three dialogues-第14节

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that　the　｛223｝　immediate　objects　existed　without　the　mind；　then
that　they　are　archetypes；　then　causes；　next　instruments；　then
occasions：　lastly　；　which　being　interpreted
proves　。　So　Matter　comes　to　nothing。　What　think　you；
Hylas；　is　not　this　a　fair　summary　of　your　whole　proceeding？

　　　　　。　Be　that　as　it　will；　yet　I　still　insist　upon　it；　that
our　not　being　able　to　conceive　a　thing　is　no　argument　against　its
existence。

　　　　　。　That　from　a　cause；　effect；　operation；　sign；　or　other
circumstance；　there　may　reasonably　be　inferred　the　existence　of　a
thing　not　immediately　perceived；　and　that　it　were　absurd　for　any
man　to　argue　against　the　existence　of　that　thing；　from　his　having
no　direct　and　positive　notion　of　it；　I　freely　own。　But；　where
there　is　nothing　of　all　this；　where　neither　reason　nor　revelation
induces　us　to　believe　the　existence　of　a　thing；　where　we　have　not
even　a　relative　notion　of　it；　where　an　abstraction　is　made　from
perceiving　and　being　perceived；　from　Spirit　and　idea：　lastly；
where　there　is　not　so　much　as　the　most　inadequate　or　faint　idea
pretended　to　　I　will　not　indeed　thence　conclude　against　the
reality　of　any　notion；　or　existence　of　anything；　but　my　inference
shall　be；　that　you　mean　nothing　at　all；　that　you　employ　words　to
no　manner　of　purpose；　without　any　design　or　signification
whatsoever。　And　I　leave　it　to　you　to　consider　how　mere　jargon
should　be　treated。

　　　　　。　To　deal　frankly　with　you；　Philonous；　your　arguments
seem　in　themselves　unanswerable；　but　they　have　not　so　great　an
effect　on　me　as　to　produce　that　entire　conviction；　that　hearty
acquiescence；　which　attends　demonstration。　I　find　myself
relapsing　into　an　obscure　surmise　of　I　know　not　what；　。

　　　　　。　But；　are　you　not　sensible；　Hylas；　that　two　things
must　concur　to　take　away　all　scruple；　and　work　a　plenary　assent
in　the　mind；？　Let　a　visible　object　be　set　in　never　so　clear　a
light；　yet；　if　there　is　any　imperfection　in　the　sight；　or　if　the
eye　is　not　directed　towards　it；　it　will　not　be　distinctly　seen。
And　though　a　demonstration　be　never　so　well　grounded　and　fairly
proposed；　yet；　if　there　is　withal　a　stain　of　prejudice；　or　a
wrong　bias　on　the　understanding；　can　it　be　expected　on　a　sudden
to　perceive　clearly；　and　adhere　firmly　to　the　truth？　No；　there　is
need　of　time　and　pains：　the　attention　must　be　awakened　and
detained　by　a　frequent　repetition　of　the　same　thing　placed　oft　in
the　same；　oft　in　different　lights。　I　have　said　it　already；　and
find　I　must　still　repeat　and　inculcate；　that　it　is　an
unaccountable　licence　｛224｝　you　take；　in　pretending　to　maintain
you　know　not　what；　for　you　know　not　what　reason；　to　you　know　not
what　purpose。　Can　this　be　paralleled　in　any　art　or　science；　any
sect　or　profession　of　men？　Or　is　there　anything　so　barefacedly
groundless　and　unreasonable　to　be　met　with　even　in　the　lowest　of
common　conversation？　But；　perhaps　you　will　still　say；　Matter　may
exist；　though　at　the　same　time　you　neither　know　
by　；　or　by　its　。　This　indeed　is　surprising；
and　the　more　so　because　it　is　altogether　voluntary　＇and　of　your
own　head＇；＇6＇　you　not　being　led　to　it　by　any　one　reason；　for　I
challenge　you　to　shew　me　that　thing　in　nature　which　needs　Matter
to　explain　or　account　for　it。

　　　　　。　　of　things　cannot　be　maintained　without
supposing　the　existence　of　Matter。　And　is　not　this；　think　you；　a
good　reason　why　I　should　be　earnest　in　its　defence？

　　　　　。　The　reality　of　things！　What　things？　sensible　or
intelligible？

　　　　　。　Sensible　things。

　　　　　。　My　glove　for　example？

　　　　　。　That；　or　any　other　thing　perceived　by　the　senses。

　　　　　。　But　to　fix　on　some　particular　thing。　Is　it　not　a
sufficient　evidence　to　me　of　the　existence　of　this　；　that
I　see　it；　and　feel　it；　and　wear　it？　Or；　if　this　will　not　do；　how
is　it　possible　I　should　be　assured　of　the　reality　of　this　thing；
which　I　actually　see　in　this　place；　by　supposing　that　some
unknown　thing；　which　I　never　did　or　can　see；　exists　after　an
unknown　manner；　in　an　unknown　place；　or　in　no　place　at　all？　How
can　the　supposed　reality　of　that　which　is　intangible　be　a　proof
that　anything　tangible　really　exists？　Or；　of　that　which　is
invisible；　that　any　visible　thing；　or；　in　general　of　anything
which　is　imperceptible；　that　a　perceptible　exists？　Do　but　explain
this　and　I　shall　think　nothing　too　hard　for　you。

　　　　　。　Upon　the　whole；　I　am　content　to　own　the　existence　of
matter　is　highly　improbable；　but　the　direct　and　absolute
impossibility　of　it　does　not　appear　to　me。

