meditations on first philosophy-第8节
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is would not have been so for any other reason than that it came into my mind that perhaps a God might have endowed me with such a nature that I may have been deceived even concerning things which seemed to me most manifest。 But every time that this preconceived opinion of the sovereign power of a God presents itself to my thought； I am constrained to confess that it is easy to Him； if He wishes it； to cause me to err； even in matters in which I believe myself to have the best evidence。 And； on the other hand； always when I direct my attention to things which I believe myself to perceive very clearly； I am so persuaded of their truth that I let myself break out into words such as these： Let who will deceive me； He can never cause me to be nothing while I think that I am； or some day cause it to be true to say that I have never been； it being true now to say that I am； or that two and three make more or less than five； or any such thing in which I see a manifest contradiction。 And； certainly； since I have no reason to believe that there is a God who is a deceiver； and as I have not yet satisfied myself that there is a God at all； the reason for doubt which depends on this opinion alone is very slight； and so to speak metaphysical。 But in order to be able altogether to remove it； I must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the occasion presents itself； and if I find that there is a God； I must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver； for without a knowledge of these two truths I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything。 And in order that I may have an opportunity of inquiring into this in an orderly way ＇without interrupting the order of meditation which I have proposed to myself； and which is little by little to pass from the notions which I find first of all in my mind to those which I shall later on discover in it＇ it is requisite that I should here divide my thoughts into certain kinds； and that I should consider in which of these kinds there is； properly speaking； truth or error to be found。 Of my thoughts some are； so to speak； images of the things； and to these alone is the title 〃idea〃 properly applied； examples are my thought of a man or of a chimera； of heaven； of an angel； or ＇even＇ of God。 But other thoughts possess other forms as well。 For example in willing； fearing； approving； denying； though I always perceive something as the subject of the action of my mind；16 yet by this action I always add something else to the idea17 which I have of that thing； and of the thoughts of this kind some are called volitions or affections； and others judgments。 Now as to what concerns ideas； if we consider them only in themselves and do not relate them to anything else beyond themselves； they cannot properly speaking be false； for whether I imagine a goat or a chimera； it is not less true that I imagine the one that the other。 We must not fear likewise that falsity can enter into will and into affections； for although I may desire evil things； or even things that never existed； it is not the less true that I desire them。 Thus there remains no more than the judgments which we make； in which I must take the greatest care not o deceive myself。 But the principal error and the commonest which we may meet with in them； consists in my judging that the ideas which are in me are similar or conformable to the things which are outside me； for without doubt if I considered the ideas only as certain modes of my thoughts； without trying to relate them to anything beyond； they could scarcely give me material for error。 But among these ideas； some appear to me to be innate； some adventitious； and others to be formed ＇or invented＇ by myself； for； as I have the power of understanding what is called a thing； or a truth； or a thought； it appears to me that I hold this power from no other source than my own nature。 But if I now hear some sound； if I see the sun； or feel heat； I have hitherto judged that these sensations proceeded from certain things that exist outside of me； and finally it appears to me that sirens； hippogryphs； and the like； are formed out of my own mind。 But again I may possibly persuade myself that all these ideas are of the nature of those which I term adventitious； or else that they are all innate； or all fictitious： for I have not yet clearly discovered their true origin。 And my principal task in this place is to consider； in respect to those ideas which appear to me to proceed from certain objects that are outside me； what are the reasons which cause me to think them similar to these objects。 It seems indeed in the first place that I am taught this lesson by nature； and； secondly； I experience in myself that these ideas do not depend on my will nor therefore on myself￥for they often present themselves to my mind in spite of my will。 Just now； for instance； whether I will or whether I do not will； I feel heat； and thus I persuade myself that this feeling； or at least this idea of heat； is produced in me by something which is different from me； i。e。 by the heat of the fire near which I sit。 And nothing seems to me more obvious than to judge that this object imprints its likeness rather than anything else upon me。 Now I must discover whether these proofs are sufficiently strong and convincing。 When I say that I am so instructed by nature； I merely mean a certain spontaneous inclination which impels me to believe in this connection； and not a natural light which makes me recognise that it is true。 But these two things are very different； for I cannot doubt that which the natural light causes me to believe to be true； as； for example； it has shown me that I am from the fact that I doubt； or other facts of the same kind。 And I possess no other faculty whereby to distinguish truth from falsehood； which can teach me that what this light shows me to be true is not really true； and no other faculty that is equally trustworthy。 But as far as ＇apparently＇ natural impulses are concerned； I have frequently remarked； when I had to make active choice between virtue and vice； that they often enough led me to the part that was worse； and this is why I do not see any reason for following them in what regards truth and error。 And as to the other reason； which is that these ideas must proceed from objects outside me； since they do not depend on my will； I do not find it any the more convincing。 For just as these impulses of which I have spoken are found in me； notwithstanding that they do not always concur with my will； so perhaps there is in me some faculty fitted to produce these ideas without the assistance of any external things； even though it is not yet known by me； just as； apparently； they have hitherto always been found in me during sleep without the aid of any external objects。 And finally； though they did proceed from objects different from myself； it is not a necessary consequence that they should resemble these。 On the contrary； I have noticed that in many cases there was a great difference between the object and its idea。 I find； for example； two completely diverse ideas of the sun in my mind； the one derives its origin from the senses； and should be placed in the category of adventitious ideas； according to this idea the sun seems to be extremely small； but the other is derived from astronomical reasonings； i。e。 is elicited from certain notions that are innate in me； or else it is formed by me in some other manner； in accordance with it the sun appears to be several times greater than the earth。 These two ideas cannot； indeed； both resemble the same sun； and reason makes me believe that the one which seems to have originated directly from the sun itself； is the one which is most dissimilar to it。 All this causes me to believe that until the present time it has not been by a judgment that was certain ＇or premeditated＇； but only by a sort of blind impulse that I believed that things existed outside of； and different from me； which； by the organs of my senses； or by some other method whatever it might be； conveyed these ideas or images to me ＇and imprinted on me their similitudes＇。 But there is yet another method of inquiring whether any of the objects of which I have ideas within me exist outside of me。 If ideas are only taken as certain modes of thought； I recognise amongst them no difference or inequality； and all appear to proceed from me in the same manner； but when we consider them as images； one representing one thing and the other another； it is clear that they are very different one from the other。 There is no doubt that those which represent to me substances are something more； and contain so to speak more objective reality within them ＇that is to say； by representation participate in a higher degree of being or perfection＇ than those that simply represent modes or accidents； and that idea again by which I understand a supreme God； eternal； infinite； ＇immutable＇； omniscient； omnipotent； and Creator of all things which are outside of Himself； has certainly more objective reality in itself than those ideas by which finite substances are represented。 Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must at least be as much reality in the efficient and to
