meno-第3节
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good know that they are evils？
Men。 Certainly not。
Soc。 Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature
do not desire them； but they desire what they suppose to be goods
although they are really evils； and if they are mistaken and suppose
the evils to be good they really desire goods？
Men。 Yes； in that case。
Soc。 Well； and do those who； as you say； desire evils； and think
that evils are hurtful to the possessor of them； know that they will
be hurt by them？
Men。 They must know it。
Soc。 And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable
in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them？
Men。 How can it be otherwise？
Soc。 But are not the miserable ill…fated？
Men。 Yes； indeed。
Soc。 And does any one desire to be miserable and ill…fated？
Men。 I should say not； Socrates。
Soc。 But if there is no one who desires to be miserable； there is no
one； Meno； who desires evil； for what is misery but the desire and
possession of evil？
Men。 That appears to be the truth； Socrates； and I admit that nobody
desires evil。
Soc。 And yet； were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire
and power of attaining good？
Men。 Yes； I did say so。
Soc。 But if this be affirmed； then the desire of good is common to
all； and one man is no better than another in that respect？
Men。 True。
Soc。 And if one man is not better than another in desiring good；
he must be better in the power of attaining it？
Men。 Exactly。
Soc。 Then； according to your definition； virtue would appear to be
the power of attaining good？
Men。 I entirely approve； Socrates； of the manner in which you now
view this matter。
Soc。 Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point
of view； for very likely you may be right：…You affirm virtue to be the
power of attaining goods？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And the goods which mean are such as health and wealth and
the possession of gold and silver； and having office and honour in the
state…those are what you would call goods？
Men。 Yes； I should include all those。
Soc。 Then； according to Meno； who is the hereditary friend of the
great king； virtue is the power of getting silver and gold； and
would you add that they must be gained piously； justly； or do you deem
this to be of no consequence？ And is any mode of acquisition； even
if unjust and dishonest； equally to be deemed virtue？
Men。 Not virtue； Socrates； but vice。
Soc。 Then justice or temperance or holiness； or some other part of
virtue； as would appear； must accompany the acquisition； and without
them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue。
Men。 Why； how can there be virtue without these？
Soc。 And the non…acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest
manner for oneself or another； or in other words the want of them； may
be equally virtue？
Men。 True。
Soc。 Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the
non…acquisition and want of them； but whatever is accompanied by
justice or honesty is virtue； and whatever is devoid of justice is
vice。
Men。 It cannot be otherwise； in my judgment。
Soc。 And were we not saying just now that justice； temperance； and
the like； were each of them a part of virtue？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And so； Meno； this is the way in which you mock me。
Men。 Why do you say that； Socrates？
Soc。 Why； because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands
whole and unbroken； and I gave you a pattern according to which you
were to frame your answer； and you have forgotten already； and tell me
that virtue is the power of attaining good justly； or with justice；
and justice you acknowledge to be a part of virtue。
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 Then it follows from your own admissions； that virtue is
doing what you do with a part of virtue； for justice and the like
are said by you to be parts of virtue。
Men。 What of that？
Soc。 What of that！ Why； did not I ask you to tell me the nature of
virtue as a whole？ And you are very far from telling me this； but
declare every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue；
as though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue；
and this too when frittered away into little pieces。 And； therefore；
my dear I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question：
What is virtue？ for otherwise； I can only say； that every action
done with a part of virtue is virtue； what else is the meaning of
saying that every action done with justice is virtue？ Ought I not to
ask the question over again； for can any one who does not know
virtue know a part of virtue？
Men。 No； I do not say that he can。
Soc。 Do you remember how； in the example of figure； we rejected any
answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted？
Men。 Yes； Socrates； and we were quite right in doing so。
Soc。 But then； my friend； do not suppose that we can explain to any
one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion
of virtue； or anything at all in that fashion； we should only have
to ask over again the old question； What is virtue？ Am I not right？
Men。 I believe that you are。
Soc。 Then begin again； and answer me； What； according to you and
your friend Gorgias； is the definition of virtue？
Men。 O Socrates； I used to be told； before I knew you； that you
were always doubting yourself and making others doubt； and now you are
casting your spells over me； and I am simply getting bewitched and
enchanted； and am at my wits' end。 And if I may venture to make a jest
upon you； you seem to me both in your appearance and in your power
over others to be very like the flat torpedo fish； who torpifies those
who come near him and touch him； as you have now torpified me； I
think。 For my soul and my tongue are really torpid； and I do not
know how to answer you； and though I have been delivered of an
infinite variety of speeches about virtue before now； and to many
persons…and very good ones they were； as I thought…at this moment I
cannot even say what virtue is。 And I think that。 you are very wise in
not voyaging and going away from home； for if you did in other
places as do in Athens； you would be cast into prison as a magician。
Soc。 You are a rogue； Meno； and had all but caught me。
Men。 What do you mean； Socrates？
Soc。 I can tell why you made a simile about me。
Men。 Why？
Soc。 In order that I might make another simile about you。 For I know
that all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty similes made about
them…as well they may…but I shall not return the compliment。 As to
my being a torpedo； if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of
torpidity in others； then indeed I am a torpedo； but not otherwise；
for I perplex others； not because I am clear； but because I am utterly
perplexed myself。 And now I know not what virtue is； and you seem to
be in the same case； although you did once perhaps know before you
touched me。 However； I have no objection to join with you in the
enquiry。
Men。 And how will you enquire； Socrates； into that which you do
not know？ What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry？ And if
you find what you want； how will you ever know that this is the
thing which you did not know？
Soc。 I know； Meno； what you mean； but just see what a tiresome
dispute you are introducing。 You argue that man cannot enquire
either about that which he knows； or about that which he does not
know； for if he knows； he has no need to enquire； and if not； he
cannot； for he does not know the； very subject about which he is to
enquire。
Men。 Well； Socrates； and is not the argument sound？
Soc。 I think not。
Men。 Why not？
Soc。 I will tell you why： I have heard from certain wise men and
women who spoke of things divine that…
Men。 What did they say？
Soc。 They spoke of a glorious truth； as I conceive。
Men。 What was it？ and who were they？
Soc。 Some of them were priests and priestesses； who had studied
how they might be able to give a reason of their profession： there；
have been poets also； who spoke of these things by inspiration； like
Pindar； and many others who were inspired。 And they say…mark； now； and
see whether their words are true…they say that the soul of man is
immortal； and at one time has an end； which is termed dying； and at
another time is born again； but is never destroyed。 And the moral
is； that a man ought to live always in perfect holiness。 〃For in the
ninth year Persephone sends the souls of those from whom she has
received the penalty of ancient crime back again from beneath into the
light of the sun above； and these are they who be
