined therefrom by



physical causes; in which case it would follow that; although the mind



firmly intended to face a given danger; and had united to this decision the



motions of boldness; yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become



suspended in a way; which would preclude the mind thinking of anything



except running away。 In truth; as there is no common standard of volition



and motion; so is there no comparison possible between the powers of the



mind and the power or strength of the body; consequently the strength of one



cannot in any wise be determined by the strength of the other。 We may also



add; that there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain; so



placed that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways; and also



that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain。



Lastly; I omit all the assertions which he makes concerning the will and its



freedom; inasmuch as I have abundantly proved that his premisses are false。



Therefore; since the power of the mind; as I have shown above; is defined by



the understanding only; we shall determine solely by the knowledge of the



mind the remedies against the emotions; which I believe all have had



experience of; but do not accurately observe or distinctly see; and from the



same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions; which have regard to the



mind's blessedness。











AXIOMS。



I。 If two contrary actions be started in the same subject; a change must



necessarily take place; either in both; or in one of the two; and continue



until they cease to be contrary。







II。 The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause; in so far



as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause。 (This



axiom is evident from III。vii。)











PROPOSITIONS。







Prop。I。 Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged



and associated in the mind; so are the modifications of body or



the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and



associated in the body。







Proof。… The ord

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