meno-第2节
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attempt to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things。
Soc。 No wonder； but I will try to get nearer if I can； for you
know that all things have a common notion。 Suppose now that some one
asked you the question which I asked before： Meno； he would say；
what is figure？ And if you answered 〃roundness；〃 he would reply to
you； in my way of speaking； by asking whether you would say that
roundness is 〃figure〃 or 〃a figure〃； and you would answer 〃a figure。〃
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 And for this reason…that there are other figures？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And if he proceeded to ask； What other figures are there？ you
would have told him。
Men。 I should。
Soc。 And if he similarly asked what colour is； and you answered
whiteness； and the questioner rejoined； Would you say that whiteness
is colour or a colour？ you would reply； A colour； because there are
other colours as well。
Men。 I should。
Soc。 And if he had said； Tell me what they are？…you would have
told him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness。
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way； he
would say： Ever and anon we are landed in particulars； but this is not
what I want； tell me then； since you call them by a common name； and
say that they are all figures； even when opposed to one another；
what is that common nature which you designate as figure…which
contains straight as well as round； and is no more one than the
other…that would be your mode of speaking？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And in speaking thus； you do not mean to say that the round
is round any more than straight； or the straight any more straight
than round？
Men。 Certainly not。
Soc。 You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than
the straight； or the straight than the round？
Men。 Very true。
Soc。 To what then do we give the name of figure？ Try and answer。
Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure
or colour； you were to reply； Man； I do not understand what you
want； or know what you are saying； he would look rather astonished and
say： Do you not understand that I am looking for the 〃simile in
multis〃？ And then he might put the question in another form： Mono；
he might say； what is that 〃simile in multis〃 which you call figure；
and which includes not only round and straight figures； but all？ Could
you not answer that question； Meno？ I wish that you would try； the
attempt will be good practice with a view to the answer about virtue。
Men。 I would rather that you should answer； Socrates。
Soc。 Shall I indulge you？
Men。 By all means。
Soc。 And then you will tell me about virtue？
Men。 I will。
Soc。 Then I must do my best； for there is a prize to be won。
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 Well； I will try and explain to you what figure is。 What do you
say to this answer？…Figure is the only thing which always follows
colour。 Will you be satisfied with it； as I am sure that I should
be； if you would let me have a similar definition of virtue？
Men。 But； Socrates； it is such a simple answer。
Soc。 Why simple？
Men。 Because； according to you； figure is that which always
follows colour。
（Soc。 Granted。）
Men。 But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour
is； any more than what figure is…what sort of answer would you have
given him？
Soc。 I should have told him the truth。 And if he were a
philosopher of the eristic and antagonistic sort； I should say to him：
You have my answer； and if I am wrong； your business is to take up the
argument and refute me。 But if we were friends； and were talking as
you and I are now； I should reply in a milder strain and more in the
dialectician's vein； that is to say； I should not only speak the
truth； but I should make use of premisses which the person
interrogated would be willing to admit。 And this is the way in which I
shall endeavour to approach you。 You will acknowledge； will you not；
that there is such a thing as an end； or termination； or
extremity？…all which words use in the same sense； although I am
aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about them： but still you；
I am sure； would speak of a thing as ended or terminated…that is all
which I am saying…not anything very difficult。
Men。 Yes； I should； and I believe that I understand your meaning。
Soc。 And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid； as for
example in geometry。
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 Well then； you are now in a condition to understand my
definition of figure。 I define figure to be that in which the solid
ends； or； more concisely； the limit of solid。
Men。 And now； Socrates； what is colour？
Soc。 You are outrageous； Meno； in thus plaguing a poor old man to
give you an answer； when you will not take the trouble of
remembering what is Gorgias' definition of virtue。
Men。 When you have told me what I ask； I will tell you； Socrates。
Soc。 A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking； and
he would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers。
Men。 Why do you think so？
Soc。 Why； because you always speak in imperatives： like all beauties
when they are in their prime； you are tyrannical； and also； as I
suspect； you have found out that I have weakness for the fair； and
therefore to humour you I must answer。
Men。 Please do。
Soc。 Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias；
which is familiar to you？
Men。 I should like nothing better。
Soc。 Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain
effluences of existence？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 And passages into which and through which the effluences pass？
Men。 Exactly。
Soc。 And some of the effluences fit into the passages； and some of
them are too small or too large？
Men。 True。
Soc。 And there is such a thing as sight？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And now； as Pindar says； 〃read my meaning〃 colour is an
effluence of form； commensurate with sight； and palpable to sense。
Men。 That； Socrates； appears to me to be an admirable answer。
Soc。 Why； yes； because it happens to be one which you have been in
the habit of hearing： and your wit will have discovered； I suspect；
that you may explain in the same way the nature of sound and smell；
and of many other similar phenomena。
Men。 Quite true。
Soc。 The answer； Meno； was in the orthodox solemn vein； and
therefore was more acceptable to you than the other answer about
figure。
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 And yet； O son of Alexidemus； I cannot help thinking that the
other was the better； and I am sure that you would be of the same
opinion； if you would only stay and be initiated； and were not
compelled； as you said yesterday； to go away before the mysteries。
Men。 But I will stay； Socrates； if you will give me many such
answers。
Soc。 Well then； for my own sake as well as for yours； I will do my
very best； but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very
many as good： and now； in your turn； you are to fulfil your promise；
and tell me what virtue is in the universal； and do not make a
singular into a plural； as the facetious say of those who break a
thing； but deliver virtue to me whole and sound； and not broken into a
number of pieces： I have given you the pattern。
Men。 Well then； Socrates； virtue； as I take it； is when he； who
desires the honourable； is able to provide it for himself； so the poet
says； and I say too…
Virtue is the desire of things honourable and the power of
attaining them。
Soc。 And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good？
Men。 Certainly。
Soc。 Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire
the good？ Do not all men； my dear sir； desire good？
Men。 I think not。
Soc。 There are some who desire evil？
Men。 Yes。
Soc。 Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire； to
be good； or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them？
Men。 Both； I think。
Soc。 And do you really imagine； Meno； that a man knows evils to be
evils and desires them notwithstanding？
Men。 Certainly I do。
Soc。 And desire is of possession？
Men。 Yes； of possession。
Soc。 And does he think that the evils will do good to him who
possesses them； or does he know that they will do him harm？
Men。 There are some who think that the evils will do them good；
and others who know that they will do them harm。
Soc。 And； in your opinion； do those who think that they will do them
good know that they are evils？
Men。 Certainly not。
Soc。 Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature
do not