　　　　　。　But　granting　Matter　to　be　possible；　yet；　upon　that
account　merely；　it　can　have　no　more　claim　to　existence　than　a
golden　mountain；　or　a　centaur。

　　　　　。　I　acknowledge　it；　but　still　you　do　not　deny　it　is
possible；　and　that　which　is　possible；　for　aught　you　know；　may
actually　exist。

　　　　　。　I　deny　it　to　be　possible；　and　have；　if　I　mistake
not；　｛225｝　evidently　proved；　from　your　own　concessions；　that　it
is　not。　In　the　common　sense　of　the　word　；　is　there　any
more　implied　than　an　extended；　solid；　figured；　moveable
substance；　existing　without　the　mind？　And　have　not　you
acknowledged；　over　and　over；　that　you　have　seen　evident　reason
for　denying　the　possibility　of　such　a　substance？

　　　　　。　True；　but　that　is　only　one　sense　of　the　term
。

　　　　　。　But　is　it　not　the　only　proper　genuine　received
sense？　And；　if　Matter；　in　such　a　sense；　be　proved　impossible；　may
it　not　be　thought　with　good　grounds　absolutely　impossible？　Else
how　could　anything　be　proved　impossible？　Or；　indeed；　how　could
there　be　any　proof　at　all　one　way　or　other；　to　a　man　who　takes
the　liberty　to　unsettle　and　change　the　common　signification　of
words？

　　　　　。　I　thought　philosophers　might　be　allowed　to　speak　more
accurately　than　the　vulgar；　and　were　not　always　confined　to　the
common　acceptation　of　a　term。

　　　　　。　But　this　now　mentioned　is　the　common　received　sense
among　philosophers　themselves。　But；　not　to　insist　on　that；　have
you　not　been　allowed　to　take　Matter　in　what　sense　you　pleased？
And　have　you　not　used　this　privilege　in　the　utmost　extent；
sometimes　entirely　changing；　at　others　leaving　out；　or　putting
into　the　definition　of　it　whatever；　for　the　present；　best　served
your　design；　contrary　to　all　the　known　rules　of　reason　and　logic？
And　hath　not　this　shifting；　unfair　method　of　yours　spun　out　our
dispute　to　an　unnecessary　length；　Matter　having　been　particularly
examined；　and　by　your　own　confession　refuted　in　each　of　those
senses？　And　can　any　more　be　required　to　prove　the　absolute
impossibility　of　a　thing；　than　the　proving　it　impossible　in　every
particular　sense　that　either　you　or　any　one　else　understands　it
in？

　　　　　。　But　I　am　not　so　thoroughly　satisfied　that　you　have
proved　the　impossibility　of　Matter；　in　the　last　most　obscure
abstracted　and　indefinite　sense。

　　　　　。。　When　is　a　thing　shewn　to　be　impossible？

　　　　　。　When　a　repugnancy　is　demonstrated　between　the　ideas
comprehended　in　its　definition。

　　　　　。　But　where　there　are　no　ideas；　there　no　repugnancy
can　be　demonstrated　between　ideas？

　　　　　。　I　agree　with　you。

　　　　　。　Now；　in　that　which　you　call　the　obscure　indefinite
sense　of　the　word　；　it　is　plain；　by　your　own　confession；
there　｛226｝　was　included　no　idea　at　all；　no　sense　except　an
unknown　sense；　which　is　the　same　thing　as　none。　You　are　not；
therefore；　to　expect　I　should　prove　a　repugnancy　between　ideas；
where　there　are　no　ideas；　or　the　impossibility　of　Matter　taken　in
an　　sense；　that　is；　no　sense　at　all。　My　business　was
only　to　shew　you　meant　；　and　this　you　were　brought　to
own。　So　that；　in　all　your　various　senses；　you　have　been　shewed
either　to　mean　nothing　at　all；　or；　if　anything；　an　absurdity。　And
if　this　be　not　sufficient　to　prove　the　impossibility　of　a　thing；
I　desire　you　will　let　me　know　what　is。

　　　　　。　I　acknowledge　you　have　proved　that　Matter　is
impossible；　nor　do　I　see　what　more　can　be　said　in　defence　of　it。
But；　at　the　same　time　that　I　give　up　this；　I　suspect　all　my　other
notions。　For　surely　none　could　be　more　seemingly　evident　than
this　once　was：　and　yet　it　now　seems　as　false　and　absurd　as　ever
it　did　true　before。　But　I　think　we　have　discussed　the　point
sufficiently　for　the　present。　The　remaining　part　of　the　day　I
would　willingly　spend　in　running　over　in　my　thoughts　the　several
heads　of　this　morning's　conversation；　and　tomorrow　shall　be　glad
to　meet　you　here　again　about　the　same　time。

　　　　　。　　will　not　fail　to　attend　you。　｛227｝

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　THE　THIRD　DIALOGUE

　　　　　　Tell　me；　Hylas；＇7＇　what　are　the　fruits　of
yesterday's　meditation？　Has　it　confirmed　you　in　the　same　mind　you
were　in　at　parting？　or　have　you　since　seen　cause　to　change　your
opinion？

　　　　　。　Truly　my　opinion　is　that　all　our　opinions　are　alike
vain　and　uncertain。　What　we　approve　to…day；　we　condemn　to…morrow。
We　keep　a　stir　about　knowledge；　and　spend　our　lives　in　the
pursuit　of　it；　when；　alas　I　we　know　nothing　all　the　while：　nor　do
I　think　it　possible　for　us　ever　t