meno-第8节
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clearly there can be no other teachers？
Men。 No。
Soc。 And if there are no teachers； neither are there disciples？
Men。 Agreed。
Soc。 And we have admitted that a thing cannot be taught of which
there are neither teachers nor disciples？
Men。 We have。
Soc。 And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere？
Men。 There are not。
Soc。 And if there are no teachers； neither are there scholars？
Men。 That； I think； is true。
Soc。 Then virtue cannot be taught？
Men。 Not if we are right in our view。 But I cannot believe；
Socrates； that there are no good men： And if there are； how did they
come into existence？
Soc。 I am afraid； Meno； that you and I are not good for much； and
that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you as Prodicus has
been of me。 Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves； and try to
find some one who will help in some way or other to improve us。 This I
say； because I observe that in the previous discussion none of us
remarked that right and good action is possible to man under other
guidance than that of knowledge （episteme）；…and indeed if this be
denied； there is no seeing how there can be any good men at all。
Men。 How do you mean； Socrates？
Soc。 I mean that good men are necessarily useful or profitable。 Were
we not right in admitting this？ It must be so。
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true
guides to us of action…there we were also right？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide unless he
have knowledge （phrhonesis）； this we were wrong。
Men。 What do you mean by the word 〃right〃？
Soc。 I will explain。 If a man knew the way to Larisa； or anywhere
else； and went to the place and led others thither； would he not be
a right and good guide？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 And a person who had a right opinion about the way； but had
never been and did not know； might be a good guide also； might he not？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 And while he has true opinion about that which the other knows；
he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth； as he who
knows the truth？
Men。 Exactly。
Soc。 Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as
knowledge； and that was the point which we omitted in our
speculation about the nature of virtue； when we said that knowledge
only is the guide of right action； whereas there is also right
opinion。
Men。 True。
Soc。 Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge？
Men。 The difference； Socrates； is only that he who has knowledge
will always be right； but he who has right opinion will sometimes be
right； and sometimes not。
Soc。 What do you mean？ Can he be wrong who has right opinion； so
long as he has right opinion？
Men。 I admit the cogency of your argument； and therefore；
Socrates； I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right
opinion…or why they should ever differ。
Soc。 And shall I explain this wonder to you？
Men。 Do tell me。
Soc。 You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of
Daedalus； but perhaps you have not got them in your country？
Men。 What have they to do with the question？
Soc。 Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them；
and if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away。
Men。 Well。 what of that？
Soc。 I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if
they are at liberty； for they will walk off like runaway slaves； but
when fastened； they are of great value； for they are really
beautiful works of art。 Now this is an illustration of the nature of
true opinions： while they abide with us they are beautiful and
fruitful； but they run away out of the human soul； and do not remain
long； and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened
by the tie of the cause； and this fastening of them； friend Meno； is
recollection； as you and I have agreed to call it。 But when they are
bound； in the first place； they have the nature of knowledge； and；
in the second place； they are abiding。 And this is why knowledge is
more honourable and excellent than true opinion； because fastened by a
chain。
Men。 What you are saying； Socrates； seems to be very like the truth。
Soc。 I too speak rather in ignorance； I only conjecture。 And yet
that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture
with me。 There are not many things which I profess to know； but this
is most certainly one of them。
Men。 Yes； Socrates； and you are quite right in saying so。
Soc。 And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading the
way perfects action quite as well as knowledge？
Men。 There again； Socrates； I think you are right。
Soc。 Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge； or less
useful in action； nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to him
who has knowledge？
Men。 True。
Soc。 And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be
useful？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 Seeing then that men become good and useful to states； not only
because they have knowledge； but because they have right opinion；
and that neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature
or acquired by him…（do you imagine either of them to be given by
nature？
Men。 Not I。）
Soc。 Then if they are not given by nature； neither are the good by
nature good？
Men。 Certainly not。
Soc。 And nature being excluded； then came the question whether
virtue is acquired by teaching？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 If virtue was wisdom ＇or knowledge＇； then； as we thought； it
was taught？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And if it was taught it was wisdom？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 And if there were teachers； it might be taught； and if there
were no teachers； not？
Men。 True。
Soc。 But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of
virtue？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 Then we acknowledged that it was not taught； and was not
wisdom？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 And yet we admitted that it was a good？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And the right guide is useful and good？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 And the only right guides are knowledge and true
opinion…these are the guides of man； for things which happen by chance
are not under the guidance of man： but the guides of man are true
opinion and knowledge。
Men。 I think so too。
Soc。 But if virtue is not taught； neither is virtue knowledge。
Men。 Clearly not。
Soc。 Then of two good and useful things； one； which is knowledge；
has been set aside； and cannot be supposed to be our guide in
political life。
Men。 I think not。
Soc。 And therefore not by any wisdom； and not because they were
wise； did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke govern
states。 This was the reason why they were unable to make others like
themselves…because their virtue was not grounded on knowledge。
Men。 That is probably true； Socrates。
Soc。 But if not by knowledge； the only alternative which remains
is that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion； which is
in politics what divination is in religion； for diviners and also
prophets say many things truly； but they know not what they say。
Men。 So I believe。
Soc。 And may we not； Meno； truly call those men 〃divine〃 who； having
no understanding； yet succeed in many a grand deed and word？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 Then we shall also be right in calling divine those whom we
were just now speaking of as diviners and prophets； including the
whole tribe of poets。 Yes； and statesmen above all may be said to be
divine and illumined； being inspired and possessed of God； in which
condition they say many grand things； not knowing what they say。
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And the women too； Meno； call good men divine…do they not？
and the Spartans； when they praise a good man； say 〃that he is a
divine man。〃
Men。 And I think； Socrates； that they are right； although very
likely our friend Anytus may take offence at the word。
Soc。 I da not care； as for Anytus； there will be another opportunity
of talking with him。 To sum up our enquiry…the result seems to be；
if we are at all right in our view； that virtue is neither natural nor
acquired； but an instinct given by God to the virtuous。 Nor is the
instinct accompanied by reason； unless there may be supposed to be
among statesmen some one who is capable of educating statesmen。 And if
there be such an one； he may be said to be among the living what Homer
says that Tiresias was among the dead； 〃he alone has understanding；
but the rest are flitting shades〃； and he and his virtue in like
manner will be a reality among s
