three dialogues-第22节

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　　　　　。　May　we　not　understand　it　to　have　been　entirely　in
respect　of　finite　spirits；　so　that　things；　with　regard　to　us；　may
properly　be　said　to　begin　their　existence；　or　be　created；　when
God　decreed　they　should　become　perceptible　to　intelligent
creatures；　in　that　order　and　manner　which　He　then　established；
and　we　now　call　the　laws　of　nature？　You　may　call　this　a
；　　if　you　please。　But；　so
long　as　it　supplies　us　with　the　most　natural；　obvious；　and
literal　sense　of　the　Mosaic　history　of　the　creation；　so　long　as
it　answers　all　the　religious　ends　of　that　great　article；　in　a
word；　so　long　as　you　can　assign　no　other　sense　or　meaning　in　its
stead；　why　should　we　reject　this？　Is　it　to　comply　with　a
ridiculous　sceptical　humour　of　making　everything　nonsense　and
unintelligible？　I　am　sure　you　cannot　say　it　is　for　the　glory　of
God。　For；　allowing　it　to　be　a　thing　possible　and　conceivable　that
the　corporeal　world　should　have　an　absolute　existence　extrinsical
to　the　mind　of　God；　as　well　as　to　the　minds　of　all　created
spirits；　yet　how　could　this　set　forth　either　the　immensity　or
omniscience　of　the　Deity；　or　the　necessary　and　immediate
dependence　of　all　｛254｝　things　on　Him？　Nay；　would　it　not　rather
seem　to　derogate　from　those　attributes？

　　　　　。　Well；　but　as　to　this　decree　of　God's；　for　making
things　perceptible；　what　say　you；　Philonous？　Is　it　not　plain；　God
did　either　execute　that　decree　from　all　eternity；　or　at　some
certain　time　began　to　will　what　He　had　not　actually　willed
before；　but　only　designed　to　will？　If　the　former；　then　there
could　be　no　creation；　or　beginning　of　existence；　in　finite
things。　If　the　latter；　then　we　must　acknowledge　something　new　to
befall　the　Deity；　which　implies　a　sort　of　change：　and　all　change
argues　imperfection。

　　　　　。　Pray　consider　what　you　are　doing。　Is　it　not　evident
this　objection　concludes　equally　against　a　creation　in　any　sense；
nay；　against　every　other　act　of　the　Deity；　discoverable　by　the
light　of　nature？　None　of　which　can　　conceive；　otherwise　than
as　performed　in　time；　and　having　a　beginning。　God　is　a　Being　of
transcerident　and　unlimited　perfections：　His　nature；　therefore；
is　incomprehensible　to　finite　spirits。　It　is　not；　therefore；　to
be　expected；　that　any　man；　whether　Materialist　or　Immaterialist；
should　have　exactly　just　notions　of　the　Deity；　His　attributes；
and　ways　of　operation。　If　then　you　would　infer　anything　against
me；　your　difficulty　must　not　be　drawn　from　the　inadequateness　of
our　conceptions　of　the　Divine　nature；　which　is　unavoidable　on　any
scheme；　but　from　the　denial　of　Matter；　of　which　there　is　not　one
word；　directly　or　indirectly；　in　what　you　have　now　objected。

　　　　　。　I　must　acknowledge　the　difficulties　you　are　concerned
to　clear　are　such　only　as　arise　from　the　non…existence　of　Matter；
and　are　peculiar　to　that　notion。　So　far　you　are　in　the　right。　But
I　cannot　by　any　means　bring　myself　to　think　there　is　no　such
peculiar　repugnancy　between　the　creation　and　your　opinion；　though
indeed　where　to　fix　it；　I　do　not　distinctly　know。

　　　　　。　What　would　you　have？　Do　I　not　acknowledge　a　twofold
state　of　things　　the　one　ectypal　or　natural；　the　other
archetypal　and　eternal？　The　former　was　created　in　time；　the
latter　existed　from　everlasting　in　the　mind　of　God。　Is　not　this
agreeable　to　the　common　notions　of　divines？　or；　is　any　more　than
this　necessary　in　order　to　conceive　the　creation？　But　you　suspect
some　peculiar　repugnancy；　though　you　know　not　where　it　lies。　To
take　away　all　possibility　of　scruple　in　the　case；　do　but　consider
this　one　point。　Either　you　are　not　able　to　conceive　｛255｝　the
Creation　on　any　hypothesis　whatsoever；　and；　if　so；　there　is　no
ground　for　dislike　or　complaint　against　any　particular　opinion　on
that　score：　or　you　are　able　to　conceive　it；　and；　if　so；　why　not
on　my　Principles；　since　thereby　nothing　conceivable　is　taken
away？　You　have　all　along　been　allowed　the　full　scope　of　sense；
imagination；　and　reason。　Whatever；　therefore；　you　could　before
apprehend；　either　immediately　or　mediately　by　your　senses；　or　by
ratiocination　from　your　senses；　whatever　you　could　perceive；
imagine；　or　understand；　remains　still　with　you。　If；　therefore；
the　notion　you　have　of　the　creation　by　other　Principles　be
intelligible；　you　have　it　still　upon　mine；　if　it　be　not
intelligible；　I　conceive　it　to　be　no　notion　at　all；　and　so　there
is　no　loss　of　it。　And　indeed　it　seems　to　me　very　plain　that　the
supposition　of　Matter；　that　is　a　thing　perfectly　unknown　and
inconceivable；　cannot　serve　to　make　us　conceive　anything。　And；　I
hope　it　need　not　be　proved　to　you　that　if　the　existence　of　Matter
doth　not　make　the　creation　conceivable；　the　creation's　being
without　it　inconceivable　can　be　no　objection　against　its　non…
existence。

