three dialogues-第15节

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pursuit　of　it；　when；　alas　I　we　know　nothing　all　the　while：　nor　do
I　think　it　possible　for　us　ever　to　know　anything　in　this　life。
Our　faculties　are　too　narrow　and　too　few。　Nature　certainly　never
intended　us　for　speculation。

　　　　　。　What！　Say　you　we　can　know　nothing；　Hylas？

　　　　　。　There　is　not　that　single　thing　in　the　world　whereof
we　can　know　the　real　nature；　or　what　it　is　in　itself。

　　　　　。　Will　you　tell　me　I　do　not　really　know　what　fire　or
water　is？

　　　　　。　You　may　indeed　know　that　fire　appears　hot；　and　water
fluid；　but　this　is　no　more　than　knowing　what　sensations　are
produced　in　your　own　mind；　upon　the　application　of　fire　and　water
to　your　organs　of　sense。　Their　internal　constitution；　their　true
and　real　nature；　you　are　utterly　in　the　dark　as　to　。

　　　　　。　Do　I　not　know　this　to　be　a　real　stone　that　I　stand
on；　and　that　which　I　see　before　my　eyes　to　be　a　real　tree？

　　　　　。　？　No；　it　is　impossible　you　or　any　man　alive
should　know　it。　All　you　know　is；　that　you　have　such　a　certain
idea　or　appearance　in　your　own　mind。　But　what　is　this　to　the　real
tree　or　stone？　I　tell　you　that　colour；　figure；　and　hardness；
which　you　perceive；　are　not　the　real　natures　of　those　things；　or
in　the　least　like　them。　The　same　may　be　said　of　all　other　real
things；　or　corporeal　substances；　which　compose　the　world。　They
have　none　of　them　anything　of　themselves；　like　those　sensible
qualities　by　us　perceived。　We　should　not　therefore　pretend　to
affirm　or　know　anything　of　them；　as　they　are　in　their　own　nature。

　　　　　。　But　surely；　Hylas；　I　can　distinguish　gold；　for
example；　｛228｝　from　iron：　and　how　could　this　be；　if　I　knew　not
what　either　truly　was？

　　　　　。　Believe　me；　Philonous；　you　can　only　distinguish
between　your　own　ideas。　That　yellowness；　that　weight；　and　other
sensible　qualities；　think　you　they　are　really　in　the　gold？　They
are　only　relative　to　the　senses；　and　have　no　absolute　existence
in　nature。　And　in　pretending　to　distinguish　the　species　of　real
things；　by　the　appearances　in　your　mind；　you　may　perhaps　act　as
wisely　as　he　that　should　conclude　two　men　were　of　a　different
species；　because　their　clothes　were　not　of　the　same　colour。

　　　　　。　It　seems；　then；　we　are　altogether　put　off　with　the
appearances　of　things；　and　those　false　ones　too。　The　very　meat　I
eat；　and　the　cloth　I　wear；　have　nothing　in　them　like　what　I　see
and　feel。

　　　　　。　Even　so。

　　　　　。　But　is　it　not　strange　the　whole　world　should　be　thus
imposed　on；　and　so　foolish　as　to　believe　their　senses？　And　yet　I
know　not　how　it　is；　but　men　eat；　and　drink；　and　sleep；　and
perform　all　the　offices　of　life；　as　comfortably　and　conveniently
as　if　they　really　knew　the　things　they　are　conversant　about。

　　　　　。　They　do　so：　but　you　know　ordinary　practice　does　not
require　a　nicety　of　speculative　knowledge。　Hence　the　vulgar
retain　their　mistakes；　and　for　all　that　make　a　shift　to　bustle
through　the　affairs　of　life。　But　philosophers　know　better　things。

　　　　　。　You　mean；　they　　that　they　。

　　　　　。　That　is　the　very　top　and　perfection　of　human
knowledge。

　　　　　。　But　are　you　all　this　while　in　earnest；　Hylas；　and
are　you　seriously　persuaded　that　you　know　nothing　real　in　the
world？　Suppose　you　are　going　to　write；　would　you　not　call　for
pen；　ink；　and　paper；　like　another　man；　and　do　you　not　know　what
it　is　you　call　for？

　　　　　。　How　often　must　I　tell　you；　that　I　know　not　the　real
nature　of　any　one　thing　in　the　universe？　I　may　indeed　upon
occasion　make　use　of　pen；　ink；　and　paper。　But　what　any　one　of
them　is　in　its　own　true　nature；　I　declare　positively　I　know　not。
And　the　same　is　true　with　regard　to　every；　other　corporeal　thing。
And；　what　is　more；　we　are　not　only　ignorant　of　the　true　and　real
nature　of　things；　but　even　of　their　existence。　It　cannot　be
denied　that　we　perceive　such　certain　appearances　or　ideas；　but　it
cannot　be　concluded　from　thence　that　bodies　really　exist。　｛229｝
Nay；　now　I　think　on　it；　I　must；　agreeably　to　my　former
concessions；　farther　declare　that　it　is　impossible　any　
corporeal　thing　should　exist　in　nature。

