meno-第5节
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
Boy。 Yes。
Soc。 And are there not here four equal lines which contain this
space？
Boy。 There are。
Soc。 Look and see how much this space is。
Boy。 I do not understand。
Soc。 Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces？
Boy。 Yes。
Soc。 And how many spaces are there in this section？
Boy。 Four。
Soc。 And how many in this？
Boy。 Two。
Soc。 And four is how many times two？
Boy。 Twice。
Soc。 And this space is of how many feet？
Boy。 Of eight feet。
Soc。 And from what line do you get this figure？
Boy。 From this。
Soc。 That is； from the line which extends from corner to corner of
the figure of four feet？
Boy。 Yes。
Soc。 And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal。 And
if this is the proper name； then you； Meno's slave； are prepared to
affirm that the double space is the square of the diagonal？
Boy。 Certainly； Socrates。
Soc。 What do you say of him； Meno？ Were not all these answers
given out of his own head？
Men。 Yes； they were all his own。
Soc。 And yet； as we were just now saying； he did not know？
Men。 True。
Soc。 But still he had in him those notions of his…had he not？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 Then he who does not know may still have true notions of that
which he does not know？
Men。 He has。
Soc。 And at present these notions have just been stirred up in
him； as in a dream； but if he were frequently asked the same
questions； in different forms； he would know as well as any one at
last？
Men。 I dare say。
Soc。 Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge
for himself； if he is only asked questions？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is
recollection？
Men。 True。
Soc。 And this knowledge which he now has must he not either have
acquired or always possessed？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 But if he always possessed this knowledge he would always
have known； or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have
acquired it in this life； unless he has been taught geometry； for he
may be made to do the same with all geometry and every other branch of
knowledge。 Now； has any one ever taught him all this？ You must know
about him； if； as you say； he was born and bred in your house。
Men。 And I am certain that no one ever did teach him。
Soc。 And yet he has the knowledge？
Men。 The fact； Socrates； is undeniable。
Soc。 But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life； then he
must have had and learned it at some other time？
Men。 Clearly he must。
Soc。 Which must have been the time when he was not a man？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And if there have been always true thoughts in him； both at the
time when he was and was not a man； which only need to be awakened
into knowledge by putting questions to him； his soul must have
always possessed this knowledge； for he always either was or was not a
man？
Men。 Obviously。
Soc。 And if the truth of all things always existed in the soul； then
the soul is immortal。 Wherefore be of good cheer； and try to recollect
what you do not know； or rather what you do not remember。
Men。 I feel； somehow； that I like what you are saying。
Soc。 And I； Meno； like what I am saying。 Some things I have said
of which I am not altogether confident。 But that we shall be better
and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire；
than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there
was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know；…that
is a theme upon which I am ready to fight； in word and deed； to the
utmost of my power。
Men。 There again； Socrates； your words seem to me excellent。
Soc。 Then； as we are agreed that a man should enquire about that
which he does not know； shall you and I make an effort to enquire
together into the nature of virtue？
Men。 By all means； Socrates。 And yet I would much rather return to
my original question； Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we should
regard it as a thing to be taught； or as a gift of nature； or as
coming to men in some other way？
Soc。 Had I the command of you as well as of myself； Meno； I would
not have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not； until
we had first ascertained 〃what it is。〃 But as you think only of
controlling me who am your slave； and never of controlling
yourself；…such being your notion of freedom； I must yield to you；
for you are irresistible。 And therefore I have now to enquire into the
qualities of a thing of which I do not as yet know the nature。 At
any rate； will you condescend a little； and allow the question
〃Whether virtue is given by instruction； or in any other way；〃 to be
argued upon hypothesis？ As the geometrician； when he is asked
whether a certain triangle is capable being inscribed in a certain
circle； will reply： 〃I cannot tell you as yet； but I will offer a
hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion： If the
figure be such that when you have produced a given side of it； the
given area of the triangle falls short by an area corresponding to the
part produced； then one consequence follows； and if this is impossible
then some other； and therefore I wish to assume a hypothesis before
I tell you whether this triangle is capable of being inscribed in
the circle〃：…that is a geometrical hypothesis。 And we too； as we
know not the nature and …qualities of virtue； must ask； whether virtue
is or not taught； under a hypothesis： as thus； if virtue is of such
a class of mental goods； will it be taught or not？ Let the first
hypothesis be…that virtue is or is not knowledge；…in that case will it
be taught or not？ or； as we were just now saying； remembered〃？ For
there is no use in disputing about the name。 But is virtue taught or
not？ or rather； does not everyone see that knowledge alone is taught？
Men。 I agree。
Soc。 Then if virtue is knowledge； virtue will be taught？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 Then now we have made a quick end of this question： if virtue
is of such a nature； it will be taught； and if not； not？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 The next question is； whether virtue is knowledge or of another
species？
Men。 Yes； that appears to be the …question which comes next in
order。
Soc。 Do we not say that virtue is a good？…This is a hypothesis which
is not set aside。
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 Now； if there be any sort…of good which is distinct from
knowledge； virtue may be that good； but if knowledge embraces all
good； then we shall be right in think in that virtue is knowledge？
Men。 True。
Soc。 And virtue makes us good？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And if we are good； then we are profitable； for all good things
are profitable？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 Then virtue is profitable？
Men。 That is the only inference。
Soc。 Then now let us see what are the things which severally
profit us。 Health and strength； and beauty and wealth…these； and the
like of these； we call profitable？
Men。 True。
Soc。 And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm： would you
not think so？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable
or the reverse？ Are they not profitable when they are rightly used；
and hurtful when they are not rightly used？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 Next； let us consider the goods of the soul： they are
temperance； justice； courage； quickness of apprehension； memory；
magnanimity； and the like？
Men。 Surely。
Soc。 And such of these as are not knowledge； but of another sort；
are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful； as； for example；
courage wanting prudence； which is only a sort of confidence？ When a
man has no sense he is harmed by courage； but when he has sense he
is profited？
Men。 True。
Soc。 And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of
apprehension； whatever things are learned or done with sense are
profitable； but when done without sense they are hurtful？
Men。 Very true。
Soc。 And in general； all that the attempts or endures； when under
the guidance of wisdom； ends in happiness； but when she is under the
guidance of folly； in the opposite？
Men。 That appears to be true。
Soc。 If then virtue is a quality of the soul； and is admitted to
be profitable； it must be wisdom or prudence； since none of the things
of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves； but they
are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of
folly； and therefore and therefore if virtue is profitable； virtue
must be a sort of wisdom or prudence？
Men。 I quite agree。
Soc。 And the other goods； such