　　　　　。　I　confess；　Philonous；　you　have　almost　satisfied　me　in
this　point　of　the　creation。

　　　　　。　I　would　fain　know　why　you　are　not　quite　satisfied。
You　tell　me　indeed　of　a　repugnancy　between　the　Mosaic　history　and
Immaterialism：　but　you　know　not　where　it　lies。　Is　this
reasonable；　Hylas？　Can　you　expect　I　should　solve　a　difficulty
without　knowing　what　it　is？　But；　to　pass　by　all　that；　would　not　a
man　think　you　were　assured　there　is　no　repugnancy　between　the
received　notions　of　Materialists　and　the　inspired　writings？

　　　　　。　And　so　I　am。

　　　　　。　Ought　the　historical　part　of　Scripture　to　be
understood　in　a　plain　obvious　sense；　or　in　a　sense　which　is
metaphysical　and　out　of　the　way？

　　　　　。　In　the　plain　sense；　doubtless。

　　　　　。　When　Moses　speaks　of　herbs；　earth；　water；　&c。　as
having　been　created　by　God；　think　you　not　the　sensible　things
commonly　signified　by　those　words　are　suggested　to　every
unphilosophical　reader？

　　　　　。　I　cannot　help　thinking　so。

　　　　　。　And　are　not　all　ideas；　or　things　perceived　by　sense；
to　be　denied　a　real　existence　by　the　doctrine　of　the　Materialist？

　　　　　。　This　I　have　already　acknowledged。

　　　　　。　The　creation；　therefore；　according　to　them；　was　not
｛256｝　the　creation　of　things　sensible；　which　have　only　a　relative
being；　but　of　certain　unknown　natures；　which　have　an　absolute
being；　wherein　creation　might　terminate？

　　　　　。　True。

　　　　　。　Is　it　not　therefore　evident　the　assertors　of　Matter
destroy　the　plain　obvious　sense　of　Moses；　with　which　their
notions　are　utterly　inconsistent；　and　instead　of　it　obtrude　on　us
I　know　not　what；　something　equally　unintelligible　to　themselves
and　me？

　　　　　。　I　cannot　contradict　you。

　　　　　。　Moses　tells　us　of　a　creation。　A　creation　of　what？　of
unknown　quiddities；　of　occasions；　or　？　No；　certainly；
but　of　things　obvious　to　the　senses。　You　must　first　reconcile
this　with　your　notions；　if　you　expect　I　should　be　reconciled　to
them。

　　　　　。　I　see　you　can　assault　me　with　my　own　weapons。

　　　　　。　Then　as　to　；　was　there　ever
known　a　more　jejune　notion　than　that？　Something　it　is　so
abstracted　and　unintelligible　that　you　have　frankly　owned　you
could　not　conceive　it；　much　less　explain　anything　by　it。　But
allowing　Matter　to　exist；　and　the　notion　of　absolute　existence　to
be　clear　as　light；　yet；　was　this　ever　known　to　make　the　creation
more　credible？　Nay；　hath　it　not　furnished　the　atheists　and
infidels　of　all　ages　with　the　most　plausible　arguments　against　a
creation？　That　a　corporeal　substance；　which　hath　an　absolute
existence　without　the　minds　of　spirits；　should　be　produced　out　of
nothing；　by　the　mere　will　of　a　Spirit；　hath　been　looked　upon　as　a
thing　so　contrary　to　all　reason；　so　impossible　and　absurd！　that
not　only　the　most　celebrated　among　the　ancients；　but　even　divers
modern　and　Christian　philosophers　have　thought　Matter　co…eternal
with　the　Deity。　Lay　these　things　together；　and　then　judge　you
whether　Materialism　disposes　men　to　believe　the　creation　of
things。

　　　　　。　I　own；　Philonous；　I　think　it　does　not。　This　of　the
　is　the　last　objection　I　can　think　of；　and　I　must　needs
own　it　hath　been　sufficiently　answered　as　well　as　the　rest。
Nothing　now　remains　to　be　overcome　but　a　sort　of　unaccountable
backwardness　that　I　find　in　myself　towards　your　notions。

　　　　　。　When　a　man　is　swayed；　he　knows　not　why；　to　one　side
of'　the　question；　can　this；　think　you；　be　anything　else　but　the
effect　of　prejudice；　which　never　fails　to　attend　old　and　rooted
｛257｝　notions？　And　indeed　in　this　respect　I　cannot　deny　the
belief　of　Matter　to　have　very　much　the　advantage　over　the
contrary　opinion；　with　men　of　a　learned；　education。

　　　　　。　I　confess　it　seems　to　be　as　you　say。

　　　　　。　As　a　balance；　therefore；　to　this　weight　of
prejudice；　let　us　throw　into　the　scale　the　great　advantages　that
arise　from　the　belief　of　Immaterialism；　both　in　regard　to
religion　and　human　learning。　The　being　of　a　God；　and
incorruptibility　of　the　soul；　those　great　articles　of　religion；
are　they　not　proved　with　the　clearest　and　most　immediate
evidence？　When　I　say　the　being　of　a　God；　I　do　not　mean　an　obscure
general　Cause　of　things；　whereof　we　have　no　conception；　but　God；
in　the　strict　and　proper　sense　of　the　word。　A　Being　whose
spirituality；