　　　　　。　You　amaze　me。　Was　ever　anything　more　wild　and
extravagant　than　the　notions　you　now　maintain：　and　is　it　not
evident　you　are　led　into　all　these　extravagances　by　the　belief　of
？　This　makes　you　dream　of　those　unknown
natures　in　everything。　It　is　this　occasions　your　distinguishing
between　the　reality　and　sensible　appearances　of　things。　It　is　to
this　you　are　indebted　for　being　ignorant　of　what　everybody　else
knows　perfectly　well。　Nor　is　this　all：　you　are　not　only　ignorant
of　the　true　nature　of　everything；　but　you　know　not　whether
anything　really　exists；　or　whether　there　are　any　true　natures　at
all；　forasmuch　as　you　attribute　to　your　material　beings　an
absolute　or　external　existence；　wherein　you　suppose　their　reality
consists。　And；　as　you　are　forced　in　the　end　to　acknowledge　such
an　existence　means　either　a　direct　repugnancy；　or　nothing　at　all；
it　follows　that　you　are　obliged　to　pull　down　your　own　hypothesis
of　material　Substance；　and　positively　to　deny　the　real　existence
of　any　part　of　the　universe。　And　so　you　are　plunged　into　the
deepest　and　most　deplorable　scepticism　that　ever　man　was。　Tell
me；　Hylas；　is　it　not　as　I　say？

　　　　　。　I　agree　with　you。　　was　no　more
than　an　hypothesis；　and　a　false　and　groundless　one　too。　I　will　no
longer　spend　my　breath　in　defence　of　it。　But　whatever　hypothesis
you　advance；　or　whatsoever　scheme　of　things　you　introduce　in　its
stead；　I　doubt　not　it　will　appear　every　whit　as　false：　let　me　but
be　allowed　to　question　you　upon　it。　That　is；　suffer　me　to　serve
you　in　your　own　kind；　and　I　warrant　it　shall　conduct　you　through
as　many　perplexities　and　contradictions；　to　the　very　same　state
of　scepticism　that　I　myself　am　in　at　present。

　　　　　。　I　assure　you；　Hylas；　I　do　not　pretend　to　frame　any
hypothesis　at　all。　I　am　of　a　vulgar　cast；　simple　enough　to
believe　my　senses；　and　leave　things　as　I　find　them。　To　be　plain；
it　is　my　opinion　that　the　real　things　are　those　very　things　I
see；　and　feel；　and　perceive　by　my　senses。　These　I　know；　and；
finding　they　answer　all　the　necessities　and　purposes　of　life；
have　no　reason　to　be　solicitous　about　any　other　unknown　beings。　A
piece　of　sensible　bread；　for　instance；　would　stay　my　stomach
better　than　ten　thousand　times　as　much　of　that　insensible；
unintelligible；　real　bread　you　speak　of。　It　is　likewise　my
opinion　that　colours　and　other　sensible　qualities　are　on　the
｛230｝　objects。　I　cannot　for　my　life　help　thinking　that　snow　is
white；　and　fire　hot。　You　indeed；　who　by　　and　fire　mean
certain　external；　unperceived；　unperceiving　substances；　are　in
the　right　to　deny　whiteness　or　heat　to　be　affections　inherent　in
。　But　I；　who　understand　by　those　words　the　things　I　see　and
feel；　am　obliged　to　think　like　other　folks。　And；　as　I　am　no
sceptic　with　regard　to　the　nature　of　things；　so　neither　am　I　as
to　their　existence。　That　a　thing　should　be　really　perceived　by　my
senses；　and　at　the　same　time　not　really　exist；　is　to　me　a　plain
contradiction；　since　I　cannot　prescind　or　abstract；　even　in
thought；　the　existence　of　a　sensible　thing　from　its　being
perceived。　Wood；　stones；　fire；　water；　flesh；　iron；　and　the　like
things；　which　I　name　and　discourse　of；　are　things　that　I　know。
And　I　should　not　have　known　them　but　that　I　perceived　them　by　my
senses；　and　things　perceived　by　the　senses　are　immediately
perceived；　and　things　immediately　perceived　are　ideas；　and　ideas
cannot　exist　without　the　mind；　their　existence　therefore　consists
in　being　perceived；　when；　therefore；　they　are　actually　perceived
there　can　be　no　doubt　of　their　existence。　Away　then　with　all　that
scepticism；　all　those　ridiculous　philosophical　doubts。　What　a
jest　is　it　for　a　philosopher　to　question　the　existence　of
sensible　things；　till　he　hath　it　proved　to　him　from　the　veracity
of　God；　or　to　pretend　our　knowledge　in　this　point　falls　short　of
intuition　or　demonstration！　I　might　as　well　doubt　of　my　own
being；　as　of　the　being　of　those　things　I　actually　see　and　feel。

　　　　　。　Not　so　fast；　Philonous：　you　say　you　cannot　conceive
how　sensible　things　should　exist　without　the　mind。　Do　you　not？

　　　　　。　I　do。

　　　　　。　Supposing　you　were　annihilated；　cannot　you　conceive
it　possible　that　things　perceivable　by　sense　may　still　exist？

　　　　　。　　can；　but　then　it　must　be　in　another　mind。　When　I
deny　sensible　things　an　existence　out　of　the　mind；　I　do　not　mean
my　mind　in　particular；　but　all　minds。　Now；　it　is　plain　they　have
an　existence　exterior　to　my　mind；　since　I　find　them　by　experience
to　be　independent　of　it。　There　is　therefore　some　other　Mind
wherein　they　exist；　during　the　intervals　between　the　times　of
｛231｝　my　perceiving　them：　as　likewise　they　did　before　my　birth；
and　would　do　after　my　supposed　annihilation。　And；　as　the　same　is
true　with　regard　to　all　other　finite　created　spirits；　it
necessarily　follows　there　is　an　；　which
knows　and　comprehends　all　things；　and　exhibits　them　to　our　view
in　such　a　manner；　and　according　to　such　rules；　as